Problems of COMMUNISM

Report on Eastern Europe

More Sino-Soviet Tensions

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Troubles in Soviet Agriculture

Replies to Soviet Critics

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Problems of COMMUNISM

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Russia, China, and the World: II

EDITORS' NOTE: Continuing our survey of current aspects of Moscow's, Peking's, and world-wide Communist policies, we present below two articles dealing with what might well be the core of recent disagreements between the Soviet Union and Communist China. In tracing the various ramifications of the long-smoldering dispute between the two powers, Mr. Zagoria makes it clear that what we are faced with is not an esoteric doctrinal discussion, but a conflict over strategy, carried on under the guise and through the means of a doctrinal exegesis. Whatever the basic causes of the tension between Moscow and Peking, and whatever the outcome of the current conflict, its very existence— and duration—make it a subject for careful and serious scrutiny. The second article, by Mr. Katona, provides a brief background of Soviet policies in underdeveloped areas.

Sino-Soviet Friction in Underdeveloped Areas

By Donald S. Zagoria

OF THE MANY complex currents agitating the Sino-Soviet alliance, none is potentially more significant, or more fraught with implications for Western policy, than the thinly-veiled struggle now unfolding between the two Communist giants for hegemony and power in the underdeveloped world. The struggle has been in progress for the past three years and still remains unresolved. It has manifested itself in three forms: a dispute over strategy and tactics for the so-called "national liberation movements" in colonial areas; active competition for favor and influence among the newly-independent countries of Asia and Africa, as well as among the countries of Latin America; and a budding rivalry for control of the local Communist movements in all these areas.[1]

While it would admittedly be premature to see in these developments an imminent polarization of world Communist leadership in two rival centers, one for the developed areas and the other for the underdeveloped

A specialist on Chinese communism, Mr. Zagoria is currently at work on a study of Sino-Soviet relations under the auspices of The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. His last contribution to this journal, "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance" (May-June 1960) evoked widespread comment.

[1] Soviet and Chinese Communist writings commonly use the term "colonial and semi-colonial areas" to refer to both former and present colonial countries in Asia and Africa, generally extending it to include the Latin American countries. "Semi-colonial" generally describes countries that are formally independent but which, in Communist eyes, are considered still subject to "imperialist" economic domination.

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sectors of the world, the potential for such a division is unmistakable. There is considerable evidence indicating that Maoist China regards itself as the appointed leader of the revolutionary movement throughout the underdeveloped world[2] and considers its own revolutionary experience and pattern of "socialist construction" more suitable models for these areas than the experience and example of the Soviet Union.[3] There is evidence, also, that the Peking leaders are perturbed by what they regard as a softening of the revolutionary militancy of their Soviet ally;[4] that they fear that Moscow's gradualist, "right" strategy in the colonial and emergent areas is unnecessarily retarding Communist gains there and could, in the long run, lead to a stalemate for the Communist movement as a whole. Finally, there are evidences of Chinese belief that Moscow, in planning worldwide Communist strategy, is putting Soviet objectives ahead of those of Communist China; that the USSR is failing in the fulfillment of its "proletarian internationalist" obligations to render unequivocal support to the national liberation movements, as well as to Communist bloc countries engaged in active disputes with the West; and that the Soviet Union, as the first country of socialism, should share its resources more generously with the less advanced countries in the bloc.

DESPITE these points of friction, it must be emphatically stated at the outset that the Sino-Soviet relationship in underdeveloped areas, as elsewhere, continues to be marked by a powerful if not overriding community of ideology and mutual hostility to the West. The two partners share a common view of the historical processes and socio-economic forces at work in these areas: they both see the same sharpening of tensions between the developed "imperialist" metropolises and their former or present colonies, the same seedbeds of agrarian revolution, the same exploitable contradictions between what they term the "comprador" bourgeoisie serving the interests of foreign imperialism, and the "national" bourgeoisie seeking to gain economic and political independence. They also see the same enemy standing in the way of a succession of revolutionary phases: the national, the "democratic," and finally the "socialist" revolution to be led by the local Communist parties and resulting in the establishment of Communist dictatorships.

These binding elements temper and constrict the struggle between the two partners, but they do not eliminate it. The purpose of the present article is, first and foremost, to provide the available evidence of Sino-Soviet conflict in underdeveloped areas, secondly to analyze the causes of conflict, and finally to discuss its implications for the future. In this effort, the author proposes to attach greater weight to Chinese and Soviet public statements at home than to the two government's outward international behavior, which twists and turns in expedient response to complex developments that the Communist states can neither foresee nor fully control. This method is employed on the assumption that such

[2] In his *On New Democracy* (1940), Mao elaborated a new form of government for the transitional period prior to socialist revolution, claiming it to be valid for all underdeveloped countries. Mao's formula envisaged a government embracing all classes willing to take part in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle, including a part of the capitalist class (the "national bourgeoisie"). This was the theoretical origin of the "four-class strategy" applied by the Chinese Communists in the postwar period, and in November 1949, just after the Communist takeover, Liu Shao-ch'i proclaimed that this strategy was the most appropriate model for "colonial and semi-colonial" countries. Dormant for many years, this claim has now reappeared.

Moscow, however, has been consistently reluctant to endorse Mao's theories or Chinese experience as models for these countries. As early as 1952, Y. Zhukov wrote that "it would be risky to regard the Chinese revolution as some kind of 'stereotype' for people's democratic revolution in other countries of Asia." Recent Soviet writing on the colonial question has shown a similar reluctance even to discuss, much less endorse, Peking's pretensions in this regard.

[3] Since the initiation of the "great leap forward" and the commune program in 1958, the Chinese have broadly hinted that these programs, based on the massive exploitation of labor power and the development of small-scale industry, are more relevant for underdeveloped countries building socialism than the Soviet model with its emphasis on the maximum exploitation of technology and the development of large-scale industry. The Chinese press has warned against worshiping foreign experience (*i.e.*, presumably that of the Soviet Union), and has stated explicitly that the tasks and forms of socialist construction in countries with large peasant populations and feudal remnants would differ considerably from those in Europe. See, for example, Ch'en Po-ta in the July 16, 1958 issue of *Red Flag*. In sharp contrast, the Russians have continued to emphasize the universal "laws" of socialist construction based largely on Soviet experience and claimed to be valid for all countries building socialism.

[4] Several Yugoslav academicians, one of whom spent two years in China, told this writer that the Chinese Communists cannot understand why so much emphasis is placed on raising living standards in the Communist bloc countries of Europe. They further indicated that the Chinese believe that the USSR, in seeking to raise its own living standards, is defaulting on its obligations to the less advanced bloc countries. At the Chinese Communist Writers' Congress in July 1960, there were pointed warnings against "bourgeois theories of human nature" which deny the class struggle and revolution and "spread illusions about imperialism." For an analysis of the anti-Soviet overtones of the Congress, see Ernest Kux, "The Chinese Writers' Congress," *Thought* (Delhi, India), October 15, 1960. (The article first appeared in the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*.)

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statements, particularly those appearing in the key party journals, provide the best single guide to Soviet and Chinese Communist strategic thinking.[5]

Global and "Colonial" Strategy

The controversy over strategy in underdeveloped areas forms a critical part of the larger debate which Moscow and Peking have been waging more or less openly since 1957-58 over worldwide Communist strategy and tactics. This larger debate originated in divergent evaluations of the degree to which Soviet advances in weapons development in the fall of 1957 altered the East-West balance of power in favor of the Communist bloc. The essence of the Chinese view was that these advances gave the bloc a decisive strategic superiority which, combined with its growing economic power, dictated a more militant and revolutionary worldwide Communist posture accepting the risk of local wars with the West.[6] Such wars, the Chinese contended, were "inevitable" in any event since the West would intervene to maintain or restore the status quo in the Middle East, Africa, Asia or Latin America, and the Communist bloc would be obligated to support the anti-Western governments or "liberation movements." But this sort of Communist "brinksmanship," Peking argued, would involve only a minimal risk of global nuclear war because the West, fully aware of Soviet strategic superiority and the rapid deterioration of its own position, would have no alternative but to accept local defeats.

The Russians apparently differed with the Chinese on the extent to which the East-West strategic balance had been altered, and they certainly differed with them on the policy implications. No Soviet leader or authoritative journal ever endorsed or even commented on Mao's much-publicized slogan, "the East wind prevails over the West wind," or on Peking's boasts that "the forces of socialism are overwhelmingly superior to those of imperialism."[7] The more cautiously qualified language used by the Soviets suggested recognition that their military lead might not be permanent, that in any case Western military and economic strength was still formidable, and therefore that the strategy advocated by Mao was too risky.[8] Since the West would be deterred—perhaps even more than the USSR—by the obvious risks of a general nuclear war, communism could triumph, albeit more slowly, by following a gradualist strategy. This strategy, with Soviet deterrent power as a backdrop, would be keyed to the maximum exploitation of the growing economic might of the USSR and of nationalist and neutralist sentiment in various parts of the world.[9]

With specific regard to Communist strategy in colonial areas, the Chinese have been much more pessimistic than the Russians—particularly since 1959—about the chances of making gains peacefully. Adhering to the traditional Leninist-Stalinist view that colonial areas can emancipate themselves from imperialist rule only by resort to violence, Peking has stressed the importance of "wars of national liberation" (*e.g.*, as in Algeria) and the "duty" of the Communist bloc to aid and support the liberation struggles even at the risk of involve-

[5] As A. M. Halpern states in *The Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism*, The RAND Corporation, July 1960, "In a certain sense I would even be willing to say that during this period (November 1957-May 1960) Chinese statements have been a more reliable guide to their underlying calculations than the record of their behavior in international affairs has been. An analysis based on their behavior alone yields a picture of inconsistency and of severe and sudden fluctuations. There is a tendency to account for these often in terms of the immediate tactical requirements of the situations that the Chinese have had to deal with. This procedure risks overlooking the connectedness of concurrent actions in different areas. . . . *The communications record provides evidence throughout the period concerning the development of a total design involving the future of the countries* (of the Asian area) as a whole."

[6] To this writer's knowledge, the only published work analyzing this critical shift in Chinese thinking in the fall of 1957 is Mr. Halpern's study cited above. Mr. Halpern writes that "at the root of this shift was the Chinese conviction that a decisive shift in the world balance of power, symbolized by Sputnik I, had occurred."

[7] See Yu Chao-li, "The Forces of the New Are Bound to Defeat the Forces of Decay," *Red Flag*, No. 6, Aug. 16, 1958.

[8] While Khrushchev seemed to believe that Soviet development of a successful ICBM gave the USSR an absolute deterrent, it was another question whether the USSR had or would soon achieve a sufficient margin of military and economic superiority over the West to justify a high-risk strategy. Khrushchev has never claimed that the overall strength of the Communist bloc exceeds that of the West, nor that the international situation has reached a "new turning point" as the result of Soviet weapons development. This latter phrase was coined by Mao in November 1957 and reiterated in the Chinese press. While Chinese spokesmen have repeatedly asserted that the strength of socialism exceeds the strength of imperialism, the Russians continue to adhere to the more conservative and ambiguous formulation that there has been a shift in the balance of forces between East and West "in favor of socialism."

[9] It would, however, be erroneous to believe that the Russians have accepted *in toto* the concept of mutual deterrence widely prevalent in the West. As one writer points out, "a prolonged state of mutual deterrence can be acceptable to the USSR only if its political effects are less than perfectly symmetrical: a usable residue of intimidation must remain." See A. L. Horelick, *Deterrence and Surprise Attack in Soviet Strategic Thought*, The RAND Corporation, July 1, 1960.

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ment in local wars with the Western powers. As for the ex-colonial countries already enjoying independence, the Chinese have strongly implied that there is slight possibility of advancing Communist aims through the existing "national bourgeois" leaderships in these countries, and that the most effective means of moving the revolution forward lies in encouraging "armed struggle" by the local Communist movements, leading to civil war. Peking has also advocated local military responses by the Communist bloc in the event that such action results in Western military intervention.

Moscow, on the other hand, seems to regard increasing Soviet economic power—and not armed violence—as the key to long-range Communist strategy in these areas. The Russians have been cautious in their support of wars of national liberation and have minimized the need for local "armed struggle." They have generally been more optimistic than the Chinese about the practical value of continuing to exploit the "national bourgeois" governments, and they have emphasized Soviet might as a deterrent to Western military intervention.

The Question of Timing

The central issue in this strategy debate has been one of timing. The controversy over cooperation with bourgeois nationalism has never turned on *whether* to form temporary alliances with it, but on *when* to form them and, more important, when to end them. The Chinese seem to fear that time is not necessarily on the Communist side in all colonial and politically emergent areas; that the "liberation" movements may falter or be retarded without strong bloc support; and that the newly independent governments may stabilize themselves and eventually gravitate back into the Western camp unless increased pressure is put upon them. These apprehensions, coupled with a more sanguine view than Moscow's of the dangers of a global nuclear war, have led the Chinese to advocate a return to "left" strategy: they have, in fact, revived Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" and applied it to the "colonial" areas.[10] The Russians, on the other hand, appear genuinely convinced that time is working to the Communists' advantage, that in the long run the economic race with the West will be decisive, and that it is needless to assume the risks inherent in a more aggressive strategy.

To define the central issue as one of timing is not simply to say that the Chinese insist upon, while the Russians oppose, immediate action to foment liberation wars or revolutionary assaults on national bourgeois governments. The issue of timing is actually far more complex, hinging upon questions of how much support can be given to "just" wars of liberation without marring current Soviet diplomatic objectives and incurring the risk of war with the West; how much pressure can and should be exerted by local Communist movements on particular nationalist governments and parties at a particular time; to what extent ultimate Communist goals should be subordinated to the tactical exigencies of alliance with the nationalists and up to what point the latter should be allowed to lead the revolution in its early stages.

With regard to this last question, the Russians and Chinese have stated sharply opposed views. The Chinese reject the Soviet thesis that hegemony can be entrusted to the national bourgeoisie in the post-liberation "democratic" phase of the revolution. The "key" to ensuring a rapid, uninterrupted transition to the socialist revolution, said Liu Shao-ch'i in 1959,[11] "is the firm grasping of hegemony *in the democratic revolution* by the proletariat through the Communist party." (Author's italics) In apparent reply to such views, the dean of Soviet experts on the "East," Y. Zhukov, cited Lenin's declaration that *"at the beginning* of any national movement," not the Communists but "the bourgeoisie assumes the role of hegemony."[12] (Author's italics) Zhukov argued that the "main task" in many Asian and African countries for a "comparatively long period" would be the struggle not against capitalism (*i.e.,* the bourgeoisie) but against medieval remnants (*i.e.,* the landlords). Hence, there was a basis for "lengthy cooperation" between the workers and the "progressive" segment of the national bourgeoisie; the day of reckoning could be deferred.

The Chinese position is evidently inspired by apprehension that if the nationalist parties are permitted to command the democratic revolution, local Communist chances of gaining power will be deferred and could even be lost entirely. Recollection of the disastrous outcome of the Chinese party's own "right" strategy

[10] Since 1958 the Chinese have revived the concept of "permanent revolution" both internally (there should be no long gaps between the domestic stages of building communism) and internationally (there can be no long gaps between the "democratic" and "socialist" revolutions in non-Communist countries). Liu Shao-ch'i, for example, in a tenth anniversary article, spoke of the need to ensure the rapid, uninterrupted transition to the socialist revolution. See *The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China,* Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1959. For the specific application to the "colonial" revolution, see Wang Chia-hsiang, *Red Flag,* October 1, 1959.

[11] Liu Shao-ch'i, *op. cit.*

[12] Y. Zhukov, "A Significant Factor of Our Times—On Some Questions of the Contemporary National Liberation Movement," *Pravda,* August 26, 1960.

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of collaboration with the Kuomintang in the 1920's strengthens Peking's fears that the nationalist parties —once in firm political control—may turn against and crush the local Communists.[13] The strategic implications of this Chinese view are obvious. In the as yet unliberated countries of Africa, for example, it means that the Communists must seek to win the leading role in the "national" revolutionary movements; and where political independence has already been won under bourgeois nationalist leadership, it implies that the Communists must seek to displace the nationalists at the helm of the revolution's further phases.

The pivotal importance of timing is underscored by Peking's denial that the national bourgeoisie can complete the "democratic" revolution—implying that the Communists must take power to complete it for them—as opposed to Moscow's contention that the national bourgeoisie has not yet exhausted its usefulness for this purpose. Moreover, the Chinese claim that state capitalism in the newly independent countries has reached a dead end, whereas Moscow maintains that it is "playing a progressive role."[14]

The Moscow conference of November-December 1960 evidently sought to resolve these differences by elaborating a new concept of "national democracy" as a transitional form of government prior to the achievement of "socialism." This compromise formula, for which Cuba was the model, embodies concessions to the viewpoints of both the gradualist Russians and the "left" Chinese. It partially satisfies Moscow by continuing to avoid premature demands that might overturn the Soviet diplomatic applecart in neutralist countries; at the same time, it partially satisfies the Chinese by implying an intensification of local Communist pressures on Nasser, Kassim, and other "bourgeois nationalist" leaders in order to secure "broad democratic rights" (greater freedom of action for the Communists), "participation in shaping government policy," and faster domestic social and economic reforms. It is nevertheless unlikely that such a semantic compromise can bridge the gap. The Russians still seem disposed to play a cautious game until such time as they may overtake the West in the economic race; the Chinese are in a hurry.

Aid of Liberation Struggles

High on the list of Chinese objections to the present Soviet strategy is the charge that the Russians are not giving sufficient support to revolutionary nationalist movements engaged in wars of colonial liberation. Algeria is an obvious case in point. Although the Russians, apparently bending before Chinese pressure since the collapse of the summit, have moved toward an ambiguous *de facto* recognition of the FLN, it is nonetheless remarkable that they have done so little to aid this classical colonial rebellion.[15]

At the January 1959 Sino-Soviet conference in Moscow, one Chinese representative expressed an annoyance that was typical of numerous Chinese statements on this issue, when he warned:

. . . not to express sympathy with and give assistance to the peoples of countries which are the victims of imperialist aggression and are fighting heroically to win and preserve their national independence, means to lack a sincere desire for the preservation and strengthening of peace.[16]

Essentially the same charge was again implied in April 1960, when Peking warned that all "revolutionary" Leninists should support colonial revolutions "without the slightest reservation."[17] In fact, one Chinese journal went so far as to declare that without this support the world revolution "may not finally emerge victorious."[18]

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[13] In criticizing Soviet strategy, the Chinese have obliquely referred several times to the disaster that overtook their party in 1927. See Liu Shao-ch'i, *op. cit.*

[14] *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism,* the present basic Soviet doctrinal textbook, states that "in the countries of the East, state capitalism in its present form is not a tool of the imperialist monopolies; on the contrary, it stimulates an anti-imperialist movement and is objectively directed against the expansion of these monopolies in the East. . . . All this is basis for concluding that state capitalism in the countries of the East is playing a progressive role." On the contrary, *Red Flag* (October 1, 1959) declared that by following the road of state capitalism, the newly independent states "can hardly free themselves from the oppression and exploitation of imperialism and feudalism."

[15] The Soviet and Chinese lines on the Algerian rebellion have been at marked variance since October 1959, when Khrushchev first indicated cautious support for de Gaulle's program of self-determination. This speech marked a sharp turn in the Soviet line, which had hitherto specifically rejected de Gaulle's plan. The Chinese press, on the other hand, has continued to voice skepticism about de Gaulle's intentions and to urge a continuation of military activities as the only way to "liberate" Algeria. For more detail, see the author's "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1960.

[16] See remarks by Hsun Fu in the Soviet journal *International Affairs,* No. 3, 1959, p. 84.

[17] Lu Ting-yi, "Unite Under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner!" (report delivered at meeting of the CCP Central Committee in Peking, April 22, 1960). Reproduced in English translation in *Long Live Leninism,* Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1960.

[18] *Kuo-chi Wen-t'i Yen-chiu* (International Studies) Peking, No. 5, May 3, 1960.

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The Moscow Declaration of December 1960[19] deferred to the Chinese viewpoint in calling it a Communist "duty" to render the "fullest moral and material assistance" to "peoples fighting to free themselves from imperialist and colonial tyranny." But while the Chinese explicitly interpreted this afterward as a commitment to support not only political but also armed struggles of colonial emancipation, East German Party Secretary Ulbricht, undoubtedly speaking for Moscow, flatly reaffirmed that "we are opposed to colonial wars."[20]

No one with any sense of history would maintain, of course, that Moscow has permanently renounced armed struggle as a means of seizing power. But in adjusting its strategy to the thermonuclear era, it has—for strategic reasons—put overwhelming stress on political and economic forms of struggle for the foreseeable future.[21] This emphasis seems to be motivated by fear that civil war in any crucially contested area may confront the USSR with a choice between two equally distasteful alternatives: either to take sides with the Communist or pro-Communist group, thus risking Western intervention and a local war, or to stand passively by while the armed uprising is crushed.

In *Foundations of Marxism-Leninism,* the new bible of Communist revolutionary strategy issued in October 1959 to replace Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism,* the concept of "peaceful revolution" was carried even a step beyond the formulation at the 20th CPSU Congress. At the congress, Khrushchev had dwelt on the increasing possibilities offered by the parliamentary path to socialism. *Foundations of Marxism-Leninism* went farther in declaring that the non-violent transition to socialism "has great advantages" because it permits a "radical reorganization of social life" with the "least sacrifices on the part of the workers."

Later pronouncements in the Soviet press tied in this new formulation with the bigger problem of East-West coexistence. Early in 1960, a Soviet journal stated quite frankly that in countries where conditions are "ripe" for social change, such change must be brought about in a manner that would not lead "to military clashes of the two antipodal systems."[22] As to how this might be achieved, the journal went on to say:

. . . this situation opens up new, unprecedented horizons for diplomacy. As methods of violence and *Diktat* are relegated to the background, methods and negotiation assume even greater importance.

Peking has strongly assailed such an assignment of priority to diplomacy and non-violent struggle, standing firm on Lenin's prediction that revolutionary violence will be necessary in a majority of cases because no ruling class ever gives way without a struggle.[23] The Chinese do not, of course, argue that revolutionary violence is the *only* means of advancing the socialist revolution. They appear to believe, however, that a peaceful transition to power is possible only in the rare circumstances when "in a given country a certain local political power is already encircled by revolutionary forces, or when in the world a certain capitalist country is already encircled by socialism."[24]

The Moscow Declaration of last December represents in this case, as in others, an attempt to smooth over Sino-Soviet differences. On the one hand, it cites the classic Communist "theoretical" justification for violence—namely, that "Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily." On the other hand, it asserts that "the Marxist-Leninist party seeks to achieve the socialist revolution by peaceful means." As between the Soviet insistence that a "peaceful transition"—albeit ambiguously defined—is increasingly likely, and the Chinese insistence that violent transition is increasingly likely, the document attempts to steer a noncommittal middle course. It concludes:

The actual possibility of the one or the other way of transition to socialism in each individual country depends on the concrete historical conditions.

Response to Western "Intervention"

Not only do the Chinese urge increased emphasis on local "armed struggle" in the "colonial" areas, but they also urge armed responses to any Western military intervention in these areas. In Peking's view, the very fact

[19] The declaration appeared in *Pravda,* December 6, 1960.

[20] See *Red Flag,* December 15, 1960, which specifically interprets this passage of the Declaration as meaning support for "armed struggle." For Ulbricht's speech, which sheds considerable light on Sino-Soviet disagreements at the Moscow meeting, see *Neues Deutschland,* December 18, 1960.

[21] Zhukov, for example, did not mention armed struggle at all in his lead article on the January 1959 joint Sino-Soviet "seminar" on the "colonial question" in Moscow. See "The Bankruptcy of the Imperialist Colonial System and International Relations," *International Affairs,* No. 3, 1959.

[22] *Ibid.,* No. 4, 1960.

[23] *Long Live Leninism, op. cit.,* p. 36.

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 39. Such reasoning might explain why the Chinese Communists seem to pursue a more patient strategy in small colonial countries in close proximity to China, *e.g.,* Cambodia and Nepal. It would also help to explain why they are less optimistic about the possibilities of peaceful revolution in countries such as the UAR, India, Indonesia and Iraq, which are either larger or not "encircled by socialism."

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that Soviet military might deters the Western powers from contemplating global war makes it all the more likely that they will undertake "last-gasp" local wars, particularly in the colonial areas.[25] This contrasts sharply with the USSR's position that its deterrent power discourages Western intervention anywhere, and that local wars are therefore becoming less rather than more likely. Thus, *Kommunist* wrote in late 1960 (No. 13) that it is "really possible to prevent the interference of world reaction in the course of a revolution, at least in the form of open intervention."

The Moscow conference clearly resulted in a stand-off on this question. The Declaration set forth in the same breath both the Chinese view that the West would continue to start local wars and the Russian view that such wars could be deterred:

Experience shows that it is possible to combat effectively the local wars started by the imperialists, and to stamp out successfully the hotbeds of such wars.

A concrete test of the divergent Sino-Soviet positions on this issue was provided by the dispatch of United States and British troops to Lebanon and Jordan in the summer of 1958, following the Iraqi coup of July which brought General Kassim to power. The Anglo-American action posed a crucial dilemma for Khrushchev—to use force, if necessary, to keep Kassim's revolutionary regime in power, or to back away in the face of American intervention in a critical area. As Mr. Richard Lowenthal earlier pointed out in these pages,[26] Khrushchev sought to escape this dilemma by issuing his "panic" appeal for an emergency summit meeting at the United Nations. Official Soviet statements between July 15 and 23 stressed the necessity of urgent and vigorous international measures to curb the Western "aggression." Although the specter of unilateral Soviet military intervention was raised, there was every indication that the Russians were not prepared to intervene militarily.

The Chinese Communists, on the contrary, gave numerous indications, both during the critical period of July 15-23 and well into the fall of 1958, that they disapproved Khrushchev's tactics and favored a vigorous military response to the Western intervention. *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily) editorials on July 21-22 did not endorse Khrushchev's July 19 emergency appeal for a summit meeting. The second of these, moreover, stated that the West was making sport of the UN charter "without meeting counterblows," and seemed to suggest outside contributions of arms and "volunteer armies," presumably by the Soviet bloc, to protect the Iraqi government and drive the Americans from Lebanon. Drawing a contrast between the "war for independence" in Iraq and Lebanon and the American War of Independence, the Chinese party organ pointedly remarked:

What is especially worthy of comparison is that the American war of independence relied greatly on the support of foreign armed forces. The Americans appealed for aid to Canada, Ireland, and France and obtained important military assistance from France, Holland, and Spain. . . . The French and Europeans formed *volunteer armies* and went to America to take part in the war. Yet today both the struggle of the Lebanese people and the victory of the Iraqi people depend almost exclusively on their own efforts. We want to ask: *Why are they not entitled to the international assistance which the American war of independence secured?* Who dares to say that the French who supported America in those days were aggressors. . . ? *(Author's italics)*

There is little doubt that Khrushchev's hurried visit to Peking on July 21 was at least partially concerned with the Middle East crisis and how to resolve it. Within five days following his departure for Moscow, *Jen-min jih-pao* carried two editorials which again implicitly rebuked the Soviet leader for his mild response to the American-British intervention. On August 8, for example, the paper declared:

. . . some soft-hearted advocates of peace naively believe that in order to relax tension at all costs the enemy must not be provoked. . . . Some groundlessly conclude that peace can be gained only where there is no armed resistance against the attacks of the imperialists and colonialists . . .

The Chinese editorials need only be compared with those which appeared in *Pravda* on August 5-6, soon after the Mao-Khrushchev meeting. The Soviet party organ stressed the deterrent power of the USSR and plainly implied that the Soviet posture—without risking war—had forestalled Western intervention in Iraq itself, and would soon induce the withdrawal of US and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan.

Role of the "National Bourgeoisie"

As already indicated, another point at issue between Moscow and Peking has been whether the "national bourgeois" leaderships in the newly independent countries can continue to play a progressive role or, on the

[25] The Chinese journal *World Knowledge* wrote on December 5, 1957, that the US strategy of massive retaliation had failed and was now being supplemented to take into consideration the fact that "local war could occur more often, have greater possibility, and become more necessary." See also *Long Live Leninism, op. cit.*, p. 12.

[26] *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1959.

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contrary, have exhausted their usefulness. Moscow takes a much more optimistic view of the possibilities of further Communist gains through collaboration with these leaderships than do the Chinese, who see in this policy grave risk of imperialist restoration.[27]

In August and September 1959, the *World Marxist Review* published a lengthy "exchange of views" on "The National Bourgeoisie and the Liberation Movement." There were contributions from 16 Communist Parties, including two from the Soviet party, but none representing the views of the Chinese Communists appeared—in itself an indication of growing Sino-Soviet disagreement on this question. Although somewhat equivocal, the principal Soviet spokesman, Levinson, generally took the line that further progress could be made via collaboration with the national bourgeoisie. The anti-imperialist and anti-feudal movement could, he said, be carried further "within the framework of the existing regimes," despite bourgeois nationalist "vacillations." Moreover, the final outcome of the revolutionary dilemma in these countries would be decided not only by the strength of the local Communist movements, but also by the course of peaceful competition between East and West. In short, the infant nationalist governments would gradually gravitate toward the socialist camp as the USSR overtakes the West economically.

Chinese objections to this gradualist line emerged most forcefully on October 1, 1959, the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic and the occasion of another Khrushchev visit to Peking. Writing in the anniversary issue of *Red Flag*, Wang Chia-hsiang, a secretary of the CPC, voiced impatience with the nationalist leaderships of some Asian and African countries, warning that at any moment they might slide back into the imperialist camp and, in any case could never free themselves from imperialist bondage. Declared Wang:

The capitalist class in power in these states [in Asia and Africa] is exercising certain historically progressive functions. . . . In varying degrees it may travel a distance along the road of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. . . . However, the bourgeois class is, after all, a bourgeois class. As long as it controls political power, it cannot adopt a resolute, revolutionary line and can adopt only a wavering, conciliatory line. As a result, these states can never expect to effect the transition to socialism, *nor indeed can they thoroughly fulfill the task of the nationalist, democratic revolution.* It should be added that even the national independence they have won is by no means secure. . . . [The bourgeois nationalists] may even pave the way for the emergence of bureaucratic capitalism, which is an ally of imperialism and feudalism. . . . *In the final analysis, they can never escape from the control and bondage of imperialism.* (Author's italics)

The Moscow Declaration of December 1960 failed to provide any unequivocal ruling on the "progressive" or "reactionary" character of the national bourgeoisie. Rather it sought to straddle the divergent Soviet and Chinese views by vaguely stating that the national bourgeoisie "retains its capacity" to make further progress in the "democratic" struggle, but that whether or not it will do so "depends on concrete conditions."

Iraq, A Case Study

Sino-Soviet differences over cooperation with the national bourgeoisie were perhaps best illustrated by the two powers' conflicting reactions to developments in Iraq during 1959. Shortly after the March uprising in Mosul, which resulted in a sharp increase of their strength, the Iraqi Communists—evidently believing that they had Kassim's backing or at least were in a position where he could not oppose them—launched a campaign demanding Communist participation in the government and removal of the prohibition against political party activity. Kassim, however, countered these demands in a May Day statement which rejected the Communist bid for cabinet representation and declared that although Iraq was on the road to democratic rule, the time was not ripe for restoration of party activities.

The incipient struggle between Kassim and the Communists apparently arose against the background of a split between a militant wing of the Iraqi party, which favored increased pressure on the government, and a moderate faction which counseled caution until the party had strengthened its organization and discipline. Several reports in the East European Communist press early in 1959 had intimated the existence of such a division, and the fact that they publicized the viewpoint of the moderates rather than of the militants strongly suggesed that it was the former who enjoyed Moscow's support. On July 8-9, the Iraqui Communist Politburo, "after studying present conditions," issued a defiant declaration which seemed to indicate that the militant wing was in the ascendancy. Peking gave prompt publicity to the declaration in its news broadcasts, while Moscow not only pointedly ignored it, but continued to

[27] The controversy over the national bourgeoisie apparently also played a big part in the reported exchange of letters between the Chinese and Soviet parties in the summer of 1960. According to one report, a Soviet letter read at Bucharest in June 1960 "rejects Chinese charges that the CPSU had commenced a flirtation with the national bourgeoisie," and defends such ties with the argument that this fosters neutralism and thereby weakens imperialism. For purported extracts from the letter, see *Deutsche Zeitung*, September 30, 1960.

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voice general approval of the Iraqi government's foreign and domestic policies.[28]

The showdown in Iraq finally came with the Kirkuk uprisings of mid-July. Whether or not the Communists inspired the uprisings, they joined in them and suffered a disastrous setback. The insurrection was quickly put down, and the Communist-infiltrated Popular Resistance Force was disarmed and disbanded. In late July the Communist leadership issued a long *mea culpa* for its "irresponsible acts" and "excessiveness," promising in essence to abandon pressure tactics and cooperate more fully with Kassim. This capitulation no doubt was impelled primarily by the party's realization of the futility of revolutionary tactics, but it may also have been influenced to some degree by Soviet pressure. The Iraqi party's apologia was carried by *Pravda* on August 17, but it never appeared in the Chinese Communist press.

There is no clear evidence that the Chinese, contrary to Soviet wishes, egged on the left wing of the Iraqi party in its abortive revolutionary attempt. But Soviet spokesmen, in the course of more or less open polemics with the Chinese in the summer of 1960, pointedly cited the 1959 tactics of the Iraqi Communists as an example of the issuance of "premature slogans of socialist transformation . . . where conditions for them had not yet matured."[29] They added that the lessons of the Iraqi failure might be "instructive also for some Communist parties of the East and Latin America, if they are faced with basically the same task." In other words, the socialist revolution in these areas should not be rushed.

Friction over Soviet Aid

A key element in current Soviet world strategy is the increasing use of economic and financial aid as a means of weaning the newly independent and uncommitted countries away from Western economic influence and thus inducing tendencies toward political neutralism and eventual alignment with the "socialist camp." As the British economist Alec Nove has suggested, the Soviet leadership appears to believe that in the long run the uncommitted countries will gravitate toward the Communist bloc because "an economically mighty bloc will be far better equipped to supply the needs of the underdeveloped world, to outbid the West, and to disorganize 'capitalist' markets at will."[30]

On the other hand, there have been intimations that the Peking leadership takes a jaundiced view of Soviet aid to the new and underdeveloped countries--at least on the scale on which it has been extended. Three plausible motivations for this attitude suggest themselves. The Chinese may believe that extensive Soviet assistance to the existing bourgeois nationalist regimes will impede rather than hasten the "socialist revolution." They may also believe that, since Communist China lacks the resources to match the Soviet aid effort, it is placed at a serious disadvantage in competing with the Soviet Union for favor and influence. Finally, they might understandably feel that the less advanced countries within the Communist bloc, including China, ought to be given prior claim to Soviet assistance.

Several occurrences last year brought this submerged conflict to the surface. Perhaps the most revealing was an incident that took place during Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's visit to Iraq in April 1960. At a press conference held by Mikoyan, a Chinese correspondent bluntly asked the Soviet leader:

What is the Soviet position on the question of developing the national economy of the Afro-Asian countries, and *how does it differ from the Western position on this question?*

Mikoyan's reply made it evident that he took the question as a provocation:

I can assure the NCNA representative that our position on this question is just as favorable for the Afro-Asian peoples who are building their national economy *as the position of the CPR Government.* We do not regard these countries as raw material appendages of industrially developed countries, as spheres of influence or of capital investment. (Author's italics)

Again, in June 1960, Moscow disseminated a lengthy defense of its aid policy in the form of an article in *International Affairs,* under the title "Soviet Aid—and Its 'Critics'." The "critics" were identified as Western, but it was evident that the writer also had some non-Western critics in mind. He took pains to refute the

[28] The controversy between the "left" and "right" groups in the Iraqi CP was recently brought into the open. The Warsaw *Glos pracy* of January 28, 1961, summarized a recent undated Iraqi Communist document criticizing the "left wing" for "trying to push the party on the road of adventurism" and the "right wing" for "rejecting the revolutionary struggle." The fight, which apparently began early in 1959, appears to hinge on how much pressure should be brought against the government and how soon to strike for power. On February 17, 1959, the Polish paper *Zycie Warszawy* quoted an Iraqi Communist publicist, Aziz Al-Hadj, as saying that his party "does not proclaim the necessity to create a Communist society now" and that "an anti-government conspiracy would be a crime in any Arab state struggling against imperialism, *even if communism were persecuted.*" (Author's italics)

[29] D. Shevlyagin, in *Sovetskaia Rossia,* June 19, 1960.

[30] *Communist Economic Strategy: Soviet Growth and Capabilities,* National Planning Association, Washington, D. C., 1959.

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argument that Soviet assistance to former colonies would impede the revolutionary process—hardly a criticism that had been voiced in the West. He further pointed out that the struggle in the underdeveloped countries would "not be solely, *or chiefly*, a struggle of the proletarians in each country against the bourgeoisie," but would instead be a struggle of all the oppressed countries against "international imperialism." It followed from this that exploitation of anti-colonial nationalism should take precedence over promotion of the class struggle, and therefore the Soviet government was "giving economic and technical assistance to former colonies on *an inter-governmental basis, rendering it to nations, and not to some classes within them.*" (Author's italics). In other words, Moscow repudiated the thesis—presumably advanced by the Chinese—that Soviet aid should be confined exclusively to proletarian revolutionary movements.

Struggle in the Local Parties

Potentially the most significant aspect of Sino-Soviet conflict in underdeveloped areas is the incipient struggle for power between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions in the Communist parties of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In some of the older Asian parties, it is true, there have long been divisions between "right" elements which wanted to postpone the showdown with bourgeois nationalism and "left" elements which sought to hasten it. But as long as Moscow's remained the sole and undisputed voice of world Communist authority, such factionalism was relatively innocuous. What makes the present leftwing splits in some Communist parties so portentous is the fact that the "leftists" now can and do find an ideological rallying point in Peking. So long as the Russians and Chinese continue to vie for influence and to disagree on strategy, such intra-party factionalism cannot be quelled. And if either of the opposing factions manages to wrest control from the other in one or more of these divided parties, the effect can only be to aggravate the strains on the Sino-Soviet axis.[31]

The split in the Indian Communist Party has been so conspicuous that it received wide publicity in the Western press.[32] The "left", pro-Chinese faction, led by B. T. Ranadive, has its strength concentrated largely in West Bengal, Andhra and the Punjab; the "right," pro-Soviet group, led by Ajoy Ghosh and S. A. Dange, seems to hold a tenuous majority among the party rank-and-file; and there is still a third group, led by E. M. S. Namboodiripad, which has sought to remain neutral. The seriousness of the split was evidenced in May 1960 by Ghosh's temporary withdrawal as party leader in favor of Namboodiripad.

Generally speaking, the Ranadive group would like to lead the Indian party in a more or less open revolt against Nehru and the Congress party. While this would probably not mean an actual, immediate attempt to seize power, it would certainly involve a greater resort to strikes and direct action tactics. The leftists are critical of the party's failure in Kerala, where the Communists gained and then lost local government control by electoral processes, and are skeptical of Khrushchev's whole thesis of parliamentary take-over. They are also blatantly pro-Chinese on the border question. According to a competent Indian observer, Ranadive is in close contact with the Chinese Communists and transmits their influence to the party.[33] The rightists, on the other hand, continue to adhere to the parliamentary path to power laid down in the Amritsar Thesis of 1958. While conceding the increasing domestic conservatism of the Congress party, they can point to Nehru's neutralist foreign policy and can argue that the "right" strategy needs more time to come to fruition.

In the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the division is neither so pronounced nor so open, but conflicting pro-Soviet "right" and pro-Chinese "left" tendencies are nevertheless discernible in the pronouncements of high-ranking party leaders. The prevailing policies of the PKI are those of its top leader, Secretary-General D. N. Aidit, whose adherence to a Moscow-oriented strategy of "patience" was clearly evident in an article commemorating the 40th party anniversary last May (*Harian Rajkat*, May 24-25, 1960), which received full publicity in *Pravda*. On the other hand, Sudisman, a member of the party Politburo, writing in *Harian Rajkat* a week later (May 30), presented an almost pure "Chinese" assessment of the international situation, charging that the "imperialists" regard peace merely as an interval between wars and that real peace can be won only through "struggle." Accusing the

[31] For remarks on this jurisdictional question, see Leonard Schapiro, "The Chinese Ally from the Soviet Point of View," paper delivered at the Third International Conference of Sovietologists, held in Tokyo, Japan, week of September 18-25, 1960.

[32] See *Christian Science Monitor*, September 10, 1960; "Indian Communists Divided," *The Times* (London), December 6, 1960; *Times of India*, August 18, 1960; Rajani Mukherje, "Emergence of 'Maoism' in India's Communist party," *The Commoner* (Katmandu, Nepal), August 10, 1960; *The Hindustan Times*, September 2 and 5, 1960, and August 6, 1960.

[33] Mukherje, *op. cit.*

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"revisionists" of fearing both war and revolution, he concluded by quoting Mao's 1958 statement that an imperialist-provoked third world war would only result in several hundred millions more people turning to socialism.[34] Pro-Chinese views have also been expressed by another member of the Politburo, Njoto.

Cuba, The Congo, and Africa

Sino-Soviet conflicts have also produced reverberations in Latin America and Africa. There is some indication of an incipient left-right split in the Cuban Communist Party over an issue which has been a major bone of contention between Moscow and Peking: how fast to move the revolution forward. At a party congress held in Havana last August, party leader Blas Roca refrained from mentioning the ultimate "socialist" goals of the Cuban revolution and stressed instead its anti-imperialist and anti-latifundist objectives. However, another speaker, Anibal Escalante, put noticeably greater stress on the future stages of the revolution. As the Cuban revolution moves forward, it seems likely that, just as in Iraq in the summer of 1959, Sino-Soviet and local intra-party differences over timing will arise.

With regard to the Congo, recent Chinese statements have voiced implied criticism of the Soviet support given in July 1960 to the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the dispatch of a UN force to the Congo. At the time the resolution was under consideration, Soviet propaganda was assailing the UN for procrastination and for not taking firmer action, while the Chinese were taking a quite different tack, accusing the UN of being a U.S.-controlled vehicle for armed intervention.[35] Commenting on the subsequent course of events in the Congo, Chinese newspaper editorials in late November observed with scarcely veiled contempt that "naive people" who "more than four months ago" believed that the United Nations could help the Congolese people were now becoming "fewer and fewer."[36]

Nor is Peking laggard in competing with the Russians for influence in Africa. The sheer scope of Chinese political, economic, and ideological overtures to the emergent African states is impressive. One Western observer reports that of more than 800 foreign groups which travelled to China in 1959 alone, 270 were from Africa—and this figure undoubtedly increased in 1960.[37] Peking radio now broadcasts more extensively to sub-Saharan Africa than Moscow does. At the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, held in Conakry in April 1960, the Chinese delegation was the largest and most active, overshadowing the delegation of the USSR.

The Chinese, significantly, are wooing the most radical African leaders. In May 1960, for example, they played host to Odhiambo Okello, from Kenya, whose militancy led him to an open break with the more responsible nationalist leaders in that British colony.[38] Since Peking's unconcealed cultivation of the most militant African nationalists acutally prejudices its chances of winning the favor of the more conservative African governments and leaders, its pursuit of this policy seems indicative of a willingness to accept temporary sacrifices for the sake of hastening the eventual Communist take-over.

Chinese Communist propaganda aimed at Africa constantly pledges complete support of the African peoples' fight against imperialism and emphasizes the Chinese example as a guide for conducting the liberation struggle. It is quite probable that the Chinese are distributing money, propaganda literature and guerrilla warfare handbooks in many key areas of Africa. An eye-witness report has attested to such activity in the British Cameroons.[39] According to some press reports, the Chinese Communists have granted between 4 and 5.5 million dollars in credits to the Algerian rebels and are said to be providing military instructors to help train the FLN army.[40]

There has already been a direct clash between representatives of Moscow and Peking over African strategy. At the Conakry conference in April, the Soviet and Chinese delegates openly collided over the terms of an economic resolution.[41] The Chinese vigorously opposed a Soviet-approved draft which stated that economic development would be speeded up if the cold war were ended, arguing that such a statement in the resolution would only create the illusion among the Afro-Asian peoples that the imperialists really believed in economic

[34] See "The Fortieth Anniversary of the Indonesian Communist Party," U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, No. 35544, September 28, 1960.
[35] New China News Agency report, August 6, 1960.
[36] *Ta Kung Pao*, November 26 and 28, 1960.
[37] See Fritz Schatten, "Peking's Growing Influence in Africa," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, August 1960.
[38] *Asian Analyst*, June 1960; for a further list of African extreme nationalists and left-wingers entertained in Peking in the past year or two, see *The Interpreter*, September 1960, and the *Economist*, July 16, 1960.
[39] *Daily Telegraph*, November 12, 1960.
[40] *Washington Post and Times Herald*, September 4, 1960.
[41] For comments on the clash, see statement by H. D. Malaviya, Indian member of the secretariat of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council, reported by the Indian news agency PTI, on May 5, 1960.

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development, disarmament and peace. According to the Indian secretary of the conference, the Chinese attitude surprised everybody, "especially the Soviet delegate."

The Future: Harmony or Conflict?

In undertaking to assess the future course of Sino-Soviet relations in underdeveloped areas, it may be helpful to pose two questions: First, what do the Chinese Communists want from their Soviet ally at the present stage? Second, how successful have they been, and are they likely to be, in pressing their demands?

In terms of power, it is the author's view that the Chinese are trying to pressure Moscow into giving Peking an equal share in the leadership of world communism, and more particularly of the revolution in the underdeveloped countries. They can hardly aspire at present to replace the Soviet leadership in command of the whole world Communist movement—if only because they know that they are not yet sufficiently powerful to claim such a role. For the moment, it would probably satisfy their demands if Moscow would begin treating Peking as a genuinely equal partner. This would mean that the Soviet leadership would take no major initiative in the cold war with the West without prior consultation with the Chinese: Khrushchev would no longer go to Washington *before* going to Peking, as he did in 1959. It would also mean that Moscow would give much greater weight to Chinese views in formulating both Soviet and worldwide Communist strategy; and, above all, that Peking would have an equal voice in deciding strategy for colonial and underdeveloped areas.

Some recent Soviet actions on the international front —such as the *de facto* recognition of the FLN in Algeria—would appear to indicate concessions by Moscow to the pressures from Peking. But the fact that the Russians have shifted just far enough to the "left" to undercut Chinese objections does not mean that they are disposed quietly to hand over the keys of the Afro-Asian revolution to Peking. For one thing, to do so would be to surrender to the Chinese hegemony over the future Communist empire in the "East" which each of the two partners envisions as within its grasp. For another, it would mean sacrificing any Soviet hopes of "doing business" with the new administration in Washington. Last but not least, it would mean assuming risks of global war that the Soviet leadership does not appear disposed to take.

In the final analysis, it seems likely that these two last factors, in particular, will impose limitations on Soviet policy which will be unacceptable to Peking. In places like Laos and the Congo, the Russians undoubtedly will continue to take maximum advantage of any opportunities to advance Communist aims, but to back down when the heat is on. Because they still believe, in spite of last year's summit fiasco, that gains can be made through summitry, they will probably continue to adjust their strategy in the colonial and underdeveloped areas to the higher demands of Soviet diplomacy. Under these conditions, the Chinese Communists can be expected to go on pursuing their own independent strategy in these areas, seeking to persuade Asian, African, and Latin American revolutionaries that their just causes are being needlessly subordinated to the interests of a mistaken Soviet foreign policy and an increasingly affluent Soviet society.

THE SINO-SOVIET struggle for hegemony for the colonial and underdeveloped world can therefore be expected to continue. As to its outcome, the author believes that it may well depend not so much on which partner's views prevail on this or that substantive issue as on which succeeds in winning control of the local Communist movements in the areas of competition. It thus seems certain that there will be an intensification and widening of the power struggle between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions that is already gathering momentum in the Indian and other local Communist parties.

In this struggle Peking would seem to have certain advantages over the Russians. One reason for the Soviet concessions to the Chinese at the November-December Communist conference may have been Moscow's realization that many Communists in Asian, African, and Latin American countries are more attracted by Peking's militant revolutionary strategy, offering as it does at least the promise of quick Communist accession to power, than by the Soviet gradualist line, which would defer that goal until such time as the USSR has triumphed in the economic race against the West. Indeed, it would seem that the only wholehearted supporters of the Russians in their quarrel with the Chinese have been the European Communist parties. Communists in the colonial and underdeveloped world generally are beginning to look to Peking for guidance and support, and if they are doing so now when the Soviets still enjoy a preponderance of power in the international Communist movement as a whole, what will be the situation in the coming years as Communist China's power increases?

Khrushchev thus finds himself on the horns of a dilemma. If he elects to continue his present policies, he risks forfeiting to his Chinese ally the allegiance

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of the Communist movements in the colonial and underdeveloped areas. If, on the other hand, he moves much farther toward the Chinese revolutionary strategy, he must forfeit his hopes of achieving Communist world supremacy peacefully—a project on which he has staked his reputation.

In the long run, it seems very likely—as Chinese Communist Vice-Premier Chen Yi has already suggested—that the Marxist-Leninist flower will develop Soviet and Chinese petals; that there will be two centers of Communist leadership, with Moscow directing the Western branch of the faith, and Peking the Eastern. How long this process will take, and whether a "division of labor" can function within a friendly and at least ideologically cohesive framework, only time and future developments can tell.

Right and Left—A Brief Survey

By Paul Katona

IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES Communist strategy envisages the propagation and support of popular movements, making use of the aspirations of the masses—such as the desire for peace—in order to mobilize them behind Communist leadership. In colonial and so-called "semi-colonial" areas, the Communists regard nationalism as the main revolutionary factor and have used it as a convenient vehicle for achieving their objectives. This, of course, is an oversimplified statement of a complex phenomenon, for ever since the establishment of Soviet power in Russia, the "colonial question" has occupied a key place in Communist theory, strategy, and propaganda.

The time, the field and the extent of cooperation with non-Communist elements represent the main criteria of rightist or leftist trends. But it is misleading to divide Soviet history into epochs, as some authors do. For example, to suggest that 1918-21 and 1928-36 were periods of leftist tactics, and that the tactics of the years in between were rightist, could give rise to misconceptions. Paradoxically, the two tendencies, as a rule, go hand in hand. One of them may, of course, temporarily predominate, but the other meanwhile remains as a subsidiary, a balancing factor, or an undercurrent. The presence of both opposing tendencies may manifest itself in a press campaign directed against the tendency which is currently in opposition to the prevailing one. Or it may be evidenced by a divergence between Comintern and government policy, or even in the form of contradictory utterances from the same source or in contradictory diplomatic maneuvers.

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Early Appeals

One of the first acts of the newborn Soviet government was the issuance, on December 7, 1917, of a proclamation to the "Laboring Moslems of Russia and the East", jointly signed by Lenin and Stalin, the latter as Commissar of Nationalities. It appealed to the Moslem peoples of colonial Asia to rise against their oppressors and put an end to foreign domination. This was the forerunner of a whole series of moves by the young Soviet state to promote Communist-nationalist alliances in the colonial world.

The appeal to the Moslems was revolutionary, to be sure; yet it was addressed to a *religious* group on *nationalist* lines. The Comintern did not as yet exist, but the Soviet government itself at that time had no scruples about openly advocating subversion—something it could no longer indulge in after Lord Curzon's insistence in 1923 on the observance of the "non-propaganda clause" of the Russo-British Trade Agreement.

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By 1920 the Comintern had been established as the primary instrument of Communist world revolution, and in September of that year it organized the "Congress of the Peoples of East" which was held at Baku under the direction of the top Comintern leaders—Zinoviev, Radek, and Bela Kun. The Soviet government was careful not to commit itself directly. Thirty-seven eastern nationalities were represented at the congress by almost two thousand delegates, over a third of them non-Communists—the first fellow-travelers in the history of international communism.

This spectacular affair was, indeed, a revolutionary event; the more so since the allies of the Communists were disorganized groups and individuals incited to embark on subversive activities upon their return home. The delegates swore to take up arms against imperialist oppressors. Slogans of a Holy War were chanted and cheered. In that sense, the Baku Congress was a leftist event. It must be borne in mind, however, that it was organized by the Comintern—not by the Soviet government.

At the same time, Lenin established direct contact with Moslem leaders who enjoyed popularity, influence, and political power. By 1921 the Soviet government had signed treaties of friendship and economic—though not military—cooperation with Amanullah of Afghanistan, Reza Khan of Persia, and Mustafa Kemal of Turkey. All three were figures of the Colonel Nasser type: leaders of nationalist, anti-imperialist, revolutionary movements; but while admiring Soviet Russia for spearheading what they regarded as "an unparalleled struggle for the emancipation of the whole world", they took energetic measures against Communists in their own countries. In Turkey and Persia the Communist movement was banned, and in Afghanistan it was non-existent. This, however, was of minor concern to Lenin, who was essentially uninterested in the Turkish or Persian Communists. He failed to react to reports that Turkish delegates, upon returning from the Baku Congress, were arrested and tortured to death. Both in theory and in practice, Lenin advocated the "stages of development" doctrine: he held that colonies and semi-colonies were not ripe for "socialist" revolution, and he therefore regarded Communist movements in them as premature. In his view, the national liberation movements were the natural allies of communism in those areas.

In his thesis for the Second Comintern Congress, Lenin advocated the closest alliance between Soviet Russia and the national liberation movements in the colonies. He said that "it would be utopian . . . to pursue Communist tactics and Communist policy in backward countries without having definite relations with the peasant movement and without effectively supporting it."[1] At the Congress, however, Lenin took a firm stand against cooperation with the "reformist bourgeoisie" who, he said, had established close ties with the bourgeoisie in the exploiting countries. His criterion in distinguishing between "reformist" and "revolutionary" movements was obviously political rather than ideological, and he felt perfectly justified in nourishing and supporting anti-Communist nationalists, provided they were effective leaders of "liberation" movements against imperialism, and especially British "imperialism."

Stalin's Policies

After Lenin's death Stalin elaborated upon the "stages of development" doctrine, dividing the dependent countries into three categories. In countries of the lowest category, he maintained, no attempt should be made to form local Communist parties, and efforts should be concentrated instead on creating national fronts against imperialism. In countries with some industrial development and a small proletariat, the workers should form a bloc with the petty bourgeoisie, and the Communists should conduct unrestricted agitation and propaganda. The formation of independent Communist parties, however, was recommended only in countries more or less developed capitalistically, where the vacillating section of the bourgeoisie would dread revolution more than imperialism.

Stalin expounded this amplification of Lenin's doctrine in an address delivered in May 1925 at the "University of the Peoples of the East" which had been established in Moscow as a special training center for Asian revolutionaries. Declaring that the revolutionary possibilities of the national liberation movements, and of united national fronts, must be neither overrated nor underrated, Stalin warned his audience against two deviations. Deviation to the right, he said, would "submerge the Communist elements in the general welter of bourgeois nationalists", while deviation to the left would "isolate the Communist Party from the masses."[2]

Stalin's warning against rightist deviation would seem to have been hardly more than lip service to the revolutionary mission of the young recruits. On the other hand, his fear of left extremism was undoubtedly genuine, for in the same breath he spoke of the Javan-

[1] V. I. Lenin, *The Communist International*, (London) 1938, p. 241.
[2] J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, (London) 1947, p. 219.

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ese Communists who had "erroneously put forward the slogan of a Soviet government for their country." Despite Stalin's admonition, the Communist leaders of Java did in fact embark on the road of immediate revolution and, in November 1926, launched an uprising. The Indonesian Communist leaders, Alimin and Musso, sought to obtain Soviet help and support; but Moscow turned a deaf ear, and the revolutionary movement was quickly smashed by the Dutch East Indian colonial administration. The Indonesian Communist revolutionaries paid the price of their leftist deviation by being isolated not only from the masses of their own country but from Moscow as well.[3]

In China, which was a far bigger prize than the Dutch East Indies, the Soviet Communists were more cautious, but equally unsuccessful. As early as January 1923, collaboration with the Kuomintang, a bourgeois-nationalist movement *par excellence,* had begun, and Borodin, a Russian propagandist, was appointed "instructor and adviser" to the Kuomintang. He drafted a Kuomintang Manifesto and a program for the first Kuomintang Congress, neither of which was of a socialist character.

Borodin hewed to Stalin's line that a Communist revolution would be premature, and to a resolution passed in 1923 by the Executive Committee of the Comintern in favor of cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. In spite of the Trotsky opposition, which later demanded an open struggle with the Chinese bourgeoisie, Borodin showed concern for the merchants, intellectuals, manufacturers, rich artisans, etc. But while lenient in the program of internal policy, he called vigorously for the cancellation of foreign concessions and extraterritoriality. Borodin held that China was ripe for a nationalist, anti-imperialist revolution, but for nothing more.[4]

When Stalin, in the summer of 1927, qualified the policy of cooperation with the bourgeoisie in semi-colonial countries by saying that "it was essential that the working class movement should be prepared to seize the appropriate moment to break away from its allies and begin to fight for its own objectives",[5] it was too late. By the end of 1927, Chiang Kai-shek had crushed the Chinese Communists. It was this failure of "rightist" tactics in China—and, to some extent, the fiasco in Java—that prompted Stalin to concentrate on industrialization and military power at home rather than on efforts to foster revolution abroad.

Shifts and Turns

The "Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries," prepared by Otto Kuusinen for the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928, essentially upheld the Lenin-Stalinist doctrines. By 1935, however, the Leninist differentiation between revolutionary and reformist national movements was overshadowed by the new policy of United Front against Fascism, and, accordingly, the resolution adopted by the Seventh Comintern Congress (August 1935) called for joint action with both. During these years Soviet policy and propaganda in the colonial world stayed very much in the background, and a new upsurge came only with the end of the Second World War. The milestones of the post-war period are Zhdanov's report to the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in September 1947, and the Khrushchev-Bulganin journey to India and Burma.

"The ruling classes of the mother countries can no longer govern the colonies according to the old fashion", Zhdanov declared. Speaking of the pillars of the anti-imperialist camp, he pointed to the "nationalist fighters for freedom in the colonies and dependent countries" together with the Communist parties and "progressive democratic forces" of all countries.[6]

The doctrine of "stages of development" and the distinction between reformist and revolutionary movements were not invoked, but the approach remained substantially the same. Soviet policy towards the colonial and former colonial world continued to be based on the assumption of inevitable colonial wars, and on the forecast—or wishful thinking—of the Second Comintern Congress twenty-seven years before that "the separation of the colonies and proletarian revolution at home will overthrow the capitalist system in Europe". In postwar terms, the underdeveloped areas of the world were merely secondary fronts in the cold war. Colonial policy and propaganda for the remainder of Stalin's lifetime were submerged in the general campaign against the West: harassing tactics and the threefold method of propaganda-infiltration-subversion with the help of "front" organizations. The activities

[3] For details on the Java revolt, see J. H. Brimmel, *Communism in Southeast Asia,* (Oxford), 1959, and Malcolm D. Kennedy, *Communism in Asia* (London), 1957.

[4] A biased but highly illuminating account on the Chinese experiment is given by Louis Fischer in *The Soviets in World Affairs,* (London) 1930.

[5] Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia,* (London), 1947, p. 213.

[6] Reports to the conference of nine Communist parties held in Poland in September 1947 (Szikra Publications, Budapest 1947), p. 14.

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of the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the World Federation of Democratic Youth were extended wherever possible to the underdeveloped countries. Later on, a permanent "Asian Solidarity Committee" and an "Afro-Asian Solidarity Council" were formed.[7] The activities of these organizations centered—and still center in—"persistent attempts to exploit nationalist ferment to Communist advantage wherever it may occur."[8]

Despite their disruptive character and despite militant slogans echoed on occasions like the annual celebration of February 21st as International Day of Struggle against Colonial Regimes, the pronouncements of these organizations have been characterized by a rightist flavor. As a rule, pro-Communist mass propaganda is avoided in order to gain the sympathy and cooperation of innocents. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo at the end of December 1957, for instance, passed a typical resolution calling on the peoples of the two continents to accord the fullest assistance to the fighters for freedom and independence. The resolution, like all similar documents and manifestos, was devoid of Communist slogans and allusions. Since 1954-55, however, even this aspect of Communist maneuvering has been relegated to the background. Khrushchev—like Lenin in the period of the Baku Congress—has gradually broadened the vistas of Soviet diplomacy. This, rather than noisy propaganda and silent infiltration, constitutes the new element in the attitude of the Soviet leaders towards underdeveloped countries.

New Concepts, New Alliances

The Khrushchev-Bulganin journey to India and Burma was the first sign of a radical change in the Soviet attitude. Like their visit earlier that year to Belgrade, it was the outcome of a careful reappraisal of Soviet international policy. It was indicative of the Soviet leaders' realization that it was possible for a country to be a valuable ally of the Soviet Union without being reduced to a satellite, and even without being actively engaged in a fight against "imperialism." This discovery of the advantages to be gained by cultivating benevolent neutrality required farsightedness, flexibility and, above all, faith that communism would ultimately triumph and therefore that precipitate revolutionary action is unnecessary.

Oddly enough, it was Molotov who first acknowledged India's genuine independence by stating, in his report to the Supreme Soviet in February 1955, that it was of great historical significance that colonial India no longer existed. This was in sharp contrast to the official Soviet position in Stalin's lifetime, which had maintained that the independence granted to India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, and even the Philippines was fictitious, and that these countries still remained semi-colonies of the imperialist powers. Thus, Bulganin, in his Rangoon speech on December 1, 1955, said that since the proclamation of independence, Burma had embarked on the path of national freedom. This statement and others to the same effect indicated clearly that the old concept implicit in references to Burma's "so-called independence" and in attacks on U Nu's "terrorist regime for the suppression of national liberation movements"[9] were relics of the past.

The new line was codified, as it were, by the 20th Party Congress, at which Khrushchev recognized that the new nations had become truly independent in their foreign policy. As pointed out by Mr. Richard Lowenthal in the January 1961 issue of *Encounter* (London), subsequent Soviet policy has been directed toward aligning these countries with the Soviet bloc in a "peace zone." This new strategy, based on the concept of a broad, non-doctrinaire alliance of Communists, Socialists and neutrals, was re-emphasized a few months after the 20th Congress in the "obituary" of the Cominform, which was dissolved in April 1956. According to this document, the Cominform had ceased to be consonant with developing international conditions, notably with the contemplated "formation of a vast peace zone including both Socialist and non-Socialist peace-loving States of Europe and Asia."[10] However, Moscow's design for a global ideological entente of Communists and fellow-travelers was frustrated, first by the repercussions of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, and later by the left-turn of the Chinese Communists.

In the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, on the other hand, Soviet diplomacy persistently followed a policy of piecemeal intrusion, difficulties and setbacks notwithstanding. This intrusion has been primarily economic. It began in 1955-56 when the Soviet Union signed a long-term credit agreement with Afghanistan to finance several development projects, and similar agreements followed with Burma, Indonesia, India and Egypt. These are, in fact, investment contracts involving the export of capital, which Communist doctrine holds to be the main criterion of im-

[7] For a comprehensive study see Robert H. Bass, "Communist Fronts: their History and Function," *Problems of Communism*, Sept.-Oct 1960.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Voprosy Filosofii* (Moscow), No. 4, 1951.
[10] *Soviet News* (London), April 18, 1956.

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perialism. But while the early European colonizers indulged in political conquest in order to find economic outlets, the Soviet imperialists have tried to work it the other way round. Capital investments, as well as Soviet bulk purchases of Egyptian cotton and Burmese rice, represent penetration tactics rather than economic ventures.

THE STRATEGIC POLICY underlying these Soviet maneuvers does not always appear acceptable to the rank and file of the international Communist movement. At the Leipzig Conference of May 1959, where Marxist theoreticians discussed Communist strategy and tactics for Africa, Asia and Latin-America, conflicting views were aired about the "correctness" of cooperating with bourgeois nationalist and anti-Communist governments.[11] It is quite understandable that many Communists look askance at Soviet policies of friendship and aid for regimes, such as that of Nasser in Egypt, which have openly persecuted the local Communist movements. A permanent and satisfactory solution of this dilemma seems impossible. Indeed, historical examples suggest that the Soviet Union has always been ready to sacrifice the local Communists in any country for the sake of long-term Soviet objectives. Lenin preferred Kemal to the Turkish Communists, and Khrushchev apparently finds Nasser's contribution to Soviet diplomatic goals more important than the momentary fate of the Communists in the UAR.

The most important question, however, is not the outcome of the inherent conflict between Communist ideological solidarity and tactical expediency, but whether or not Khrushchev's "rightist" tactics will ultimately pay dividends in furthering Soviet and Communist aims. Lenin's alliances with Amanullah and Kemal proved useless in the end, as did the Comintern's early policy of alliance with Chinese nationalism. Now, as then, expediency is a two-edged weapon. The Communists cultivate the friendship of non-Communist governments and leaders to serve their own ends, but the other side does the same. Who is using whom? When the friendship ceases to be useful, either partner may drop the other like a hot brick.

[11] The conference took place under the auspices of the Leipzig Institute of World History and included a discussion of the "National Bourgeoisie and the Liberation Movements." See *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 2, No. 8, August 1959, p. 61 ff.

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Contrasts and Comparisons

EDITORS' NOTE: Whether or not Moscow still subscribes to the principle of "different roads to socialism" —as proclaimed at the 20th Congress of the Soviet CP in February 1956—the fact is that in several important respects the East European bloc today is hardly as homogeneous in its make-up as it was in the days of Stalin. The differences between the individual countries do not, of course, pertain to goals, but rather to methods of achieving the selfsame goals; as such, they reflect Moscow's understanding that an enforced uniformity which does not take into account basic geographic, political, economic, and cultural differences between the individual countries is in the last analysis self-defeating. On the other hand—as is clearly brought out in the article by Messrs. Bromke and Drachkovitch—any attempt to attain a greater measure of autonomy (say, in the realm of foreign policy) is bound to end in failure: Khrushchev, in short, is not a Stalin; but neither is he a Djilas. The process of complete Sovietization of the East European bloc may vary with each country: in Czechoslovakia, for instance (see article by Mr. Taborsky) the pace is fast—so much so that this country no longer calls itself a "people's democracy," but a "socialist state"; in Hungary, on the other hand (see article by Mr. Ignotus), the process is equally dogged, but the pace is slower, the concessions to some parts of the population (e.g., the intelligentsia) greater. The fact that the system imposed on these countries is essentially the same gives rise to certain phenomena that hold true for the area as a whole (article by Mr. Landy); more important, it also disposes of illusions that any real *liberalization within the Soviet empire will ever come from above, through the conscious efforts of those in power.*

What Price Corruption?

By Paul Landy

AMONG THE MANY problems besetting the governments of Eastern Europe, none seems more pressing than what is commonly called "economic crime" or, as a Polish paper aptly put it, "institutional demoralization,"[1] revealed by mounting evidence of theft, fraud, bribery, and blackmarket activity. Vehement propaganda campaigns as well as theoretical discussions of this phenomenon in the official press have revealed the extreme gravity with which the ruling party in every East European country views the spread of economic corruption. Yet the Communist approach is essentially a surface therapy, moving on the fringes of the real issues, and carefully avoiding the deeper sources of the admitted examples of widespread moral disintegration. Despite the growing awareness of a moral erosion of the system from within, the Communists publicly blame most of its manifestations on that perennial scapegoat: the inter-

[1] *Glos Pracy* (Warsaw), November 12, 1960.

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national and internal class enemies who "poison the minds of the laboring masses and introduce confusion in their consciousness."

The present paper aims at discussing corruption as a socio-economic phenomenon—its basic nature, causes, and the attempts made at combatting it. Economic crime, it must be emphasized, implies by definition an act which inflicts damage on socialist or collective property. The concept of a completely socialized economy entails the possibility that any offense against state property may be regarded as anti-state political activity. Indeed, in the explosive atmosphere of 1957-58, even petty thefts of state or public property were said to have acquired "a counter-revolutionary character" in Hungary and Rumania.[2]

Negation Upon Negation

Underlying the complex structure of economic crime is—to borrow a phrase from the Marxist lexicon—the "irreconcilable contradiction" between official dogma about the "workers' state" and "state property" and actual relations of production. Milovan Djilas clarified this important point in the following words: "Property is legally considered social and national property. But in actuality, a single group manages it in its own interest. The discrepancy between legal and actual conditions continuously results in obscure and abnormal social and economic relationships."[3] The contradiction between the legal fiction of state property and its actual content—the possession, management and use of property by the political bureaucracy—is bound to lead to institutional corruption and deformation of public morality.

In spite of certain important distinctions determined by varying social and political conditions in different countries, there are certain fundamental traits which are common to all totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe with regard to the phenomenon of economic crimes. The key point is that by the very logic of their social and economic position, the workers (and the other exploited strata of the population) refuse to identify social property with their own. Under a system which precludes the free expression of opinion or the protection of workers' interests by genuine trade unions, economic crimes may be viewed as a peculiar outgrowth of a new form of class struggle wherein workers react to their deprived condition in ways that, in the final analysis, pervert general moral standards.[4]

The contradiction between the doctrine of state property and the reality of elite control tends to be more openly recognized in periods of acute crisis, such as the Hungarian and Polish Octobers, which stimulated the establishment of "factory councils" and "workers' councils" in a number of East European countries during 1956 and 1957. Since then, workers' control has been gradually shorn of most of its substance even in Poland, while in Hungary, since the aftermath of the uprising, the newly established "factory councils" have merely been used to furnish a pretense of workers' authority.

[2] See the speech delivered by Rudolf Rosman, Rumanian Deputy Minister of Justice: "The assaults on socialist property often have the character of counterrevolutionary actions". *Romania Libra* (Bucharest), September 16, 1958. Also *Belpolitikai Szemle* (Budapest), January 1958: "The weakening of public morals is the result of the counterrevolution; these morals have been damaged even further by the indifference and criminal weakness of the instigators. The looting of factories and state farms is a class question not only because social property is the basis of socialism, but also because the looting is done by conterrevolutionaries who have been defeated and compelled to go underground and who are trying in this way to disorganize production."

[3] Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, (F. A. Praeger, New York, 1957), p. 65.

[4] To pick a quotation almost at random: "Let us admit that the greater part of the damages inflicted on public property is not being caused by the so-called 'heavy criminals' but rather by the petty thieves, squanderers, sluggards. The slack worker does not regard collective property as his own and due to his irresponsibility, social property is suffering immense damages." *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), March 12, 1959.

PRACTICAL SOLUTION

Sign pointing to "Emergency exit" of a textile factory reads: "Reserved for factory thieves!"

—From Ludas Matyi (Budapest), April 14, 1960.

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It would, however, be a dangerous oversimplification to equate the chasm between the "haves" and "have-nots"—and the derivative economic crime wave—with an open, violent, and spreading political hostility against the regime.[5] The recent years of stabilization and accelerated socialization have, if anything, been characterized by a gradual tightening of the political reins along with a deep political lethargy of the masses throughout Eastern Europe.[6] Yet, in this very period, economic offenses ranging from petty thefts to misappropriation of state funds, from bribery to a wide variety of blackmarket activities, have assumed disastrous proportions.[7]

The second underlying source of economic crimes is the continuing neglect of consumer needs. The pre-1956 investment-consumption ratio, giving priority to heavy industry, has been maintained in all the "people's democracies." Though the supply of consumer goods is inadequate both in absolute terms and in relation to purchasing power, the long-term (1961-1965) economic plans remain as far as ever from the principles of market mechanism, of flexible adaption to supply and demand, and of thorough decentralization. Despite increasing popular demands, none of the East European regimes has shown the slightest intention of changing the pattern of economic development. Ambitious long-range blueprints will hardly suffice to solve the crucial immediate dilemmas in housing, consumer goods production, and consumer services. Caught in the tangle of taboos surrounding economic realities, the regimes avoid touching one of the basic factors, the unreality of the artificial price structure which has created a glaring contrast between the state price of a scarce commodity and its real value.[8]

Apart from the economic damages—running into hundreds of millions in the local currencies—the regimes are not unjustifiably alarmed that the frequency and dimensions of thefts of state property, embezzlement of state funds, and speculative activities are, in fact, condoned and accepted by the majority of the people as a legitimate means of survival. In the words of a Polish newspaper:

> **Is the number of economic crimes diminishing? According to official data—yes. However, when we look around with open eyes, when we listen to what people say, when we watch the merry life of some persons who are "materially" responsible for various institutions—we come to the conclusion that the number of economic crimes must be growing. . . . Are these facts really so concealed that nobody knows about them? By no means. They are difficult to discover only for the inspectors, and difficult to prove before the courts. But the neighbors know very well what is going on. They know, but keep quiet when interrogated by the militia or at the courts. . . .**[9]

This attitude implies widespread popular cynicism and a passive negation of basic elements of Communist theory and practice. Though improvements in the standard of living and limited concessions may assuage the general feeling of dissatisfaction, there is mounting evidence that the Communist economic and political structure—to paraphrase a well-known remark by Lenin—produces corruption and immorality "continously, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale . . ."

Who Steals What?

It is possible to discern four main (though frequently overlapping and interrelated) groups of "economic criminals." The first and most numerous group is comprised of factory workers. As a Polish paper put it, theft of public property has become so common that it has almost achieved the respectability of custom; and the East European press has cited many cases of pilferage.[10] Next to the chronic problems of workers'

[5] This lamentable tendency can often be discerned in some Italian and American journals publishing "on-the-spot" reports on Hungary and Bulgaria.

[6] The author must note his disagreement with Mr. Ignotus' opinion that corruption in Hungary is "the main asset of the present regime" ("Hungary's Craving for Normalcy", *Problems of Communism,* March-April, 1960). Official statistics relating to arrests and prosecutions do not seem to support the statement about the alleged "nonchalant toleration of corruption."

[7] There is a good deal of statistical evidence available concerning these cases, often involving vast syndicates. For Poland, see *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), May 26, 1959, January 28, February 6, October 4, 10, 1960; *Slowo Powszechne* (Warsaw), November 3, 1960; *Rada Narodowa* (Warsaw), February 20, 1960. For Hungary: *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), July 30, 1960; *Esti Hirlap* (Budapest), October 18, 1960; *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), September 10, 1960. For Czechoslovakia: *Jihoceska Pravda* (Prague), March 31, 1960; *Prace* (Prague), July 24, 1960. For Bulgaria: *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), November 26, 1960; *Borba* (Trnovo), September 24, 1960; *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), January 19, 1960. As for the extent of total damages or the overall number of offenders, *Glos Pracy* (May 11, 1960), reported that in Poland 152,000 economic crimes were discovered in 1958 and 144,000 in 1959; in Hungary, *Nepszabadsag* (February 17, 1960) estimated the annual damages caused by factory thefts alone at 200,000,000 forints; in Czechoslovakia, *Nova Mysl* (August 1957) reported total damages inflicted on state property in 1956 as 559,000,000 crowns.

[8] This important factor has so far been mentioned only in Poland. See *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), September 1957.

[9] *Rada Narodowa,* February 20, 1960.

[10] *Prace,* March 26, 1958, described how one worker managed to make eight boilers for central heating installations during his regular working hours—with the use of factory material. He then sold these products for as much as 20,000 crowns.

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absenteeism and high labor turnover, factory thefts constitute the prime target of the drive for the protection of socialist property. It is a particularly pressing issue in Hungary and Poland, where the existence of a limited private sector provides a potential source of complications. Yet even in the most prosperous satellite country, Czechoslovakia, where private enterprise was liquidated by 1953, pilfering causes losses exceeding 400 million crowns per annum.[11] Occasionally this diversion takes on the appearance of an old-fashioned stage comedy, as for example when 81 chimney sweeps were charged before a Prague People's Court with having "fished out" 1.700 kilos of sausages through the chimneys of a meat factory.[12]

More persuasive as an explanation of such pilferage than the Communist references to "class enemies" are the hard facts of economic life: excessive inequalities in nominal wages, the fostering of an "elite" by the party, a volume of demand greatly exceeding the available supply of goods and services, and last but not least, the still meager possibilities of upward mobility for the great masses of workers.

Again, the pattern of crime is different among employees in the socialized trade and distribution apparatus, whose offenses—embezzlement, fictitious purchases, false inventories, etc.—are generally attributed to their petty-bourgeois background. The essential difference between pilfering workers and fraudulent employees of the trade and distributive apparatus lies in the extent of damages and the duration of the offenses committed. While the factory worker is generally either a subordinate member of a gang or a petty thief on his own, those in the second category, by virtue of their positions, have easier access to opportunities for large-scale fraudulent activities. As members of this group usually work with accomplices, bribing the controlling officials, they are in a position to carry on their offenses for considerable periods of time. Furthermore, the economic sophistication of shopkeepers, bookkeepers, buyers, etc., and the favorable circumstances as well as the temptations of their situation—are all factors markedly different from those influencing the workers' behavior.

Owing to the periodic shortages of consumer goods and the permanent scarcity of consumer durables, to inefficient distribution and ponderous bureaucracy—and lately the serious bottlenecks in the supply of agricultural products in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary —the distributive branches of the East European economies provide breeding grounds for a multitude of rackets. Estimates based on official statistics indicate that at least 15 percent of the turnover of goods and money in Poland takes place outside legal channels.[13] A blacklist drawn up by the Polish Ministry of Commerce gives the names of 19,000 former trade employees who have inflicted damages amounting to 243 million zlotys.[14] In Bulgaria, an estimated 70 percent of the persons sentenced to death for economic crimes during the past three years were employed in the trade network.[15]

This second category tends to play the role of a peculiar "transmission belt" linking the legal and illegal private entrepreneurs both with the pilfering workers and with the lower and medium strata of the state and managerial bureaucracy. Typical is this report from Hungary:

A salesman of the Koebanyai Brewery in Budapest, Istvan Vig, formed a criminal gang of 62 persons, comprised of workers, packers, salesmen and doorkeepers. For three years the gang stole beer, barrels, bottles. They arranged with the doorkeepers, who were supposed to control outgoing shipments, to take out more than the quota. Later they expanded their enterprise and began to steal entire shipments of beer. Through contact men, they sold the stolen beer and bottles at retail prices to scores of managers of state-owned shops and pubs in Budapest and in the neighboring villages. Altogether 1500 cases of beer, worth more than 1,000,000 forints, were stolen. The receivers of the stolen goods resold them at a substantial profit. The most successful receiver was Laszlo Galgoczi, the director of a Cultural Center at Pesterzsebet, who admitted not only to having received stolen goods, but also to underweighing and overpricing. With his profits he bought a car, TV set and washing machine.[16]

Poland and Hungary

This interlinking of groups, which may be called the "institutional framework" of corruption and speculation, is primarily pertinent to Poland and Hungary where the regimes since 1956 have countenanced a greater measure of freedom in various areas of internal life.[17] Though many of these concessions have gradually

[11] *Nova Myšl*, August 1957.
[12] *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), December 23, 1960.
[13] *New York Times*, October 4, 1960.
[14] *Glos Robotniczy* (Warsaw), May 20, 1960.
[15] Author's calculation on the basis of reports in the Bulgarian press.
[16] *Nepszava* (Budapest), February 4, 1960.
[17] According to the latest available data, there are 13,825 private retail outlets and 90,000 artisans' shops in Hungary (*Nepszabadsag*, September 19, 1958, and April 30, 1960); in Poland, 4.680 small factories employing 22,000 workers, 139,700 artisans' shops, 22.700 trade outlets and 1,120 restaurants (*Kurier Polski*, December 16, 1959, *Zycie Gospodarcze*, October 2, 1960); in Rumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, the private sectors have, respectively, a 2.3 percent, 0.4 percent, and 0.2 percent share of total retail trade. (*Obrana Lidu*, Prague, May 27, 1959).

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been revoked or curtailed, the urban small commodity producers, who form the third group of "criminals," have so far remained an essential part of everyday economic life. While subject to strict limitations and growing harassment, private initiative has expanded at an accelerated pace, operating like a natural law clearly incompatible with Communist principles as well as with the original ceiling imposed on the activities of the private sector. The governments in Poland and Hungary had intended to use the private sector primarily as an economic expedient to fill the gaps in consumer services, to supplement craft services, to promote construction and the manufacture of some high quality products. But when it became evident that private initiative, by virtue of its inherent dynamism, was incessantly extending its range of influence, the governments began shifting to a quite different tack at variance with the initial benevolence. Diverse steps—stringent controls on prices and raw materials, tax and rent increases, restrictions on the size and location of businesses—have been taken to halt the growth of the private sector.[18]

The new restrictive regulations, however, had a boomerang effect, both in terms of aggravating the difficulties stemming from lack of a market mechanism and in the broader context of social relationships and public morals. Private firms, in order to procure much needed raw materials, were virtually forced to resort to bribery, blackmarket operations and speculation, thus giving an even more powerful impetus to pilferage among factory and trade employees as well as to malpractices on the lower and medium levels of the state and managerial bureaucracy. The "blow hot, blow cold" attitude of the Polish and Hungarian leaders indicates their awareness of the conflict between economic exigencies and doctrinaire considerations.[19] In the opinion of the author, barring basic changes in the organization of productive forces, the private sector is bound to remain a factor of disruption in an economy based on the orthodox Communist concept of a unified substructure.

An example of the collisions taking place between entrepreneurs and the regimes is provided by the once famous Hungarian shoemakers who had been plagued for a long time by a shortage of good leather. A group of 56 leather experts set up a flourishing business buying, processing, and selling fine calf leather for shoes. Janos Szemes, a former storekeeper obtained a license to buy leather for the state-run leather firm. He built up a large syndicate of salesmen and operators. Soon afterwards, they set up a little factory for the production of shoe leather. They bought hides for 100 forints apiece, production costs were 100 forints, and they sold their products for 500 forints. There was such interest in their products that Sandor Szabo, a storekeeper from Nyiregyhaza, transported large purchases of leather by plane from Budapest to Nyiregyhaza. (One must bear in mind that air travel inside Hungary is still a luxury enjoyed only by a few, mostly officials.) And when a fashionable Vaci Street shoemaker in Budapest heard of the good leather available in Nyiregyhaza, he flew there and brought back the same stuff. Meanwhile, Szemes & Co. doled out shares to the other operators. In the course of one year the enterprise made a profit of one million forints.

The "director" and "shareholders" were arrested in July 1958 and sentenced to prison terms ranging from two to five years on April 11, 1959.[20]

Corruption at the Top

Among the many reports of economic crimes in the East European bloc, those relating to the mushrooming semi-capitalistic enterprises and the creeping corruption within the state and managerial bureaucracy have attracted special attention—not without reason. The first category of "crimes"—pilfering by factory workers—has been interpreted by some observers as proof that socialism is after all not an "irreversible reality" in the East European countries. However, while the profit instinct and the quest for greater material wealth are of course vital elements in the general background of the economic offenses, they seem irrelevant as a threat to the Communist structure of these states. On the other hand, the numerous instances of flourishing corruption among state officials tend to confirm the impression, prevailing in some quarters, that Djilas' sweeping generalizations about the "new class" have relevance to the *entire* political and state apparatus in every East European Communist state.

In this author's view, however, it is a dangerous and misleading oversimplification to use such a blanket term

[18] In Hungary, a new code of restrictive regulations was published on May 1, 1958. Since then the number of private artisans has declined from 119,300 to 90,000. In Poland the number of private shops in the first three quarters of 1960 decreased by 4.4 percent.

[19] See the speech delivered by Kadar at an election rally on October 15, 1958: "The private artisans and shopkeepers will for many years continue to enjoy the opportunity of active work as small capitalists. . . . We think, however, that the time will come when they, the artisans and small capitalists, will have to make a step forward and join the rest of the population in a society where there are no longer any capitalists".

[20] *Erdekes Ujsag* (Budapest), August 7, 1958 and *Esti Hirlap*, April 12, 1959.

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as the "new class" to designate various groups in various countries, who have little in common apart from the fact that they represent the lowest strata of the bureaucratic and managerial apparatus and the fourth or "top" class of economic offenders. The reaction of the state and economic bureaucracy to the pressures emanating partly from below, partly from the contradictions of the system itself, will vary considerably, depending on such factors as group consciousness and homogeneity, political reliability, the scope of controls by the upper and lower party organs, and the level of political and economic stability in the particular country.

The reliance of totalitarian regimes on a state bureaucracy with vested interests inevitably creates a tendency toward self-corruption and an elaborate system of privileges; but it also leads inexorably to conflict *between* and *within* the main groups of the hierarchy. Past experience indicates that the lower strata of the state and managerial bureaucracy, where upward mobility is most restricted but eagerness for status symbols (durable consumer goods, automobiles, and, more recently, tourism to foreign countries) is often strongest, are most susceptible to the temptation of committing or condoning a wide variety of economic crimes. Though for obvious reasons there is very little statistical evidence to provide sociological insight into the anatomy of crime, information coming mainly from Polish and Hungarian official sources confirms these contentions.[21]

This tendency—the degradation of moral standards among officialdom—has become one of the main sources of internal instability in Poland and Hungary, while in the other satellite countries it has been discernible to a far lesser extent. The explanation for this contrast is to be found in a combination of political and economic factors.

National dissatisfaction, the presence of Soviet troops, low living standards, the aftereffects of political purges, and factionalism in the party—all combined to create in Hungary (albeit temporarily) the possibility of a violent overthrow, and in Poland the possibility of a peaceful transformation of the totalitarian system.

[21] According to *Trybuna Ludu* (December 13, 1960), a large number of persons (5,096) expelled by the Central Control Commission of the party in 1960 were holding "important positions in the state and economic apparatus, including 257 directors and 1,083 leading employees, many of whom were believed to have been activists in the *wojewodztwo* (district) and municipal party committees." According to *Slowo Powszechne* (November 3, 1960), "the most frequent causes of crime [among public employees] were the lack of moral responsibility on the part of the managers of socialized trade, a desire for better means, amusement, and greater personal wealth, and the wrong moral and ethical attitude of employees of the economic branch."

—What has become of Malinowski?
—He's changed jobs. He used to steal in the shoe store, but now he steals in the tailor shop.

—From Szpilki (Warsaw), May 17, 1959.

Despite the sharp contrasts in the chain of events in the two countries, the crushing of the Hungarian revolution and the gradual backtracking of the Gomulka regime have created in both of them a political and moral disintegration which in Hungary is tinged with popular hate and in Poland is saturated with despair. In a larger sense, therefore, the economic crimes merely reflect an acute moral crisis which permeates the intelligentsia as well as the youth and manifests itself even among the political elite.

On the other hand, the Czechoslovak regime has managed to preserve intact the fiction of a sacrosanct dogma, has never lost control over intellectual life, and has channelized popular discontent through economic concessions. The application of an essentially conservative line has so far attained—by East European standards—a surprising degree of internal stability. This development has, of course, been aided by such factors as prewar industrialization, relatively high living standards, lack of explosive national dissatisfaction, and a peaceful changeover in the party leadership from the Gottwald era to the reign of Antonin Novotny. For these reasons, the Czechoslovak party has been able to instill a "sense of mission" into the entire bureaucracy with greater success than any other East European party. Because of tight controls and perennial screening by the higher organs, in addition to the factors outlined above, the lower strata can be more effectively shielded from maleficent influences than elsewhere in the orbit.

Nevertheless there is convincing evidence that, given a less fortunate combination of stabilizing factors, sud-

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den crises in basic areas of internal life may encourage further corruption and economic crimes among the lower and middle groups of the state and managerial bureaucracy—without, however, constituting an imminent threat to the basic organization of the Communist state.

The Case of Bulgaria

Recent developments in Bulgaria, for instance, are especially illuminating in this regard. Here, even during the crucial 1956-1957 period, the political pattern and ideological edifice of total dictatorship remained intact, the party and state apparatus resisted the infection of revisionism, and intellectual ferment and popular discontent were generally forced below the surface. Clearly, the same essential elements of stabilization as in Czechoslovakia combined to produce this situation. Nevertheless, stabilization in Bulgaria has always been incomparably more limited than in Czechoslovakia because, despite some economic concessions, the development of productive forces has not been accompanied by a corresponding rise in the standard of living, which remains notoriously low.

Let us turn then to more recent events in this "quiet" satellite. Since early 1959 the efficiency, discipline and morale of the state *and* party bureaucracy have dangerously weakened. Ironically, this process was set in motion by the party itself, which overrated the existing potentials, and proclaimed a "great leap forward" two years ago.[22] Since then, fantastic planning targets have been set and later partially altered. Without adequate preparation, a drastic reorganization and decentralization of the state and economic administration was carried out. Following the completion of agricultural collectivization, a sweeping amalgamation of the collective farms was ordered and then subsequently revised by breaking up excessively large farms into smaller units. The private plots of the collective farm members were confiscated, but as shortages began to assume disastrous proportions, party leaders condemned the "incorrect attitude" of those responsible and once again proclaimed the sanctity of private plots.

As a result of these fluctuations in basic policies, the group consciousness, cohesion and reliability of the lower and intermediate levels of power were undermined, and the line of command and control from above was weakened. The party, once it became aware of what was happening, acted on two fronts to correct this state of affairs. First, a concentrated effort was made to stamp out the potential sources of obstructive political discontent by tightening party controls and removing "doubters" and "skeptics" from the upper ranks of the hierarchy. Second, a near-collapse of the economy was staved off by obtaining massive aid from the USSR.

Such periods of instability, caused by bewildering shifts in basic policies, may of course, occur in *any* totalitarian system. The example of Bulgaria demonstrates, however, that they do not necessarily imply a systematic opposition to the leadership, let alone a direct threat to the foundations of the regime. In the writer's opinion, barring unexpected upheavals in the Soviet bloc, it is the Bulgarian pattern, rather than the Hungarian and Polish, which will govern the broad trends toward institutional corruption in the area.

Countermeasures

To what extent have the East European regimes been able to curb the spread of economic crimes by administrative measures imposed from above? The relentless assaults on economic criminals, with primary stress laid on the use of terror, have so far proved singularly unsuccessful. A wide variety of coercive measures, including a startling number of death penalties, long prison terms, and deportations, and the establishment of corrective camps, have failed to bring about a revolution in human nature and have, if anything, retarded even timid and limited attempts to face the real issue squarely.[23]

Instead of stimulating the emergence of the long heralded "socialist morality," these coercive measures have given a powerful impetus to a feeling of "underground solidarity" among the workers, and have created widespread popular apprehension over harsh penalties for offenses which are widely regarded as necessary weapons of economic self-defense.[24]

[22] For a detailed report on Bulgaria, see "The Bulgarian 'Leap Forward'," by Boris A. Christoff, *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1959.

[23] Death sentences for "particularly grave economic crimes" were first applied in Bulgaria in 1954, in Rumania and in Hungary in 1958, and in Poland in 1960. Radio Warsaw (December 22, 1960) reported a death sentence imposed on Boleslaw Dedo, former deputy chairman of the tannery cooperative "Przyszlosc" in Radom, for misappropriation of state funds and black market dealings in leather, causing losses of 20,000,000 zlotys to the state. Three other defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment, and twelve received prison sentences of 6 to 15 years. In Bulgaria, death sentences have been imposed on 43 major economic offenders since 1956. In Czechoslovakia crimes against state property are punishable by prison sentences ranging from three months to 20 years.

[24] See *Nepakarat* (Budapest), November 12, 1957; "A wrong kind of solidarity has developed in some plants. It is thought 'smart' to pilfer. This kind of solidarity cannot be tolerated."

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Since the beginning of 1960, there has been a determined effort—particularly in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary—to revive and extend the activities of the "comrades' courts" which, except in Bulgaria, were established during the 1956-1958 period. In contrast to their role in the Soviet Union,[25] the comrades' courts in the East European countries have never been an important instrument for enforcing labor discipline and norms of social behavior. There is a growing awareness, however, that without popular participation "the main thrust of the offensive hits a void".[26] The new Soviet measures in this field have given a powerful additional stimulus to the efforts to raise the "political consciousness" of the masses.

Though new East European regulations affecting the comrades' courts closely follow the Soviet pattern, there are some important differences in the interpretation of the courts' role. As the "people's democracies" are still in the "first phase" of socialist development—*i.e.*, "the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism"—primary stress is laid on the immediate educative and intimidating function of the courts, and not on their broader role in the context of an ideal Communist society. Outside of Czechoslovakia, the new parajudicial institutions have not yet passed the experimental stage.[27] The potential dangers of the application of extrajudicial power on a wide scale and the lack of procedural safeguards have been openly criticized, as might be expected, only in Poland.[28]

Evidence so far available and information leaking out of the East European countries indicate that the new institutional devices in the campaign against economic crimes are popularly regarded as portending trouble and a general tightening of the political reins. In this writer's opinion, the record indicates that the application of extrajudicial instruments of power will tend to reinforce the role of fear and coercion in the management of these societies.

TO SUM UP, the spread of economic crimes is partly the price the Communist regimes pay for their fictitious talk of "socialist property." In an unfavorable conjunction of circumstances, the trend towards "institutional demoralization" may take political forms as well. Short of a serious crisis, however, this tendency will most likely assume predominantly opportunistic forms of self-enrichment. Moves away from the more extreme forms of party dictatorship and improvements in the standard of living can mitigate the pressures toward economic crime. But the permanent factors—the myth of workers' ownership of state property and the emphasis on heavy industry at the expense of consumer needs—will remain stimulants to corruption. If the regimes continue on their present course, based mainly on old methods of coercion and new devices of extrajudicial power, economic crimes are bound to persist as points of infection in the political body, regardless of economic progress.

[25] For a discussion of "comrades' courts" in the USSR, see "Totalitarianism without Coercion?", by Herbert Ritvo, *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1960.

[26] *Prawo i Zycie* (Warsaw), October 30, 1960.

[27] Decrees setting up comrades' courts were issued in 1955 in Poland, in 1956 in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in 1958 in Rumania and in 1960 in Bulgaria. Published information on the subject indicates that the experiment has so far been a failure in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. See *Nepszabadsag*, June 12, 1959, and February 17, 1960; *Munca* (Bucharest) January 10, 1959; *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), January 19, 1960. (On Czechoslovakia, see article by E. Taborsky elsewhere in this issue.—Ed.)

[28] See *Prawo i Zycie*, November 21, 1960.

Crime and Punishment Under Socialism

Recently the Sofia court handled the case of a representative of the former capitalist class who has remained up to the very last faithful to the customs of his class. The director of a former commercial enterprise, Stojko Kantscheff Stojkoff, has for the last five or six years carried on illegal activities. Due to the insufficient vigilance and control of some authorities, he was able to organize and direct a private industrial firm for the manufacture and sale of woolen blankets. He procured the basic materials from the "state company for secondary [second-hand] basic materials." The wool was manufactured for him by state-owned factories. For a time the carpet factory in Lukowit, the industrial plant "S. Babakoff" in Plovdiv, and some other plants were working entirely for him. Stojkoff pretended to be "a representative of the state." The sale of his products was also organized through the socialized trade outlets. Working in his enterprise were members of his family who also appeared before the court. The Sofia court sentenced Stojkoff to death and his accomplices to 2-15 years.

—*Semedelsko Sname* (Sofia), November 26, 1960.

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Poland and Yugoslavia: The Abortive Alliance

By Adam Bromke and Milorad Drachkovitch

ONE OF THE MOST novel developments in Communist bloc politics following the Polish and Hungarian "Octobers" was the attempt by Poland and Yugoslavia to achieve a *rapprochement.* The atmosphere for such an alignment was prepared by Tito's reaction to these two events: his enthusiastic approval of Gomulka's triumph over the Stalinist faction, and his ambiguous position on Soviet intervention in Budapest. At about the same time, Khrushchev's troubles in the Kremlin and Mao Tse-tung's support of Gomulka created a situation of unusual fluidity in East European politics. The centrifugal forces at work seemed to foreshadow a widening disintegration of the Soviet empire; at the very least, they served to warn the Kremlin of the need to reshape the political order in the entire satellite area.

It was only logical to expect that in a situation whose dramatic features were the direct result of Stalin's imperial rule, two of his most prominent—and surviving —victims, Tito and Gomulka, would come closer together. Khrushchev's "Canossa" trip to Belgrade in May 1955, the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and Tito's triumphal visit to Russia in June 1956 had convinced the Yugoslav leader that Soviet post-Stalin policies were basically changed. He firmly believed that the great moment of his final rehabilitation had come. The texts of the 1955 Belgrade and 1956 Moscow declarations signed by Khrushchev and Tito, with their solemn endorsement of certain cherished Yugoslav postulates, constituted in Tito's mind the final rejection of Stalinism in relations between Communist states and Communist parties. In his view, the further lesson to be learned from the events in Hungary was the need for a polycentric Communist system, with various creative and liberalized centers of Marxism-Leninism—Moscow, Peking and Belgrade acting as "first among equals." This system supposedly would reinforce Communist rule internally and would make communism's worldwide appeals more irresistible, particularly among the "uncommitted" nations. Countless texts prove that, at least up to November 1957, this was Tito's feeling about his own historical mission.

Gomulka, during and after his victory over the Stalinists in October 1956, appeared to be adopting the "Titoist" pattern in Poland and thus was a potentially priceless partner in Tito's "great design." To Gomulka, a Communist chief without ideas for export, what was appealing in the Yugoslav example was not so much Tito's design for foreign policy as the advantages of the Yugoslav leader's internal position, which Gomulka himself would have liked to emulate in Poland: specifically, the Yugoslav Communist Party enjoyed a monopoly of political power and freedom to experiment with its own version of communism; the country was free of the physical presence of the Soviet Army; and at the same time Yugoslavia received abundant Western economic aid without any political strings attached.

To Khrushchev and Mao, preoccupied as they were with internal problems at that time (end of 1956, beginning of 1957), the maintenance of Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe was momentarily the most urgent task. In consequence, they were willing to support Gomulka and to tolerate Tito—although resenting the latter's criticism of the first Soviet intervention in Hungary. They acted on the assurance that neither the Yugoslav nor Polish leader intended to disrupt the system of "people's democracies." As for

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"polycentric communism," its fate was to be determined later.[1]

In this delicate post-October situation, when both Moscow and Peking were pondering more suitable future policies, Tito and Gomulka entered into a companionship.[2] Their experiences with Moscow dictated closer, though still cautious, mutual ties. But they viewed each other from different angles. It is the unfolding of their complex relationship, and its implications for the future of intra-bloc relations *in toto,* that this article proposes to analyze.

The First Steps

For the first time since 1948, high-level connections between the Yugoslav and Polish Communist parties were established in the second half of 1956. In August a delegation of the Polish United Workers' party, led by Politburo member Franciszek Mazur, visited Yugoslavia. Since Mazur was then the leader of the Stalinist faction in the Central Committee of the PUWP, the visit was essentially of a ceremonial nature. In December of the same year, a delegation of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, headed by one of the Secretaries of its Executive Committee, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, visited Poland. This visit was more fruitful not only because by that time Gomulka was at the helm of the PUWP, but because the talks on that occasion "had an exclusively working character."[3] It was at that time that concrete plans for strengthening the bonds between the two countries and the two parties were first made.

Throughout the first half of 1957, Yugoslav-Polish economic cooperation received primary emphasis. Commercial relations between the two countries steadily improved. In June 1957 they signed a new agreement aiming at a 30-percent increase in the volume of trade. At the same time they exchanged views, at various levels, on the experiences of each country in the field of economic planning and management. The Poles were favorably impressed by Yugoslav experiments in the decentralization of their economy and the establishment of workers' self-government in industrial enterprises;[4] in fact, the Polish statute of November 1956 on workers' councils already had been largely copied from the Yugoslav model.[5]

In the field of foreign policy, Polish-Yugoslav cooperation was more diffident. Yet, when the new Moscow-Belgrade controversy erupted over Tito's Pula speech in November 1956, dragging on until the visit of Kadar to Moscow in March 1957, Polish sympathies were unmistakably on the Yugoslav side. The very fact that the Poles upheld their right to a "road to socialism" different from that of the Soviet Union brought them close to the Yugoslav position. Moreover, they not only refrained from attacking the Yugoslavs, which in itself was significant, but published the Yugoslav retorts alongside the Soviet attacks in the leading party organs.

In establishing bilateral bonds with Tito, however, Gomulka proceeded cautiously. He obviously wanted to avoid anything which might further aggravate his already strained relations with the other Communist countries. Thus, some drastic change was required within the Soviet bloc to bring Yugoslavia and Poland still closer together. It seems that Gomulka believed such a change had taken place when the "anti-party group" was purged from the CPSU by Khrushchev in July 1957.

Climax of Cooperation

Both Tito and Gomulka seemed to misread the import of Khrushchev's victory in the intra-party struggle. Tito apparently was convinced that "Khrushchev's desire to shake off the inexpedient remnants of Stalinism also involved a departure from a dichotomic vision" of the world.[6] Consequently, soon after Molotov's downfall, the Yugoslavs decided to seek a new rapprochement with the Soviet Union. In July, Tito's closest collaborators, Edvard Kardelj and Aleksander

[1] On December 5, 1956, the Chinese press published a lengthy manifesto dealing primarily with the international situation in a sense encouraging to Gomulka; on February 27, 1957, Mao Tse-tung made his famous speech on "The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", launching a campaign for "rectification of the style of party work." On the interpretation of these two documents, *cf.* G. F. Hudson's introduction in *The New Leader* (New York) Supplement, (September 9, 1957).

[2] For a thorough discussion of Yugoslav-Polish relations before and immediately after October 1956, see Andrew Haven, "Tito and Gomulka: Some Contrasts and Comparisons," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. VI, No. 4 (July-August 1957).

[3] Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, "Delegation of Yugoslav Communists in Poland," *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), No. 163 (January 15, 1957).

[4] This is clearly shown in a symposium of articles by several Polish economists. *Cf. Dyskusja o polskim modelu gospodarczym,* Ksiazka i Wiedza, Warsaw, 1957.

[5] For more detailed discussion, *cf.* Adam Bromke, "Workers' Councils in Poland," *Slavic and East European Studies,* Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1956-57).

[6] Z. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc—Unity and Conflict,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960, p. 313.

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Rankovic, were dispatched to Moscow. Early in August, a Khrushchev-Tito meeting took place in Bucharest. The results of the talks appeared encouraging to Tito. Not only did Khrushchev absolve Tito from any responsibility for the Hungarian debacle, but he also agreed to re-establish the close ties which had developed between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia prior to that event.[7] Moreover, the official communique which followed the meeting, by reaffirming the principles enunciated in the earlier Belgrade and Moscow declarations, seemingly endorsed the Yugoslav version of the principle of "different forms of socialist development."[8] Confident that Yugoslav-Soviet friendship was now fully restored, Tito made several moves in foreign affairs clearly aimed at pleasing Khrushchev.[9] It appeared, indeed, that the political intimacy between Khrushchev and Tito had returned to the high point reached during the summer of 1956.

Both the Moscow purge itself and its effects upon Soviet-Yugoslav relations were received with utmost satisfaction by the Polish Communists, who were convinced that the "Molotov group" opposed a Moscow-Belgrade rapprochement. On September 10, 1957, Gomulka, accompanied by three other members of the PUWP Politburo, arrived in Belgrade. After a week of constant talks at the highest level, a joint declaration was issued on September 16, noting an "identity of views on all questions dealt with."[10] It reviewed major international problems and current issues of the international Communist movement essentially in line with the Soviet position; it also dealt with the further development of Yugoslav-Polish relations in the political, economic and cultural fields. Specifically, it provided for mutual consultation on foreign policy, establishment of a joint commission to expand economic cooperation, and the opening of information centers in Warsaw and Belgrade to promote cultural exchange. All in all, although cautiously worded, the declaration testified to the fact that the two delegations had achieved a basic understanding upon which an intimate and enduring Polish-Yugoslav alliance could be built.

If the declaration was a disappointment to those who expected it to be overtly anti-Soviet, by the standards of the Communist bloc it was still an unusual document. It contained several formulations which ran quite close to what only recently had been branded as "revisionism". These apparent heresies, however, were interwoven with other statements which stressed full conformity with the Soviet line. Thus, for example, the endorsement of "active coexistence," dear to Tito but—in this phrasing—unpleasant to Moscow, was coupled with the principle of "proletarian internationalism," which sounded reassuring to Kremlin ears. In a similar vein, adherence to the principle of "different forms and methods of building socialism" was followed by a profession of allegiance to the "unity of the workers' movement". Likewise, after urging the development of "bilateral relations between Communist and Workers' parties," the declaration added that "wider contacts on questions of mutual interest to more parties can also be very useful."

Gomulka and Tito themselves had contributed to this mingling of unorthodox remarks and reassuring declarations. Gomulka's speech at the airport upon arriving in Belgrade sounded an anti-Stalinist note: "We meet after years as old friends who were separated by adverse fortunes, but who for that very reason appreciate even more and are determined to guard our renewed friendship."[11] Tito, however, in toasting Gomulka shortly before the latter's departure from Yugoslavia, strongly underlined the necessity of good relations with the Soviet Union and denied that Poland and Yugoslavia were bent on developing "so-called 'national' communism—which is sheer nonsense . . ."[12]

Despite such ambiguities, both sides made some gestures which suggested their willingness to act with greater independence in the international sphere. Within the space of several weeks in September and October 1957, there was a sudden burst of diplomatic activity in the entire East-Central European area. On the day of his deparature for Belgrade, Gomulka, in an interview with a Danish newsman, launched the idea of neutralization of the Baltic area as a pre-condition for cooperation among the countries in that region. On the same day, Rumanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica addressed a letter to Tito and other chiefs of the Balkan countries in which he suggested a meeting of the government heads of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey, with the aim of "strengthening friendship among the

[7] This is Tito's own interpretation given at the Seventh Congress of the LCY in April 1958. Stenographic account in Serbo-Croatian. Belgrade, 1958, p. 46.

[8] For the text of the Bucharest statement, *cf. Review of International Affairs,* No. 178 (Sept. 1, 1957), p. 21.

[9] Some of these were: recognition by Yugoslavia of the East German regime; adoption of the Soviet bloc's attitude on the Hungarian issue in the UN; criticism of the Eisenhower doctrine. Tito's own article in the October 1957 issue of *Foreign Affairs* is perhaps the best example of the pro-Soviet orientation of Yugoslav foreign policy at that time.

[10] For the entire text of the declaration, *cf. Yugoslav Review,* published in New York by the Yugoslav Information Center, no. 7-8 (Sept-Oct 1957).

[11] *Trybuna Ludu,* September 11, 1957.

[12] *Yugoslav Review, loc. cit.*

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peoples of the region and their peaceful coexistence."[13] Three days later, while he was engaged in discussions with Gomulka at his Brioni retreat, Tito answered Stoica, warmly approving his initiative. Finally, on October 2, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki came out before the General Assembly of the United Nations with his plan for banning nuclear weapons from both Germanies and Poland. He had the full support of Yugoslavia, almost certainly secured beforehand.

All these ideas and proposals in the early autumn of 1957, though certainly made with Soviet knowledge and approval, seemed to herald an expanded role for the East European countries of a kind which Stalin would never have tolerated. Very soon, however, it became clear that Nikita Khrushchev was not inclined to tolerate such a development either.

The Flowers That Wilt in the Fall

With a suddenness typical of Communist shifts in doctrine, the emerging concept of "polycentrism" suffered a sharp reversal at the meeting of Communist leaders in Moscow in November 1957. On that occasion, the representative of the LCY refused to sign the declaration of the twelve ruling Communist parties, while Gomulka joined in it. This first fissure in the nascent Yugoslav-Polish alliance was, above all, the result of the Chinese reversal of their earlier "liberal" stand.[14] There is reason to believe that the paragraphs of the Moscow declaration most objectionable to Tito, such as those stressing the leading role of the Soviet Union, enumerating the "basic laws" applicable to all countries "building socialism," and indicting "revisionism" as the main current danger, were inserted at Mao's insistence.[15] Thus, it became obvious that Communist "polycentrism" outside of Moscow's and Peking's undisputed authority was not to be tolerated.

This turn of events infuriated the Yugoslav Communists, who felt deceived by the Chinese and outmaneuvered by Khrushchev.[16] All that remained for them to do was to insist with injured righteousness that the Moscow declaration of November 1957 was incompatible with that of June 1956. But while Tito was in a position to disagree once again with Khrushchev, Gomulka was not. Nevertheless, Gomulka tried to take a middle road between the LCY and the other Communist parties. It was reportedly he who proposed the "Communist Peace Manifesto," which served as a substitute link between Yugoslavia and the "socialist camp". Moreover, after returning from Moscow, Gomulka explicitly rejected the need to reestablish the Comintern and continued to stress the importance of bilateral ties between the "people's democracies". With regard to the position of Yugoslavia, he refused to be pessimistic. "It is certain," he declared, "that sooner or later the time will come when those problems, which today are the subject of controversy, will be resolved in cooperation with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia."[17] Gomulka's hopes, however, proved to be shortlived.

In March 1958 a new Soviet-Yugoslav controversy flared up over the Draft Program prepared in advance of the Seventh Congress of the LCY. The cancellation of Soviet participation in the Congress placed before Gomulka a hard but unavoidable choice. He had either to send a delegation of the PUWP to the Congress and thus overtly side with the Yugoslavs, or cancel Polish attendance and thereby take sides with the Soviets. At first, he still tried to pursue his self-appointed role as "honest broker." Early in April, two prominent mem-

[13] *Trybuna Ludu*, September 16, 1957.

[14] The Yugoslavs, and even more the Poles, attached great hopes to cooperation with China in "liberalizing" the Soviet bloc from within. The shortlived Chinese "hundred flowers" course was received with great enthusiasm in both countries, and its abrupt reversal in June 1957 apparently escaped their attention. In his television interview with Edward R. Murrow at the end of that month, Tito declared that his views on the different national paths to communism were "to a great extent identical with those of Mao Tse-tung." *New York Times*, July 1, 1957. The Poles clung to that view even longer. "The position of the Chinese Communists . . . continues to assist in the struggle against dogmatism and conservatism, and helps to affirm among Communists the Leninist thesis of different roads . . ." Juliusz Burgin, "Chiny: 1949-1957," *Swiat i Polska* (Warsaw), September 26, 1957.

[15] In his speech at the Fifth Congress of the German Socialist Unity Party on July 11, 1958, Khrushchev asserted that the statement concerning the leading role of the Soviet Union was not included in the draft of the Moscow declaration, but was inserted afterwards. *Cf.* Vaclav L. Benes, Robert F. Byrnes, Nicolas Spulber, (Editors), *The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, Indiana University Publications, Bloomington, 1959, p. 210. In the opinion of a competent American student of Chinese Communist affairs, "at the time of the fortieth anniversary celebration in Moscow, Mao's insistence on strengthening the declaration of the Communist countries by the reaffirmation of subordination to Moscow prevented Yugoslavia from signing, although Tito's party had agreed to an earlier, milder statement proposed by Moscow. Mao was reported enraged almost to the point of hysteria, insisting that the Yugoslav comrades had to sign the declaration." Richard L. Walker, "Chairman Mao and the Cult of Personality," *Encounter* (London), June 1960, p. 41.

[16] For more detailed discussion of Tito's position, *cf.* Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-315.

[17] "Wyniki narady partii komunistycznych i robotniczych w Moskwie," *Nowe Drogi*, No. 12/102 (December 1957).

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bers of the PUWP Politburo, Ochab and Morawski, were dispatched to Belgrade to plead with the LCY leaders to eliminate from their program the statements most objectionable to the Soviet Union. Since they were unsuccessful in this mission, the PUWP, following the Soviet example, announced that its delegation would not participate in the Congress. The Polish Ambassador in Belgrade, however, was named an "observer", and when the representatives of other Communist countries left the meeting in protest, he remained in attendance.

Soon, however, Gomulka came out against the LCY in an even more explicit manner. In the storm of anti-Yugoslav criticism which filled the press in all Communist countries following the Yugoslav Congress, the Polish press remained most reserved, but it nevertheless clearly opted for Moscow. On May 14, 1958, a lengthy article, calm in tone but thoroughly critical, "Concerning the Seventh Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists," appeared in *Trybuna Ludu*.[18] It was restricted to a review of the LCY stand in international affairs, which was described as "fundamentally erroneous." The Yugoslav Communists were charged with departing "from the class point of view," ignoring "the role of American imperialism," and deviating from the "fundamental principle of the international solidarity of all socialist forces." Still, contrary to the stand taken by the Chinese and Soviet press, *Trybuna Ludu* absolved the Yugoslav Communists from any blame for the 1948 dispute with the Cominform, affirmed the socialist character of their state, and expressed the hope that the ideological differences between the LCY and the other parties would be overcome.

Six weeks later, speaking in Gdansk, Gomulka himself accentuated the Polish criticism of the LCY. He scored strongly its "erroneous revisionist theories" which isolated Yugoslavia from the other socialist states and thus "injured the united forces of the socialist countries and the whole international workers' movement." Nevertheless, he did not abandon all hope that reconciliation would be possible. "We are critical," he explained, "in the hope that sooner or later they will come to realize the harmfulness of their present conduct."[19]

Further Disintegration

The summer of 1958 marked an accelerated cooling of Polish-Yugoslav relations. At that time Yugoslavia was under strong Sino-Soviet attack, the vituperativeness of which recalled the Cominform era.[20] At the same time, Gomulka became aware of his own growing isolation within the Communist bloc. Thus, he was embittered—as some parts of his Gdansk speech indicated—by the Yugoslav rejection of his advice to try to change Soviet bloc policies from within. Left without a parner in this enterprise, he decided to improve his position by seeking a direct rapprochement with Moscow. His prolonged visit to the Soviet capital in October-November 1958 was a consequence of this decision.

Gomulka's trip represented a far cry from his voyage to Belgrade one year before. The speeches delivered by Khrushchev and Gomulka on November 11 at Moscow's Lenin Central Stadium reflected their full alignment. This time, Gomulka went into an all-out assault on the "erroneous, revisionist path" of the LCY. He emphasized that from the very outset the attitude of the PUWP toward the program of the LCY had been "definitely critical." He explained also to his Moscow audience that the Polish party favored good relations with the LCY based "on the spirit of proletarian internationalism," but that "the blame for the present situation rests completely and exclusively with Yugoslavia." Finally, while voicing hope that the LCY would once again return to the "fraternal family of socialist countries," he intimated that this time the initiative must come from the Yugoslavs.[21]

Gomulka's attack evoked an outburst of anger on the part of the leadership of the LCY. A long and bitter article in *Borba* on November 14, publicly buried —in the words of the *New York Times*—"the long cherished hope that Poland's leaders would remain friendly despite the Soviet bloc's campaign against the Tito regime".[22] The Yugoslav rebuttal of Gomulka's speech consisted essentially in quoting chronologically the latter's various declarations on the subject of the LCY, starting with the admiring ones made in 1957 and changing gradually—always one step behind Moscow—toward hostility. The article even implied that Gomulka was lying in trying to represent the PUWP criticism of the LCY Draft program as the earliest one in the socialist bloc; for, according to *Borba,* the two

[18] The entire text in English is included in the *Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, op. cit.,* pp. 157-69.

[19] *Ibid,* pp. 190-195.

[20] Khrushchev's attack on the LCY at the Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Sofia on June 3, 1958, was the sharpest statement since Stalin's day. For the English text, *cf.* Robert Bass and Elisabeth Marbury (ed.), *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958: A Documentary Record,* Prospect Books, New York, 1959, pp. 190-200.

[21] For English translations of their speeches, *cf. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. X, No. 45, December 17, 1958, pp. 7-12.

[22] November 15, 1958.

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members of the Polish Politburo who discussed its contents in Belgrade "were far from appraising LCY's views as revisionist." Indeed, *Borba* pointed out that on March 28, 1958, the Polish party had accepted an invitation to send an official delegation to the LCY Congress, but had cancelled its participation on April 18, just two weeks after the decision by the CPSU to boycott the congress.

Thus, under the impact of this angry November dispute, the Yugoslav-Polish "alliance" collapsed even before its construction was completed. Clearly, its foundations were inadequate. Viewed both in terms of ideology ("exportable" Titoism and strictly "domestic" Gomulkaism) and power (a strong LCY, but a weak PUWP), the two regimes were in dissimilar situations, and their mutual bonds were not really of primary importance for either of them. Their cooperation was brought about by the explosive forces which shook Eastern Europe in the turbulent year of 1956. Above all, their alignment was made possible by the temporary vacillation of Soviet leadership in that area. As soon, however, as Soviet policy regained decisiveness, the Yugoslav-Polish rapprochement had to come to an end.

The New Pattern

In his Moscow speech during Gomulka's visit, Khrushchev defined two aspects of future relations between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia. In the first place, Khrushchev rejected Stalin's approach of total severance of ties with Yugoslavia: "Along state lines we will strive to develop friendly relations with Yugoslavia and encourage trade and cultural ties . . ." Khrushchev then made his second point: "As for our disagreement on ideological questions, we have waged and will continue to wage an irreconcilable struggle against distortions of Marxism-Leninism." The clear implication of this statement was that reconciliation with the LCY was discarded unless the Yugoslav Communists were willing to repudiate their own program and rejoin the "socialist" camp. The third basic point of Khrushchev's stand had been formulated somewhat earlier, in his speech at the Congress of the German Socialist Unity Party on July 11, 1958: "In our struggle for the Communist cause," he declared, "we should not devote greater attention to the Yugoslav revisionists than they actually deserve." [23] It meant—again contrary to Stalin's attitude, which can only be described as pathological—that Yugoslavia's "deviations" would be treated with cool indifference—*i.e.,* contempt—rather than vehement indignation.

These three directives established the pattern of relations between Yugoslavia and all other Eastern European countries, including Poland.[24] Thus, a chronological survey of contacts between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc countries, prepared by Radio Free Europe in Munich, shows that in the period from January 1, 1959, to May 15, 1960, all 212 contacts were confined to the "state level." [25] The same survey indicates that during that period Poland was still the first in number of contacts with Tito's government, and was second only to the USSR, among all the Soviet bloc countries, in trade with Yugoslavia.[26] In the political sphere, Polish-Yugoslav relations as a whole remained proper, although on the Polish side Yugoslav diplomats were treated with a certain amount of suspicion. The Poles, unlike the Chinese or the Albanians, did not indulge in chicanery; yet in December 1959 hospitality was withheld from the Yugoslav military attaché. In the cultural sphere, the flow of delegations between the two countries continued, but on a considerably smaller scale than in 1957-58. Permission to open a Yugoslav information center in Warsaw was declined by the Polish authorities.[27]

Although the violence of the Chinese and Albanian attacks against the LCY was never matched in Poland, the PUWP adhered to the principle of carrying on an "irreconcilable ideological struggle" against Yugoslav "revisionism."[28] In his speech at the Third Congress of

[23] For the English text, *cf. The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, op. cit.* pp. 202-216.

[24] The notable exception was Albania, where the first point of Khrushchev's program has been reduced to the bare minimum and whose verbal assaults on Yugoslavia retain much of the Stalinist flavor.

[25] It should be observed, however, that in Communist states where state officials are also prominent party functionaries, the distinction is necessarily blurred. Thus, for example, when Mijalko Todorovic, a member of the Central Committee of the LCY and Vice-President of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council, visited Warsaw in January 1960, heading the economic delegation, or when Vukmanovic-Tempo arrived in Warsaw in May 1960 as Chairman of the Yugoslav Trade Union Federation, their visits might well have had a political character, too.

[26] *Statisticki Godisnjak* for 1958. p. 186. For later figures, *cf.* Yugoslav monthly survey *Indeks,* No. 3, (1959), p. 32; No. 3 (1960), p. 32. From the Polish point of view, trade with Yugoslavia occupied sixth place among the Communist countries and ninth place among all countries in the world. *Cf. Concise Statistical Yearbook of the Polish People's Republic, 1960,* Polskie Wydawnictwa Gospodarcze, Warsaw, 1960, pp. 132-123.

[27] *Yugoslav News Bulletin,* published by the Yugoslav Information Center in New York, January 8, 1960.

[28] Occasionally, the Yugoslavs have complained also about malicious comments in the Polish press. For instance, *Borba* of March 25, 1960, sharply answered the two articles published in the Polish weekly *Zdarzenia,* charging they vilified the Yugoslav people and society.

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the PUWP in March 1959, Gomulka echoed the Soviet charges against the LCY and was less optimistic than ever regarding future relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc.[29] His attack was answered on March 17 by an icy and rather contemptuous article in *Borba,* which deplored Gomulka's inconsistency and lack of principle in his treatment of Yugoslavia. It stated significantly that in the anti-Yugoslav campaign ". . . new elements are brought in by others, whom Gomulka joins only later." It is obvious, concluded *Borba,* that "he is no longer ready to behave, or is prevented from behaving, toward Yugoslavia as he previously did."

Khrushchev's third precept—studied indifference—was also observed by the Poles. Although it is likely that this principle appealed to the Poles the most, it was actually enforced on a bloc-wide basis, a fact which provoked Tito's complaints.[30] It is true that in the second half of 1959 and in 1960, Tito's own espousal of the main tenets of Soviet foreign policy had considerably reduced the scope of Soviet and satellite attacks against Yugoslavia, but here again it was the Soviet Union which determined the attitude toward Yugoslavia, and other states had only to comply. This was patently clear from what transpired among the Communist leaders present at the session of the UN General Assembly in New York last September. Meeting Khrushchev several times and having reportedly come to terms with him, Tito ignored Gomulka, who reciprocated. Again while Gomulka did not show the slightest sign of divergence from the general line of the bloc, Tito's efforts to foster "active coexistence" was conspicuously directed, not toward the East European bloc, but toward the Afro-Asian uncommitted countries.

Outlook for the Future

The trend of events in Central and Eastern Europe tends to reduce rather than improve the chances for a revival of the Polish-Yugoslav rapprochement. Since 1958, political currents have pulled the two countries even farther apart. Yugoslavia has continued to follow the line of "active coexistence" with its three-sided program: backing virtually all Soviet foreign policies; cultivating good relations with the West primarily for economic reasons; and strengthening ties with the Afro-Asian "neutrals." Domestically, experimentation—particularly in the socio-economic realm—has given to Yugoslav society some features not existing in other Communist countries.

At the same time, Poland has travelled in exactly the opposite direction. The stress on "the specific Polish road" both in external and domestic policies has been considerably toned down. Since the Polish-Soviet rapprochement in 1958, Poland's foreign policy has adhered even more strictly to the line of the Communist bloc. Although Poland's contacts with the West still remain wider and freer than those of any other Communist country, on all major issues of international politics Poland invariably sides with the USSR. Likewise, there has been a marked hardening of the internal political course. Individual liberties still exceed those existing anywhere else in the bloc, but compared with 1956-57 they have been seriously curtailed. Economic experimentation aimed at creating a new type of socialist economy corresponding to Polish needs has been brought to a standstill.[31] All in all, Poland has been moving toward a greater degree of assimilation with the rest of the "socialist camp."

There are other more general developments in Eastern Europe which must be taken into account in anticipating the future of Yugoslav-Polish relations. In the first place, the most active anti-Communist forces had been profoundly disheartened by the outcome of the dramatic events of late 1956, and particularly by Western inability to help them in any effective way. Unless some new crisis occurs in the Soviet empire, they are not likely to rise again in the near future.[32] In the second place, the plans to promote a gradual change through the establishment of some kind of a neutral zone in Central and Eastern Europe, hopefully though vaguely advocated in the years 1957-58, are no longer heard. The concept of "disengagement" has been conceded by both sides to be dead.[33] The crucial problem of

[29] Wladyslaw Gomulka, "Referat sprawozdawczy na III. Zjezdzie PSPR," *Przemowienia, 1959,* Ksiazka i Wiedza, Warsaw, 1960, p. 85.

[30] Speaking in Zagreb on December 12, 1959, about relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc, Tito declared: ". . . recently these attacks have been reduced. But there is another way: keeping quiet about and ignoring any of our important statements, declarations, and even the national holiday which we had. The press did not take any notice. This is not very nice. This should not be done." Radio Belgrade broadcast of the same day.

[31] *Cf.* "The Polish 'Economic Model'," by J. M. Montias, *Problems of Communism,* March-April 1960.

[32] For a discussion of the impact of events of 1956 upon Eastern Europe, *cf.* William Griffith, "The Revolt Reconsidered," *East Europe,* Vol. 9, No. 7 (July 1960); Adam Bromke, "Disengagement in East Europe," *International Journal,* Vol. XIV, No. 3 (Summer 1959).

[33] The Poles still occasionally revert to the Rapacki plan in their pronouncements. Yet, by simultaneously adhering to the Soviet proposal to conclude separate peace treaties with the two German states, they indicate that they no longer seriously consider the plan. For instance, see Gomulka's speech in the UN on September 27, 1960.

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the area, namely German unification, is recognized at present as virtually insoluble.

The USSR is evidently preparing to maintain its hegemony in Eastern Europe indefinitely. Soviet political controls over the "people's democracies" have been considerably streamlined through regular multilateral meetings and bilateral contacts linking each country directly with the Soviet Union. There are repeated rumors about the approaching formalization of these bonds through the re-establishment of the Comintern. Simultaneously, economic ties have been strengthened. Under the aegis of the CMEA the process of bloc-wide economic planning and integration has been systematically advanced.[34]

WITH THE NEW ascendancy of Soviet power, the impact of Titoism upon Eastern Europe has diminished almost to the vanishing point. Tito's ambiguous attitude toward the Hungarian events of 1956, his essentially defensive position in the recent controversy with the USSR, and last but not least Khrushchev's tactic of ignoring Yugoslavia have all contributed to the declining prestige of Tito's regime in the eyes of Communists and non-Communists alike. Indeed, it appears that the role of Titoism as a focal point for the dissidents in Eastern Europe is ended. Even if a new crisis were to break out in that area, it is unlikely that the other countries, and particularly the relatively distant and in some respects more advanced Poland, would look to Yugoslavia for political inspiration.

Moreover, it is highly improbable that Tito would still be at the helm of the Yugoslav government by the time any new changes were to take place in Central and Eastern Europe. He is now quite close to seventy, and although he looks robust and agile, the problem of his succession is already very much on the minds of the LCY leaders. The disappearance of Tito from the political arena is likely to bring about far-reaching changes in Yugoslav internal as well as external policies. Indeed, it might result in a general crisis of the regime, now so dependent on its charismatic leader. Such a possibility hinges essentially on the ability of Tito's successors to maintain party unity on basic foreign and domestic policies in the face of pressures from both East and West.

On the other hand, Poland's foreign policy is unlikely to be affected in the near future by the problem of succession. It is not only that Gomulka is much younger than Tito and therefore, despite his poor health, likely to remain longer in his post. What is far more important is that, owing to Poland's geography, no drastic change in her external policy is feasible without a basic shift in the international situation. Not only the Communists but also many non-Communists in Poland recognize this.[35] No matter who heads the Polish government, his policies will be determined by the all-pervasive factor of Polish politics, namely, Poland's location on the most strategically crucial border of the USSR. To sum up, the difference in the geopolitical location of the two countries and the switch in Soviet and Chinese attitudes are the two basic elements which doomed the idea of a Yugoslav-Polish alliance in 1957-58, and which will most likely prevent it from being revived in the years to come.

[34] *Cf.* "The CMEA: A Progress Report", by Alfred Zauberman, *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1960.

[35] This attitude on the part of the non-Communists was well illustrated by the statement of a prominent leader of the Polish lay Catholics: "The alliance with the Soviet Union . . . represents the foundation of our policy. This is understood by all politically conscious Poles . . ." Stanislaw Stomma, *Trybuna Ludu,* October 22, 1960.

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Czechoslovakia's March to Communism

By Edward Taborsky

IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, exploitation of man by man has been practically abolished, and the foundations of socialism have in substance been built. Our alignment in the mighty socialist camp, our firm alliance with the Soviet Union, and the results that we have attained enable us to set the completion of socialist construction in our fatherland as our next goal.

With these words, spoken at the Eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) in June 1958, the party's First Secretary, Antonin Novotny, officially proclaimed a new stage in Communist Czechoslovakia's advance along the Marxist-Leninist path,[1] a stage which—as later described by the new "socialist" constitution of 1960— is to "create the material and spiritual prerequisites for the transition of our society to communism." As spelled out by Novotny and embodied in the final resolution of the congress,[2] the "completion of socialist construction" involved five main tasks:

1). Achievement of "a decisive victory of socialist relations of production" in agriculture;

2). Removal of "the remnants of antagonistic classes" by liquidating remaining "kulaks" in rural areas and "other capitalistic elements in the cities";

3). Development of "the productive forces on the basis of the most advanced techniques" and steps "to secure a further uninterrupted growth in the people's living standards";

4). Action to "deepen and perfect incessantly our socialist democracy"; and

5). Moral strengthening of "the political unity of the people in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist teachings, and completion of the cultural revolution."

It is the purpose of this article to examine how and with what results these five main tasks have thus far been carried out.

[1] *Rude pravo* (Praha), June 19, 1958.
[2] *Ibid.* June 23, 1958.

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The Agricultural Situation

The remaining non-collectivized farmers were the first to feel the brunt of the neo-Stalinist offensive. While the more lenient treatment accorded them during the post-Stalin "thaw" could not compare with the latitude granted the farmers in Hungary and (after the "October Revolution" of 1956) in Poland, the Czechoslovak peasants had nevertheless enjoyed a brief respite after the death of Stalin. Collective farm membership declined from 381,000 in 1953 to 329,000 in 1955; the number of persons engaged in the private sector of agriculture rose simultaneously from 1,159,000 to 1,320,000; and the share of total agricultural land accounted for by the socialist sector fell from 44.7 to 42.6 percent.[3]

Alarmed by this loss of ground, the party leaders in 1955 issued a resolute call for a renewed collectivization drive and ordered all party and state organs to "show the peasants the road of socialism more boldly and forcefully."[4] Thus, the collectivization steamroller, temporarily halted after the death of the Soviet dictator, began to move again. Between the years 1955 and 1959, collective farm membership swelled from 329,000 to 970,000, while the number of persons working in the private agricultural sector dropped from 1,320,000 to 542,000, with a further sharp decline to 339,000 in

[3] Unless otherwise stated, all statistical data used in this article are taken from the *Statisticka rocenka republiky Ceskoslovenske* (Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Republic) and other official announcements of the Czechoslovak Office of Statistics.
[4] *News from Behind the Iron Curtain,* New York, Vol. 4 (1955), No. 8, p. 51.

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1960. Simultaneously, the socialist sector's share of total agricultural land rose from 42.6 percent in 1955 to 87 percent in 1960. In view of these results, there is little reason to doubt that the regime's plan to do away with private farming altogether by the end of 1961 will be attained on schedule.

The "victory of socialist productive relations" in agriculture enabled the party leaders at long last to begin applying the current Soviet policy of *merging collective farms into bigger units.* At the 1958 party congress, Novotny had flatly rejected "the ill-conceived ideas of some comrades regarding the merging of cooperatives and the creation of new large villages," on the ground that this might jeopardize the push toward complete collectivization. But the speedy progress of the drive evidently allayed his anxiety, and in November 1959 he announced that the average size of collective farms had to be increased "so as to take advantage of large-scale production economies and improved methods of management." [5] Since then, the merging of collective farms into bigger units has become a major item of the regime's agricultural program. By October 3, 1960, 2,530 of the country's collective farms had been merged into 1,050 units averaging 623 hectares of land per farm instead of the previous 300 hectares.[6] Judging from Soviet practice, which the chiefs of Czechoslovak communism tend to follow by force of habit, and from explanations of the merger program in official party publications, the process of collective farm amalgamation will undoubtedly continue until the farms attain whatever size the regime considers most efficient.

Apart from the calculation that larger collective farms will facilitate more thorough mechanization and more effective controls than were possible with smaller units, the merger program is also motivated by ideological considerations. One Czechoslovak journal, for example, wrote:

The merging of the collective farms . . . will raise agricultural production to the level of our socialist industry, will bring both forms of socialist ownership in agriculture [state and cooperative] closer to each other, and will ensure the elimination of differences in living standards between town and country.[7]

Since these last two anticipated results—realization of a "higher" form of socialist ownership and the overcoming of differences between town and country—figure among the time-honored requisites of the transition from socialism to communism, the farm amalgamation program fits in perfectly with the orthodox Marxist-Leninist line. As a matter of fact, some of the merged collectives have already begun replacing the existing method of measuring the individual member's share of farm income by labor-day units with a "system of reward analogous to that existing in state socialist ownership, *i.e.,* pecuniary compensation for work. . . ." [8]

AMALGAMATION OF THE collective farms into bigger units became all the more necessary when the Czechoslovak regime decided at the close of 1958 to follow the Soviet lead in *abolishing machine-tractor stations* as suppliers of mechanized equipment and labor to the collectives. The circumstances under which this decision was reached deserve particular attention. Aware of the value of the machine-tractor stations not only as mechanized equipment centers but also as an effective instrument of agricultural controls, the Czechoslovak leadership was at first anything but enthusiastic about Khrushchev's sudden *ukase* disbanding the Soviet MTS. Even as late as June 1958, Novotny assured the Eleventh Party Congress that the "machine-tractor stations will continue to be an important factor in the development of the Unified Agricultural Cooperatives and will constitute bases where the principal means of mechanization will be concentrated." [9] By the end of 1958, however, there was an abrupt change of mind. Since 1959 the machine-tractor stations have been selling their machinery to the collective farms, and the process was substantially completed by the end of 1960.[10]

But while the stations have been relieved of the main function for which they were originally established, they have not been abolished. Rather, their role has been changed and adapted to the new agricultural pattern. They no longer plough the fields and harvest the crops, but they continue to be charged with other functions such as land improvement, machinery maintenance and repair, and the training of mechanics. Since, in addition, they are directed to perform "technical inspection service"—*i.e.,* keeping track of the use of machinery by the collective farms and instructing the members of the collectives in its proper operation and maintenance—it is obvious that the reorganized stations continue to play a part in the interlocking Communist system of agricultural controls.[11]

[5] *Rude pravo,* November 13, 1959.
[6] *Nova mysl* (Praha), No. 11, November 1960, p. 1184 ff.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Rude pravo,* June 19, 1958.
[10] *Pravda* (Bratislava), January 3, 1959, and *Prague News Letter,* Vol. 16, No. 3, February 6, 1960.
[11] *Prague News Letter,* Vol. 16, No. 3, February 6, 1960: *Zivot strany* (Praha), No. 15 (1959), p. 919.

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In fact, both the amalgamation of the collective farms and the reorganization of the machine-tractor stations have been utilized for the purpose of further strengthening the system of controls. The transfer of machinery from the tractor stations to the collective farms was accompanied by the transfer of "politically and professionally mature" MTS employees,[12] while the mergers have similarly enabled the regime to "raise the level of management" through a "suitable selection of cadres from a broader membership basis." [13] Furthermore, regional and district party organs were ordered to take advantage of the farm reorganizations in order to establish primary party units in the collective farms.[14] (Hitherto the party had not attempted to set up primary units in the collectives and had operated in rural areas only through village party organizations.) Although such units had been formed in only 872 of the country's more than 12,000 collective farms by the beginning of 1960,[15] there is no doubt that the process will be pushed forward to rapid completion.

Away with Capitalist Survivals

Compared to the achievement of a "decisive victory of socialist productive relations" in agriculture, the liquidation of the "kulaks" and of remaining "capitalistic elements" in the cities presented only a minor problem. As for the hapless "kulaks," they had already been virtually wiped out by the time of the Eleventh Party Congress, and Novotny's bellicose call for their extinction was chiefly by way of using them as a convenient whipping-boy. To a somewhat lesser extent, this was also true of the "capitalistic elements" in the cities. Although "petty-bourgeois capitalism" had registered a slight revival in Czechoslovakia during the post-Stalin "thaw," its comeback had been much less noticeable than in neighboring Hungary and Poland: at the end of 1955, there were only 48,000 persons in the entire non-agricultural sector who could be designated as private entrepreneurs, and by 1958 their number had dwindled to 21,000. Hence, Novotny's inclusion of their elimination along with the "kulaks," as one of the party's five main tasks in the new era of the "completion of socialist construction" was altogether out of proportion to the practical importance of the problem. Obviously, Novotny was prompted more by the compulsion to pay homage to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy than by any practical need—though there probably was a genuine desire to do away with the last embarrassing leftovers of private enterprise which, as the Communist press itself conceded, were often "cheaper, quicker and simpler to work with" than the top-heavy, over-bureaucratized national enterprises.[16] At any rate, the new offensive against "petty-capitalism" was vigorously pressed, and by the end of 1959 only 9,000 private entrepreneurs remained.

The Production Picture

In explaining the third main task confronting the party in the forthcoming years, *i.e.*, the further development of the "productive forces," Novotny described the country's economy as "the main battlefield on which the completion of socialist construction will be decided." On the same occasion, he announced new exacting economic targets for 1965, subsequently revised upwards in 1959 and 1960. How has Communist Czechoslovakia

[12] *Zivot strany,* No. 15, 1959, p. 919.
[13] *Nova mysl,* No. 11, November 1960, p. 1184 ff.
[14] *Zivot strany,* No. 1, 1960, p. 6 ff.
[15] *Ibid.,* No. 13, 1960, p. 794.
[16] *Rude pravo,* August 15, 1957, and February 5, 1958.

TABLE I.
Major Indices of the Czechoslovak Economy: 1948-1965
(1937 = 100)

	1948 actual	*1955 actual*	*1960 plan*	*1965 plan*
National income	97	174	238	338
Growth of industrial production	108	234	397	622
Producer goods	110	274	473	817
Consumer goods	107	212	322	431
Electricity	183	365	590	948
Hard coal coke	121	198	240	330
Crude steel	114	195	296	464
Nitrogeneous fertilizers	118	242	585	1288
Cement	130	227	393	687
Shoes	117	114	170	190
Sugar	82	105	142	194
Labor productivity in industry	103	197	273	390
Growth of agricultural production[a]	75	95	108	132
Public transportation of goods	117	256	378	571
Public transportation of persons	199	354	542	539
Real Wages	—	122	156[b]	187

NOTES: [a]1936 = 100. [b]Estimate.
SOURCE: *Statisticke zpravy* (Statistical Reports), Prague, No. 8, August 1960, p. 216.

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fared on this "main battlefield" of "socialist construction"?

It is impossible to deal adequately with so massive a subject within a few paragraphs of a general survey.[17] The basic indices shown in Table I and a few words of evaluation must therefore suffice to indicate at least the main trends.

Although Communist statistical releases do not always accurately reflect economic realities, Table I does provide an approximate picture of Czechoslovakia's past economic development and future plans. It reveals a pattern typical of the entire Soviet orbit—namely, a spectacular increase in capital goods production, a much more modest but still quite substantial rise in the overall output of consumer goods, and a truly miserable showing in the field of agriculture. Recurrent upward revisions of industrial production targets, made possible by the overfulfillment of previously fixed goals, have contrasted sharply with downward revisions of agricultural production targets, made necessary by recurrent underfulfillment of the plan (see Table II).

While the overall *quantitative* achievements in industrial production are certainly impressive, they conceal various deficiencies which must be taken into account to obtain a properly balanced view. It is evident from persistent consumers' complaints as well as official admissions that the quality of merchandise leaves much to be desired, especially in the consumer goods field. Thus, to cite just one recent example, a spot check of textiles offered for sale in retail stores revealed, according to *Rude pravo* of August 18, 1959, that "65 percent of the checked merchandise was deficient and should not have appeared on the market." Rejects continue to be excessive, and in 1958 alone 873 million crowns (125 million dollars) were lost in this way.[18] Fulfillment or even overfulfillment of the planned targets in quantitative terms has frequently been accompanied by non-fulfillment of the planned assortment.[19] Although these and similar deficiencies do not invalidate the official claim of substantial advances in the field of industrial production, they do reveal that economic reality is considerably less glamorous that the overall statistical indices might indicate.

Nor should the tremendous human cost of the economic achievements be forgotten. The stepped-up targets of the Second Five-Year Plan, announced in the

TABLE II.
Target Revisions under the Second Five-Year Plan: 1956-1960

(Percent of increase over 1955)

	Original plan	*1958 revision*	*1960 revision*
Industrial production	50	54.4	64
Producer goods	57	61	73
Consumer goods	40	44	52
Agricultural production	30	27	14

SOURCE: Official plan announcements.

wake of the temporary respite of the first post-Stalin years, have led to an ever-tightening regimentation of labor. Although the methods of constriction have become subtler compared to the drastic disciplinary measures of Stalin's day, pressure has grown more persistent, more pervasive, and evasion has become more difficult as economic dependence on the all-mighty state increased and the network of controls became more refined.

While the Stalinist regulations forbidding workers to leave their jobs without the consent of management and their district people's committee no longer apply, the regime now restricts free movement of labor by making the length of uninterrupted employment in one place a major factor in computing the amount of an employee's sickness and maternity benefits and the length of his annual vacation, as well as in the assignment of housing and the allocation of other priorities. As for collective farmers, the Czechoslovak press itself has recently supplied evidence showing that collective farmers may not leave without permission of the farm administration.[20]

The struggle against absenteeism at work has also been intensified in recent years. The customary correctional measures were supplemented in 1959 by "comradely visits" paid to sick fellow-workers in order to expose those suffering from "potato rheumatism," "gardening fever" and other such "seasonal illnesses." At the same time, renewed warnings, reminiscent of the Stalin era, have lately been addressed to physicians against "buying cheap popularity" by declaring workers unfit for work because of sickness. Stiff jail sentences have been meted out to those issuing sickness certificates to allegedly healthy workers.[21]

Furthermore, the "socialist competitions", which began to plague the citizens of Czechoslovakia soon after the Communist seizure of power, have grown more var-

[17] The subject is considered in the present writer's *Communism in Czechoslovakia—1948-1960,* to be published later this year by Princeton University Press.

[18] *Zivot strany,* No. 16, 1959, p. 999.

[19] For the latest of many complaints, see *Rude pravo,* January 11, 1961.

[20] *Zemedelske noviny* (Praha), December 30, 1959; also *Ceskoslovensky zpravodaj* (New York), No. 294, May 9, 1960.

[21] *Rude pravo,* October 20, 1959.

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ied, more widespread, better organized and less "voluntary." And so have those obnoxious devices of labor exploitation called "voluntary work brigades" and "voluntary action" groups. How much "free-time" work without pay the regime manages to extract from the population was revealed in an official estimate indicating that work donated in 1960 on public improvement projects alone was worth approximately two million crowns (278,000 dollars) per day on the average.[22]

Finally, in a determined drive to bolster labor productivity—an effort upon which the fate of the new and ambitious Third Five-Year Plan primarily depends—a wholesale *"hardening" of work norms* was carried out in 1959 and 1960 under the guise of "wage reform."[23] Although wage rates were raised, work norms increased even more, so that many workers have in fact suffered a decrease in earnings, while others have to work harder in order to earn as much as before—and much harder still to secure pay increases.[24] The "hardening" of the norms has also wiped out whatever benefit Czechoslovak workers may have gained from the 1957 reduction of the workweek from 48 to 46 hours. They now have to produce more in fewer hours, or put in additional hours to catch up with their work. How illusory the 1957 workweek reduction really was has been strikingly revealed by a Czechoslovak economic journal, which stated that the average daily shift for construction workers was 8.1 hours in 1956, 8.2 in 1958, 8.4 in 1959 and 8.5 in the first half of 1960.[25]

The Question of Living Standards

But while labor regimentation has tightened the workers' living standards have improved. Average monthly wages of industrial workers have risen from 1,263 crowns in 1955 to 1,384 in the last quarter of 1960.[26] As the several price reductions granted in recent years have cut down the cost of living, real wages are said to have risen by one-fifth between 1956 and 1960.[27] Old-age and disability pensions were increased to an average of 610 crowns (85 dollars) per month at the end of 1959.[28] A corresponding increase has also taken place in child-allowances.

Thus, overall material conditions of life in Czechoslovakia have certainly improved since the death of Stalin, especially in the years 1957-1959. But have they improved as much as the regime asserts? In particular, have real wages truly risen by the claimed 56 percent over prewar levels? Although the limited length of this article disallows a fuller enquiry into this intriguing topic, an exhaustive study made by the present writer suggests a negative answer, this mainly for two reasons:

1). In figuring prewar levels of real wages, the Communist regime does not include almost two-fifths of the gainfully employed population (outside agriculture), such as persons in the liberal professions and other self-employed individuals, most of whom had considerably higher-than-average earnings. Moreover, it uses wage data as reported for the purposes of accident and old-age insurance, which were invariably lower than actual wages, and it also omits bonuses, overtime pay and other premiums.[29]

2). On the other hand, the cost-of-living index in Communist Czechoslovakia is calculated on the basis of the lowest official prices of the cheapest varieties of merchandise, which, as is generally known, are usually obtainable only by privileged officials and a few first-comers. The index thus grossly underestimates the actual level of prices, and, by the same token, overrates the real-wage level.

Perfecting "Socialist Democracy"

In expounding the party's fourth task, the "deepening and perfecting of socialist democracy," Novotny dwelt mainly on *decentralization* and *de-bureaucratization* of the country's sprawling administration. Neither was a novel proposition, what with various steps that had already been taken—such as the transfer of a substantial part of ministerial functions to the lower echelons of the administration (the people's committees), or the reduction of the central administrative apparatus, especially by weeding out members of the "defeated bourgeois class . . . seeking to overcome its defeat [by] infiltrating the organs of the proletarian state . . ."[30] It should be added, however, that all these decentralization measures of 1957-1960 were concerned almost exclusively with allocations of additional duties rather than additional powers. As stressed in no uncertain words in the 1960 resolution of the party Central Committee on

[22] *Ceskoslovensky zpravodaj,* No. 284, March 1, 1960.
[23] *Rude pravo,* November 20, 1958, September 22, 1959, and February 18, 1960.
[24] On the results of the wage reform, see *Rude pravo,* January 3 and 23, and Feb. 18, 1960; also *Prace* (Praha), Dec. 8, 1959.
[25] *Hospodarske noviny* (Praha), August 26, 1960.
[26] Last figure from *Hospodarske noviny,* December 21, 1960.
[27] *Rude pravo,* December 25, 1960.
[28] *Ibid.,* February 9, 1960.
[29] For a Communist admission to that effect, see Jan Kren, *Ceskoslovensko v obdobi docasne stabilisace kapitalismu* (Czechoslovakia In the Period of the Temporary Stabilization of Capitalism), Praha, 1957, p. 252.
[30] *Rude pravo,* January 25, 1958.

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the reorganization of the people's committees, the keynote of the reform was "a strict observance of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, which combines in a harmonious fashion the development of local initiative with the strengthening of central guidance." [31]

But the main step toward "deepening socialist democracy" in the years under review was the adoption, on July 11, 1960, of a new "socialist" constitution. As could be expected, the new constitution goes well beyond the previous "Ninth-of-May" Constitution of 1948 in its similarity to that of the Soviet Union. Thus, its provisions regarding ownership and the economic system in general are little else than a paraphrase of the corresponding clauses of the Soviet constitution. So is its "bill of rights," which stresses economic and social obligations, such as the duty to work, and de-emphasizes political rights—primarily by circumscribing them with various restrictive phrases similar to those found in the Soviet constitution. The National Assembly has been promoted from "the highest organ of legislative power," as it was defined in the 1948 constitution, to "the highest organ of state power," thus receiving the same status as the USSR's Supreme Soviet. The judiciary has been similarly refashioned. The judges of all courts have been made elective and have been directed to render periodic accounts of their work to the assemblies or voters that have elected them. A new institution of "local people's courts" has been added as a Czechoslovak equivalent of the Soviet "comrade's courts" to enforce "the rules of socialist life." Like its Soviet model, the new Czechoslovak fundamental law lumps together in one and the same chapter the judiciary and the prosecuting branch—the procuracy.

On the other hand, the 1960 constitution has retained the "bourgeois" institution of a one-man "presidency of the Republic" rather than adopting the presidium pattern prevalent in the USSR and throughout the satellite orbit. To be sure, the Presidency's constitutional status has been downgraded. In contrast to the previous system, the President has now been deprived of his (never-used) right to dissolve the National Assembly and to veto its laws, and he has been made responsible to the Assembly for the discharge of his presidential functions. But the very fact that such a unique opportunity for doing away with this conspicuous leftover from the democratic past has been allowed to slip by, is a clear indication of the manner in which the Czechoslovak Communists seek to exploit to their advantage the prestige and stature that became attached to the Presidency under Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes.

However, the most noteworthy feature of the new constitution is its inclusion of several Marxist-Leninist axioms pertaining to the transition from socialism to communism. It lists the "gradual transition to communism" as the chief goal of state policy. It refers to the "overcoming of the substantial differences between physical and mental work and between town and country." It stresses the necessity of an "all-round development of production on the basis of an incessant progress of science and technology, and an increase in the productivity of labor." It even contains the assertion that "some of the tasks of the state organs are gradually being transferred to social organizations." Clearly, all this is a faithful echo of the very latest Soviet reinterpretation of the "withering away of the state," which is now visualized by Khrushchev simply as a gradual transfer of state functions to the "social organizations of the people." [32]

Thus, the new constitution of the "Czechoslovak Socialist Republic"—as Czechoslovakia has now been renamed—and the manner in which it contrasts with the "Ninth-of-May" Constitution of 1948, reflect with considerable accuracy the extent to which Czechoslovakia's body politic has been sovietized in the past twelve years. While a few concessions—largely formal—continue to be made to the tenacious traditions of the country's parliamentary past, the inexorable tendency is to eliminate the last remaining distinctions from the "Soviet model." At the same time, by embodying in its clauses

[31] *Ibid.*, April 14, 1960.

[32] See Khrushchev's speech to the 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, *Pravda,* January 28, 1959.



"If a new customer doesn't show up soon, we'll be out of spare parts . . ."

—From Dikobraz (Prague), August 4, 1960.

„Jestli se neobjeví nový zá kazník, budeme bez náhradních dílu . . ."

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the basic Communist dicta on the transition from socialism to communism, the new constitution has become, from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, the most advanced fundamental law of the entire Communist orbit, and has in that respect overtaken even its Soviet model.

The "Cultural Revolution"

Of all the tasks that Novotny has set for the "completion of socialist construction" none was more crucial than the raising of the ideological level and the completion of the "cultural revolution." After all, the fate of communism hinges in the last resort on whether or not it can produce a new species of "Communist man" who wholeheartedly accepts the new system and contemptuously rejects the blandishments of Western democracy. Yet no task is harder to accomplish, for no sure means has as yet been devised to control men's thoughts.

The tightening of controls in the fields of culture and ideology became all the more urgent because this was precisely the area where the post-Stalin "thaw" had made its most far-reaching advances. Encouraged by the ideological ferment spreading through the Soviet orbit in 1955-1956, the Czechoslovak writers and artists gave vent publicly to their dislike of Marxism-Leninism.[33] Even many of the party's own faithful began to succumb to the "pernicious influence" of "alien bourgeois ideologies." Hence, as soon as it had recovered from its initial shock, the party leadership initiated a counter-offensive—at first slowly, and more recently with ever-increasing vigor. In line with the latest Soviet precepts, a relentless struggle has been waged against "the vicious poison of revisionism" and other "survivals of petty-bourgeois thinking" within and without the party ranks. Writers who had raised the banner of creative freedom at their rebellious congress in 1956 became the prime target of the attack. Unable to subdue them by "persuasion" alone, the party leaders switched in 1959 from recriminations and exhortations to direct action. A "National Conference of Writers," hastily convened in March 1959, removed from the leadership of the Writer's Union most of those who had led the struggle for liberalization in 1956. The ousted leaders were replaced by die-hard Stalinists, among them the most notorious advocate of rigid orthodoxy in science and culture, Ladislav Stoll. Another die-hard Stalinist took over the editorship-in-chief of the Union's journal, *Literarni noviny* (Literary Journal). The two literary reviews, *Kveten* (May) and *Novy zivot* (New life), which had steered farthest away from the formulas of "socialist realism," were closed down in the middle of 1960.

A similar recrudescence of neo-Stalinism has made itself felt in the other fields of culture. Painters and sculptors have repeatedly been urged to do away with their "servility" to "decadent" western examples.[34] Theater and film people have been warned of the dire consequences that would befall them should they "close their doors to the struggle for communism." [35] Strongly-worded resolutions of the party's Central Committee in June 1960 restated most emphatically the duty of radio and television to "educate working people in the ideas of communism . . . to disseminate the teaching of Marxism-Leninism . . . and overcome the survivals and influences of bourgeois ideologies . . ." [36] Even circuses have been directed (according to a law passed in December 1957) to "raise their ideological and artistic level" and to promote "the artistic and ideological growth of the circus artists."[37]

But the most important role in the battle for the mind has been assigned to the schools. Under the slogan of "strengthening the link between school and life," school curricula from the six grade through the university now include a substantial amount of factory and collective farm work. As stressed by Novotny at the Eleventh Congress, this further "polytechnization" is expected not only to make children acquire "good working habits," but also to "create conditions for a further enhancement of the school's influence on political education in the spirit of socialism."

To this end, school faculties have been subjected to ever-stiffening controls by the party, the school authorities, and various "social organizations." New directives were issued by the Ministry of Education in 1959, ordering all those concerned with admission procedures to consider, first and foremost, the applicants' class origin and political attitudes, as well as their entire family background, past and present.[38] Insistence on "political maturity and ideological dependability" as conditions *sine qua non* for successful graduation has recently grown stronger than ever; and the official teachers' journal has reemphasized, in no uncertain terms,

[33] See, for instance, Edward Taborsky, "Czechoslovakia under the Khrushchev-Bulganin Era," *The American Slavic and East European Review,* Vol. XVI, No. 1, February 1957, p. 50 ff.

[34] See, for instance, "Czechoslovakia's Rebellious Artists," *East Europe,* Vol. 9 (1960) No. 5, p. 6 ff.

[35] Novotny's speech on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the National Theater in Praha, *Rude pravo,* November 19, 1958.

[36] *Zivot strany,* No. 12, 1960, p. 735 ff.

[37] Law No. 82, of December 19, 1957.

[38] *Ceskoslovensky zpravodaj,* No. 286, March 15, 1960.

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the right of the "political representatives of the people's committees" sitting on examination commissions to co-determine students' grades.[39]

The Balance Sheet

How successful have the Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia thus far been in implementing the directives of the Eleventh Party Congress to "complete socialist construction"—and thus lay the foundations for the forthcoming "transition to communism?" The answer is that they have largely succeeded in the first four tasks, but failed in the fifth—which in the long run matters most.

They have indeed attained the coveted "decisive victory of socialist productive relations" in agriculture by virtually completing rural collectivization, strengthening their controls over the rural areas, and even taking the first steps toward the eventual transformation of collective farms into state farms. They have done away with the *kulaks* and effectively suppressed the remaining "capitalistic elements" in the cities by reducing private enterprise there to a few thousand family shops providing personal services. Except for the poor showing in agricultural production in every year of the Second Five-Year Plan save the last one (when agricultural production rose some seven percent above 1959[40]), they have achieved impressive economic advances, especially in the privileged capital-goods sector. They have raised the overall living standards of the population, though not as much as they claim and at the cost of harder work and more regimentation. They have managed to purge the state apparatus of most "bourgeois elements," to reduce somewhat the overgrown ranks of the bureaucracy, and to enlarge the scope of activities of the people's committees—under the aegis, of course, of the central authorities.

But the Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia have thus far been signally unsuccessful in implementing their fifth task—that of "morally deepening the political unity of the people in the spirit of the Marxist-Leninist teachings and completing the cultural revolution." It is true that the dissident voices have been largely silenced, and that Czechoslovakia has been restored to a situation of "normalcy," startlingly (though not fully) reminiscent of the Stalin era. However, by all indications, the "pernicious bourgeois ideologies" that were supposed to be wiped out have only been pushed underground. Thus, the task of transforming the Czechs and the Slovaks into new species of "Communist men," and of reaching the final utopia, still is unfulfilled. And such it is likely to remain.

[39] *Ucitelske noviny* (Praha), November 30, 1958.

[40] As claimed by Novotny in his New Year's speech, *Prace*, January 2, 1961.

Hungary: Existence and Coexistence

By Paul Ignotus

SINCE THIS AUTHOR'S last review of developments in Hungary,[1] trends in the life and governing policy of that country have not substantially changed—they have only become more explicit and more emphatic. There are certain contradictions, apparent or real, in these ruling trends: some point to a letup in Communist harshness, to increased efforts towards achieving "coexistence" with the population as well as the Western world, whereas others indicate a tendency to streamline Hungary in the Soviet image, to subordinate her economy to the interests of the USSR, and to liquidate ruthlessly all institutions and conventions likely to act as a check on total Communist party control.

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[1] "Hungary's Craving for Normalcy", *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1960.

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In both these tendencies, the Hungarian government accepts Soviet guidance without reservation and seems quite content to experiment, at Mr. Khrushchev's behest, in forging useful links with the non-Communist world, while quenching all attempts at deviation from the Moscow party line at home. This may indeed be the reason for the rumored hostility of the Chinese Communists towards the present Hungarian regime.[2]

Living Conditions

According to a statement made in December 1960 by a high Hungarian party official,

the total consumption of the entire population of Hungary increased in the last three years by 20 percent—an improvement affecting particularly food. . . This year the average per capita consumption of calories, proteins and fats has reached the level prevailing in the most developed countries.[3]

Whether exaggerated or not, this estimate reflects the gradual steps to improve living conditions forced by the Hungarian revolt of 1956. By 1960, however, as a result of a number of factors, this trend was halted, if not reversed.

In making this statement, one need not dispute the announcement made last December by Odon Kishazi, the Minister of Labor, that during 1960 "nominal wages and salaries of workers and employees increased by more than 2.5 percent on the average," that in some fields, where wages had been particularly low, the increases ranged as high as 5-15 percent (leaving the implication that in other areas the wage levels remained stationary or possibly even declined), and that in certain branches of industry, where long workdays had proved detrimental to the workers' health, hours had been reduced.[4] But Kishazi failed to mention other developments of the last year that more than offset the small rise in nominal wage rates: *i.e.*, the sudden and steep rise in rents (which until recently had been extremely low); a slight increase in the prices of consumer goods; and the tightening of work norms in industry, which has resulted in fewer bonuses and smaller take-home pay. Figures published last July in the government's official statistical survey *Statisztikai Kozlemenyek* revealed that the purchasing power of industrial workers' earnings declined by roughly 6-8 percent in the one-year period ending July 1960.[5] There is little doubt that the downward trend in money and real incomes in the industrial sector has continued, since it was only late last year that the higher work norms began to be put in effect on a wider scale.

As to the outlook for the months ahead, Hungarians have little to look forward to. According to the 1961 target figures of the current Five-Year Plan, average real personal income is to increase by 1.8 percent, with real income of the wage-earning population rising 2.9 percent.[6] These figures do not suggest substantially improved living conditions in the near future.

Drive for Higher Productivity

The second Hungarian Five-Year Plan (1961-65) coincides—not surprisingly—with the timing of the Soviet Seven-Year Plan. Its primary goals are: (1) increased industrial production (by 8 percent in 1961, based, in part, on 85,000 additional workers and employees);[7] (2) total collectivization of agriculture, coupled with a rise in production (by 7.9 percent in 1961);[8] and (3) integration of Hungary into the Soviet bloc trade network (increasing the volume of trade between the USSR and Hungary in 1961 by an anticipated 25 percent over the previous year).[9]

The degree of success in fulfilling these targets will depend first of all on raising the productivity of Hungarian workers and peasants. Thus far, as Communist authorities keep stressing, the increases in production that have taken place have been largely due to heavy public investment, an increase in the industrial labor force, and to Soviet aid, which presumably can no longer be expected to flow into the country at the rate established during the past four years. There has been little success in raising the workers' productivity. It has been brought out, for instance, that machine tools obtained at high prices from abroad were used in a slack way and failed to increase productivity.[10]

In order to boost output per worker, a drive was started last year—first in periodicals specifically concerned with ideological and economic questions,[11] and then in the daily papers—to tighten production norms in industry. The new regulations do not impose a rigid

[2] *E.g.*, Gordon Shepherd reporting from Budapest, *Daily Telegraph* (London), November 1960.
[3] Lajos Feher, *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), December 9, 1960.
[4] *Nepszabdsag*, December 31, 1960.
[5] No. 9, July 1960.
[6] *Nepszabadsag*, January 1, 1961.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Nepszabadsag*, December 21, 1960.
[10] *Figyelo*, November 15, 1960.
[11] Such as *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Social Review), scientific periodical of the party; *Partelet* (Party Life), organ of the party functionaries; *Figyelo* (Spectator), economic weekly.

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set of norms on the economy as a whole, but leave it to the managements of industrial branches to determine new performance standards within their areas of responsibility. In principle, the norms are to reflect the average worker's highest capacity, and premiums are to be awarded only for truly exceptional achievements.[12]

In the beginning, the Communist press did not even try to conceal the angry workers' reactions to the stiffening of the norms. "The belated rearrangement of norms and the resulting substantial decrease of incomes," admitted the economic weekly *Figyelo*, "has of course been received unfavorably by the workers affected by it." [13] In the later stages of the campaign, however, the tightening of the norms was represented as a "socialist achievement," enthusiastically received by all those affected. "The great majority of the workers are both anxious and able to perform more than required by the norms, which have been altered as a result of technological progress," proclaimed the official party organ *Nepszabadsag*.[14] By the middle of January the Hungarian public was informed that the campaign for higher norms was an idea originated by the workers themselves. Thus, *Nepszabadsag* cheerfully announced that in the largest Hungarian industrial combine (and the main workers' revolutionary center in 1956), the metal-works of Csepel,

the workers voluntarily agreed to tighten work discipline and increase productivity. Indeed, from then on, the productivity curve has shown a sharp turn upward: while in July daily per capita production amounted to 7,555 florins, in November it rose to 11,200 florins.[15]

In the meantime, "socialist work competition" has again become fashionable, reviving the Stakhanovism of the Stalin era.[16] On the grounds of past experience, one may expect that these latest pressures applied on Hungarian labor will lead to few spectacular achievements at first, and to spectacular fiascos later on.

The End of Private Farming

Despite the strenuous efforts to increase industrial productivity, the regime has been concentrating most of its attention on accomplishing complete collectivization of Hungarian agriculture by early spring of this year—a step which, according to party spokesmen, is necessary if planting and harvesting technology is to be improved

[12] See Kishazi article in *Nepszabadsag*, December 31, 1960.
[13] October 15, 1960.
[14] December 1, 1960.
[15] *Nepszabadsag*, January 10, 1961.
[16] Extolled by Janos Kadar in his speech at the Communist Youth Congress, December 17, 1960.

Pusztai Pál rajza

FALUSI REGGEL

— A papa nem kel még fel?
— Ráér! Ő a téeszbe megy dolgozni...

***Below left:* "Morning at the village." *Right:*—"Isn't papa up yet?"—"There's time! He's working on the cooperative farm.**

—*From Lucas Matyi (Budapest), Oct. 27, 1960.*

and the 30-32 percent increase in agricultural output, scheduled for the Five-Year Plan period, achieved. Preparations for this final blow to the private peasant economy have been afoot for the past two years, and thus the decision to undertake the "great leap" in 1961 did not come as a surprise.

Perhaps the most comprehensive, if somewhat curious, rationalization of the government's decision was given in Parliament by the Minister of Agriculture, Pal Losonczi, and party Presidium member (and agricultural expert) Lajos Feher.[17] They reported that whereas only 30.7 percent of Hungary's arable land suitable for large-scale farming belonged to the socialist sector of the economy in December 1958, 77 percent was incorporated in the socialist sector by the end of 1960. Nevertheless, progress in agricultural production had been slow. While industrial output had risen by 250 percent between 1938 and 1960, agricultural production in-

[17] *Nepszabadsag*, December 9, 1960.

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creased by a mere 15 percent, and this despite the fact that in 1960 11 percent of the national income had been invested in agriculture, principally in the collective farms. It was therefore the party's conclusion that, in the common interest, collectivization had to be completed, and to convince the peasants of this necessity, "it is our duty to call on [them] in their homes in the coming winter and exchange opinions with them. . . ."

In pursuit of this campaign of personal "persuasion," hundreds of Communist officials descended on the Hungarian villages in recent months, haranguing the peasants about the virtues of "cooperation." The press has also lent a hand, and collectivization is being popularized by all possible means. Hungarian classics and historical figures are quoted as approving "cooperation," [18] and much publicity and personal tribute are showered on peasants who agree to join farm collectives.[19]

Meanwhile, the *tsz's* (collective farms) are expected gradually to lose their semiprivate character and become more strictly integrated into the state economy. Of the many statements advocating this policy, the most revealing is perhaps an article by the agronomist Ferenc Erdei, entitled "Socialist Agriculture Entails New Practical and Scientific Tasks." [20] Articles signed by Erdei are of particular significance because ever since the first postwar years, when he was Minister of Interior (representing the National Peasant Party), he has often been selected by the party to put before the peasant population pending agricultural measures which the Communists knew would be received with even greater hostility if they themselves presented them to the public.

In his recent article, Erdei explained that it was now necessary to introduce "large-scale technology" (economies of scale used in manufacturing) into agricultural production—an "unusual expression," as he himself hastens to add, but one that is "already familiar in Soviet agriculture, and also in the agriculture of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia." The principal innovations under this scheme include increased roles for the *tsz* chairmen and the leading agronomists, and a new stress on the development of specialized functional brigades in fields such as plowing, animal husbandry and so forth. Erdei then pointed out that in their efforts to achieve a better organization of agricultural labor and more specialization, various countries of the Soviet bloc used different points of departure. Thus, in Czechoslovakia, "cooperation of cooperatives is being organized"; in the GDR, the tractor-stations are the dominant units; and in the USSR, the "inter-*Kolkhoz* enterprises are acquiring an increasingly important role." Erdei suggested that it still was an open question which of these approaches would be most suitable for Hungarian agriculture, but a coordination of efforts, he concluded, would be indispensable.

There have thus far been no spectacular acts of peasant resistance to the current collectivization drive. Some of the more traditional reactions to impending socialization have made themselves felt, however. Thus livestock is being slaughtered by the peasants "before it is too late," a practice that has already resulted in a serious drop in the total stock of beef cattle and hogs.[21] But perhaps the most striking result, and one that seems to perturb the Communist authorities the most, is the flight of the peasantry from the land. Deprived of the prospect of working their own land, the village population, and particularly the youth, are attracted by the amenities of city life; they prefer to be wage earners in a suburb rather than on a *kolkhoz*. This problem was widely discussed at the last Congress of the Hungarian Communist Youth Association, where many functionaries complained how difficult it was to persuade the young village people to stay on the farms.[22]

State-Patronized Culture

The latest measures taken in Hungarian intellectual life are more ambivalent. Some tend in the direction of complete *Gleichschaltung,* such as the decree of last October 15, stipulating that the Hungarian Academy of Sciences—which from its foundation in 1825 was supposed to be an autonomous body—be wedded to the principles of dialectical materialism and "supervised by the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers'-Peasants' Government" (as the Hungarian regime since the crushing of the 1956 revolution is officially called). There have also been attempts, hitherto fairly isolated, to compel clergymen to support actively the political aims of the party. Thus *Katolikus Szo,* the organ of the pseudo-Catholic and crypto-Communist "Peace Priests" organization, exhorted its readers to

speak out for disarmament . . . about the results of the World Peace Movement and the self-determination of colonial peoples. Concerning the problems of our own country, we must speak aloud of the advantages of cooperation, of the prospects for cooperatives. If this is politics, well then, let us talk politics. . . .[23]

[18] *Ibid.,* December 25, 1960.
[19] *Szabad Fold* (Free Land), December 3, 1960; *Nepszabadsag* during the whole period, etc.
[20] *Nepszabadsag,* December 1, 1960.
[21] See Losonczi's speech in *Nepszabadsag,* December 9, 1960.
[22] *Ibid.,* December 17, 1960.
[23] As quoted by *News from Hungary,* compiled by Free Europe Committee, December 30, 1960.

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In other areas, however, a qualified "thaw" continues. It is obviously conditioned by the desire of the regime to win the goodwill of moderate opinion in the West, especially in Britain and France, and of the Hungarian middle-class intellectuals attracted by Western culture. A determined—and quite successful—effort is also being made to spread knowledge and to make the arts and sciences accessible to the widest circles of the population, provided, of course, that by doing so no publicity is given to statements critical of the Hungarian regime or the Soviet Union. The generosity of the state in patronizing the arts is publicized with special pride. Thus, according to a recent article in *Figyelo*:

In Hungary, before the war, 8,000 books were published in 17 million copies . . . In 1959, 20,000 books in 55 million copies . . . Thus we became a Great Power in the book trade. In 1959, for instance, our books coming from the printer equaled, if counted in tons, those published in France in 1958 . . .[24]

The same article also noted a growth in theater and concert audiences, which cost the state 88 million florins (some 2 million dollars), and similar increases in participation in scientific lectures and language courses and in the turnover in public libraries.

At the same time, much prominence is being given the establishment of "cultural links with the capitalist countries." The Secretary-General of the International PEN Club, David Carver, was given a warm welcome on his visit to Budapest,[25] and subsequently more and more Hungarian intellectuals of repute were allowed to visit Western countries. Most significant of these journeys was the visit of a Hungarian cultural delegation to London and Paris in November 1960. This group consisted of the novelists Aron Tamasi and Geza Ottlik; the poet, Ferenc Juhasz; the historian Tibor Kardos; and the director of the state publishing house, Bela Kopeczi. (Tamasi was once Vice-President of the former Hungarian Writers' Association, banned at the beginning of 1957; Juhasz, a gifted Communist poet, strikingly deviated from the Zhdanov cultural line in the 1950's and played an important part in the subsequent intellectual "thaw"; Ottlik is a man without a definite political profile, a non-Communist, and mainly interested in English literature; Kardos is professionally a student of the Italian Renaissance, but a committed Marxist; Kopeczi is an active *apparatchik*.) On their return to Budapest, they gave rather non-political accounts of their journey.[26] Kopeczi was the only one who came out with an emphatic statement favorably comparing Hungarian cultural conditions with those in the West, though he, too, did so in a moderate tone and admitted that "in certain fields we can even learn from highly developed capitalist countries." He also quoted Tamasi's cautious praise of the Hungarian regime expressed at a press conference in London. Thus, at the price of some faint lip-service or reticence on one side, and liberality in issuing passports on the other, a *modus vivendi* has been achieved between the present Hungarian government and most of those writers whose behavior in 1956 and 1957 was such a blow to Communist intellectual prestige.

As part of the campaign to enlist British and French sympathies for Communist Hungary, the *Hungarian Quarterly* and the *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie,* are being revived. In the first number of the *New Hungarian Quarterly* (September 1960), its editor pays a high tribute to his predecessors who countered Nazi influence by establishing links between Britain and Hungary before World War II—thus implying a compliment, if not to the Horthy regime, then at least to its moderate wing. Indeed, the publication shows a strange mixture of Marxist-Leninist sloganeering and ostentatious traditionalism. In its pages dealing with foreign affairs, the United States is violently attacked but Great Britain is spared.

The Twin Bogies

The monolithic character of the Hungarian regime thus does not rule out friendly gestures towards non-Communists in Hungary, much less towards non-Communists abroad. There are, however, two foes about whom the Hungarian party is uncompromising in its ideological struggle. One is personified by the late John Foster Dulles, and the other by the late Imre Nagy. They stand as the respective symbols of "American capitalism" and "revisionism"; the former is depicted as a menace all over the globe, and the latter as the principal menace within the Soviet bloc.

The anti-American campaign follows the usual Soviet pattern, which is supplemented by frequent reproaches to the United States for "its futile attempt to interfere in our internal affairs and to organize cold-war campaigns against us" in the United Nations and other forms.[27] The American Legation in Budapest is denounced for having frustrated all efforts of the Hungarian Government to establish normal diplomatic

[24] November 4, 1960.

[25] *Elet es Irodalom* (Life and Literature), weekly of the new and now subservient Hungarian Writers' Association.

[26] *Ibid.*, December 23, 1960.

[27] Gyula Kallai, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, speaking in Parliament, *Nepszabadsag,* December 8, 1960.

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EMBEZZLER

—Don't turn around, gentlemen. I have a run in my stocking . . .

—From Ludas Matyi (Budapest), Nov. 3, 1960.

relations with the United States;[28] Americans are held responsible for past frontier incidents with Austria because of former family ties between the Dulles family and the owner and publisher of *Die Presse*, a leading Viennese daily.[29] It is still too early to say whether this propaganda line will change as a result of Mr. Kennedy's assumption of the American presidency.

The ideological campaign has as its other main target the "rightist," liberalizing Communists, those who "masqueraded as believers in communism" and then turned out to be "traitors"—that is, the revisionists. True enough, "dogmatism" and the "personality cult" are also blamed for the tragedies of 1956, but these aberrations are said to have been disposed of by the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU.[30] Internal revisionism, linked up with American "capitalism," thus remains the principal present evil and past culprit in the 1956 "counterrevolution."

After more than four years in power, the Kadar regime seems to have persuaded the great majority of Hungarians to accept Soviet domination as a fact not to be undone by internal plots or external intervention. In this quest for popular submission, Kadar has been careful to avoid the most conspicuous psychological blunders of the Rakosi era, and his chances of success have been further enhanced by massive Soviet political and economic assistance. Thus, for the present, the spirit of the 1956 Revolution is gone, and the thin hope that remains in the country is cautiously vested in future slow improvements induced by a universal recognition that the existing conditions of life are untenable in the long run.

On the other hand, all efforts of the regime to represent the October rising as a "counterrevolution" and to win active popular support have utterly failed. To quote an observation by an English tourist: "Any *apologia* a Hungarian may make on behalf of his government is really an *apology*." Kadar has won all the battles except that for popularity.

[28] Foreign Minister Dr. Endre Sik, *ibid.*

[29] *Nepszabadsag*, December 6, 1960.

[30] Kadar in his article in *Pravda* and *Nepszabadsag*.

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BURMA'S RADICAL LEFT: A Study in Failure

By John H. Badgley

BURMA'S ATTAINMENT of independence in 1948 placed the reins of government in the hands of a group of young leaders who had inspired the Burmese nationalist movement since the late 1930's.* It was these leaders who in 1944, with Burma still under Japanese military occupation, performed the vital task of forging the various communal and political factions into a single national political coalition, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL). And it was these leaders who, after the return of peace, succeeded in convincing the Labor Government in Britain that Burma, no less than India and Pakistan, should be granted freedom from colonial authority.

In pressing for complete independence rather than dominion status for Burma, Aung San, the first president of the AFPFL, chose the most radical course thus far taken by any nationalist leader in the British Commonwealth since the war. This stand was taken with an eye to the powerful Left Wing in Burma and was indicative of its influence upon the new government. But the Left lacked cohesion, and within a year it split up into various groups. Some were Communist factions disposed to seek power by insurrection; others embraced Communist theory but shunned a resort to arms; a few were composed of Socialists who often supported Soviet bloc international policies but rejected Communist ideology.

Three revolutionary groups, two of them Communist, were the most powerful of these left-wing elements; yet, even their combined strength proved insufficient to accomplish the seizure of the government. In terms of direct causes, the Communist failure can correctly be attributed to the strength displayed by a Burmese national leadership which has persistently based its internal and external policies on neutralist principles. This alone, however, does not provide an adequate explanation. The purpose of the present article is therefore to reexamine the course of political development in Burma with a view to discerning some of the deeper, underlying factors which have influenced the behavior and effectiveness of the Burmese radical Left in the past, and which may continue to affect its role in the future.

Marx and Burmese Nationalism

The nationalist movement in Burma conformed in most respects to the pattern generally characteristic of the South and Southeast Asian countries formerly under colonial rule. In all these countries, leadership of the nationalist drive for independence came from a Western-trained indigenous elite outside the colonial bureaucracy—from men who aspired to bring their peoples the economic and social advantages prevalent in the West, and who sought a system of political ideas and symbols which would help them to unite and lead the masses in a struggle to attain nationalist goals. Some turned to their own historic national heritages in search of traditional symbols of authority, while others viewed the legacies of the indigenous past as a source

* The author expresses his appreciation to Miss Daphne Whittam and Mr. Oliver Clubb for their helpful suggestions during the preparation of this article. Neither, however, is responsible for the interpretations presented.

Mr. Badgley is currently completing his doctoral dissertation at the University of California (Berkeley, Calif.). The present article is based on a chapter of his thesis, a study of the effect of traditional political attitudes on modernization in Burma.

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of weakness which must be overcome by introducing modern political and social doctrines and scientific techniques taken from the West. To many of the latter, the revolutionary, anti-colonialist teachings of Marxism and communism seemed the most satisfactory answer to their needs, and converts to these radical doctrines assumed a prominent place in the leadership of the nationalist movements throughout colonial Asia.

In one respect the Burmese movement differed from its nearby counterparts: it was slower in getting started. Until the 1930's, no sustained drive for independence developed and nationalist demands were restricted to limited home rule and separation from India. In 1931, however, the outbreak of the rural-based Saya San rebellion, instigated by a reactionary wing of the nationalist movement, revealed a new depth of popular response. Subsequent nationalist pressures resulted, in 1937, in the promulgation of a new constitution giving Burma a separate government from India with substantial home rule. By then, however, these limited gains were no longer enough to satisfy the more radical elements in the nationalist camp.

In the mid-1930's the Left in Burma consisted of a small party, the *Dobama Asi-ayone,* and an association of university students and recent graduates calling themselves "Thakins", a title of address hitherto reserved exclusively for Europeans. Both groups were dedicated to the goal of complete independence for Burma, and many of the Thakins belonged to the *Dobama Asi-ayone* and took guidance from its leaders. The Thakins, however, displayed three distinctive characteristics: they consciously identified themselves with traditional and rural Burma by their language and dress, and by centering their political activity in the country towns; their political ideas were drawn largely from radical socialist, Communist, and—occasionally—Fascist sources; and they regarded violence and direct action such as strikes and boycotts as essential tactical weapons.

The Thakin group grew out of student discussion meetings and book clubs organized after the Saya San rebellion by some of the older leaders of the *Dobama Asi-ayone* and a British educator, J. S. Furnivall, with a view to stimulating more sophisticated political thinking among the young Burmese student intellectuals. The writings of Indian nationalist leaders, of Sun Yat-sen, of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, of the Fabian Socialists and American liberals, and even of Hitler were read, compared, and often translated. A student newspaper appeared and thrived despite government opposition. The Thakins became active political agitators: some participated in the communal riots which were a chronic problem in the 1930's; others organized strikes against the university administration, in industrial firms and public transportation.

Of the twenty or thirty leading Thakins, only two or three professed to be Communists. There is no evidence that the group had any contacts at this stage with the Comintern or with the Indian and Chinese Communist Parties, although two members of the group —H. N. Goshal, a Burmese of Indian extraction, and Thein Pe Myint, who was a student at Calcutta in 1935 —had friends among the Indian Communists. Many of the Thakins visited India in this period, but their contacts were mainly with sympathetic leaders of the Indian National Congress. Other members of the group flirted briefly with Fascist ideas but were soon disenchanted by Japan's occupation policies in China and Hitler's aggressions in Europe. Increasingly the group as a whole tended to identify itself as socialist.

The Communists in the War

More radical tendencies asserted themselves in 1939, when one group of Thakin leaders formed the clandestine Burma Revolutionary Party patterned after the Communist Parties in Europe and another group led by Aung San began organizing a militia-cadre.[1] The first major ideological split, however, developed as a consequence of Japan's military advance into Southeast Asia. Already in 1940, the Japanese had made advance efforts to win the support of Burmese nationalist leaders, including members of the Thakin group, by promising Japan's help in achieving Burmese independence. These overtures eventually resulted in a cleavage between the minority of Thakin leaders who took a Stalinist position, and the majority whose Communist leanings were outweighed by the nationalist urge to accept any aid that might promote independence. Of the minority group, Thein Pe Myint and a few lesser Communists withdrew to India after the Japanese invasion and established formal contact with the Indian Communist Party, while the other Communist leaders remained in Burma to organize an underground party.

The rift between the Communist wing and the majority faction of Thakin leaders was shortlived, for by the end of 1942 the rapid growth of anti-Japanese sentiment in occupied Burma impelled the inner circle of Thakins to draw the Communist dissidents back into their confidence. When the Japanese granted Burma nominal independence in 1943, three members of this inner circle were given high official positions because

[1] Aung San had been leader of the student government at Rangoon University in 1936-37.

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of their influence among the Communist elements. Thakin Nu, who had not identified himself with any of the prewar factions, was made Foreign Minister; Aung San, who had taken a contingent of Thakins to Japan in 1941 to receive military training, and who had subsequently commanded the Burma Independence Army supporting the Japanese invasion, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the new Burma National Army; and Than Tun, the most prominent of the pro-Communist Thakins who had not gone underground, became Minister of Agriculture.

During the remainder of the war, most of the Thakins were engaged in the construction of Aung San's National Army. Of the original group, only the Communists and radical Socialists continued their political activities, and it was not until 1944 that these men met with Aung San—by then the acknowledged leader of the non-Communist national movement aiming at immediate postwar independence for Burma—to discuss the formation of a united national party. Aung San's later remarks concerning this meeting indicate that his was the initiating role in the organization of the AFPFL:

. . . in the beginning of August, I think the 4th to the 7th, in Pegu, after months of exchanges of view, Communist representatives and I met together, discussed and approved my proposal for the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League and the draft of its first manifesto, and evolved a plan of action together. Then the AFPFL was broadened as far as conditions at the time permitted.[2]

Burma's "Leftist" Orientation

The Communists at the outset enjoyed a dominant position in the AFPFL because they alone had a political organization extending into all the local districts. Thakin Soe, an intransigent Stalinist, and other members of the Communist faction played a key role in building the AFPFL organization, and Than Tun, acknowledged by the end of the war as the foremost Communist leader, became its secretary-general. The Communists faced some competition from another left-wing faction formed around the core of the old Burma Revolutionary Party and calling itself Socialist. It is significant, however, that a listing of the members of the AFPFL Supreme Council at that time ranked Than Tun and two other Communists ahead of the Socialist members. By early 1946, no less than fifteen political, communal, and economic organizations were represented on the Council, and it was apparent that the AFPFL coalition had established itself as the chosen political instrument of the nationalist drive for independence.

Although there was a conscious ideological division between Socialists and Communists in the AFPFL leadership, this was perhaps of less significance than the fact that all the various groups were in general agreement on a "leftist" approach to the problems of national reconstruction after the attainment of independence. The top leaders of the AFPFL were unanimous in desiring a thorough social revolution, and even though the British political system served as an important model for reorganization of the government, most of these leaders founded their political philosophies upon Marx's economic interpretation of history and of imperialism. Both the new Burmese Constitution and the first economic Development Plan, which were conceived in 1947 before the Communists switched to insurrectionist tactics, embodied a number of Marxist-Leninist concepts. The sections of the Constitution dealing with "workers' rights" and "the directive principles of state policy" evidently were inspired by the Yugoslav Constitution.[3] Subsequent declarations by non-Communist AFPFL leaders repeatedly emphasized the "leftist" orientation of their policies. Soon after independence became effective in January 1948, U Nu defined the gist of this orientation as follows:

. . . What we call Leftism in this country has a noble aim. . . . There can be no such thing as insufficient clothing or living exposed to the inclemencies of the weather. There should be no master and servant, and no division of the people into classes. . . . If we analyze the evils which I have just recited, these arise from and are dependent on the idea of property. . . . If Leftism prevails, there would be an end to private property. The wealth inside the earth and over the earth would no longer be exploited for private use, but for the use of all men and women, and each will work according to his strength and capacity and take from the produce just what he needs. This in essence is what I mean by Leftism.[4]

U Ba Swe, another important non-Communist leader of the AFPFL, was much more explicit in designating Marxism as the necessary path for Burma:

Let me be plain. Marxism is the guide to action in our revolutionary movement, in our establishment of a Socialist Burmese State for workers and peasants. . . . Only Marxism can pave the way for the attainment of

[2] From a public address delivered August 29, 1945. See Aung San, *Burma's Challenge*. 1946 (mimeograph), Defense Services Historical Institute, Rangoon, n.d., p. 16. (Author's italics)

[3] For comments on the origins of the Constitution, see Maung Maung, *Burma's Constitution*, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1959.

[4] From a public address delivered June 13, 1948. See U Nu, *Towards Peace and Democracy*, Government Printing, Rangoon, 1959, pp. 128-29.

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the goal to which we look forward. Our revolution is impossible without Marxism as a guide. We must understand this once and for all.[5]

But general agreement on a socialist reconstruction of Burma did not preclude serious conflicts within the AFPFL over methods and policy.[6] Although the moderate elements in the coalition managed to preserve a consensus, the extremists on both Right and Left began splitting off from the AFPFL long before independence, and because they were denied further political influence, they eventually resorted to violence. In July 1947 Aung San and six members of the cabinet were assassinated by rightists in an attempted *coup d'état*. Less than a year later, with independence but a few months old, the Communists began an insurrection that was to last for a decade.

Communist Insurgency

The launching of the insurrection in April 1948 climaxed a gradual alienation of the Communists from the AFPFL that had begun much earlier. Within six months of the Japanese surrender, Thakin Soe took his small Stalinist faction out of the coalition, attacking the moderate AFPFL leaders for their conservatism and Than Tun's majority Communist group for "Browderism," or rightist tendencies. The Stalinist faction then formed its own Communist Party of Burma, known as the "Red Flags", rivaling Than Tun's Burma Communist Party (BCP) or "White Flags," which remained in the coalition. In July 1946, however, British action outlawing Thakin Soe's party led the White Flags to initiate a series of strikes which at first were aimed at the British but eventually were directed against the AFPFL itself, forcing Than Tun's resignation as secretary-general of the coalition. The BCP thereafter took a critical stand toward the AFPFL leadership throughout the independence negotiations, but it continued to refrain from the violent tactics already being employed, ineffectually, by the Red Flags.

With the advent of independence, there were signs of a stiffening of BCP policy, seemingly encouraged by contacts with outside Communist parties. H. N. Goshal, a member of the BCP leadership, had been in Calcutta during the December 1947 session of the Indian Communist Party Central Committee, and had reportedly held consultations on policy questions with leaders of the CPI.[7] Following his return to Burma in March 1948, the BCP circulated an official policy directive known as the "Goshal Thesis", which enunciated a new party line exposing the independence granted to Burma as "fake independence" and "a new maneuver [by the imperialists] to tighten the grip of their domination over our country." There were further contacts in February 1948, when Than Tun himself attended the Communist-sponsored Southeast Asia Youth Conference in Calcutta, at which a number of foreign Communist delegations, including one from the Soviet Union, were present.

Soon thereafter, events in Burma moved swiftly toward a climax. In March 1948 the BCP staged a series of popular demonstrations against the AFPFL, and in April Than Tun ordered the nationwide party organization into armed revolt against the new government. The evidence pointing to possible outside pressures on the Burmese Communists just before the insurrection should not, however, be taken as proof that the action of the BCP was primarily the result of Soviet instigation. In fact, it appears more likely that whatever pressures or influence may have been exerted served merely to sanction a course which the BCP leadership already felt impelled to take because of considerations connected with the domestic struggle for power. The decisive factors behind the BCP action probably were the Socialists' acquisition of a dominant voice in national policy formulation and the exclusion of the Communists from cabinet posts in the new government.

Besides bringing the White Flag and Red Flag Communists together in a common camp, the insurrection tended to become polarized into a broader conflict between moderates and radicals. Other national political organizations of significant size and with armed formations of their own found themselves under pressure to choose between supporting the U Nu government and joining the insurgents. To avert the latter danger, U Nu

[5] From a speech at a Trade Union Congress, December 18, 1951. See U Ba Swe, *The Burmese Revolution,* Information Dept., Rangoon, 1952.

[6] Accounts of the early positions of the various leaders concerning the war, independence, and other issues may be found in U Nu, *Burma under the Japanese,* Macmillan, London, 1954; Aung San, *op. cit.;* and Tun Pe, *Sun Over Burma,* Rangoon, 1949.

[7] H. N. Goshal, Thakin Soe, and especially Thein Pe Myint had maintained contacts with the Indian Communists during the war, and the establishment of the Cominform in 1947 gave a new impetus to closer relations between the Burmese and Indian Communists. Regarding the conferences held in Calcutta between December 1947 and March 1948, see Ruth McVey, *The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asia Uprisings,* Cornell University, Ithaca, 1958; Sally Cassidy's report in *Etudes,* (Paris), October-December 1948; John Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India,* Technology Press, Cambridge, 1956; and Tribib Chaudhuri, *The Swing Back,* Calcutta, 1950.

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offered a plan of "Leftist Unity" involving the sacrifice of some of the Socialists' power, but after two months of negotiations the effort collapsed as the Communists scored initial successes against the small Burmese Army. By late June of 1948, local bands belonging to some of the independent national groups began seizing government property, in effect joining the Communist insurrection.

Of these groups, the one which provided the Communists with their greatest military support was the People's Volunteer Organization (PVO). This was a militia force organized by Aung San in 1946 to strengthen the postwar position of the Burmese nationalists, and its leaders and men were recruited almost entirely from among veterans of the former Burma Independence Army. While the top leaders owed no allegiance to the Communists, many in the lower echelons were sympathetic to the Communist cause, and eventually a major part of the PVO forces joined the revolt.[8] In the summer and fall of 1948, the insurrection spread further as other military elements and communal groups turned against the government for reasons of their own. Especially serious was the defection of the Army's Karen battalions, which joined the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) in insurgent action aimed at forcing the establishment of an autonomous Karen state.

The Insurgent Alliance

During the first four years of hostilities, the three main forces in the radical camp—Than Tun's White Flags, Thakin Soe's Red Flags, and the PVO militia—operated independently of one another, setting up no unified military command or political organization, and maintaining only intermittent liaison at Than Tun's White Flag headquarters. While remaining separate, however, the three groups developed along parallel lines in organization and operational methods. Both Communist groups speedily adopted Chinese and Malayan Communist patterns of political-military organization, guerrilla tactics, and civil administration in occupied areas. The PVO also shifted gradually to these patterns and, by 1950, more or less paralleled the two Communist organizations, although lacking the same degree of discipline.[9]

In October 1949, the Chinese Communist leadership took the initiative in a move to encourage unification of the leftist forces in Burma. A communication from the Chinese Communist Politburo to the BCP (White Flags) suggested a four-point program involving, principally, the organization of a united leftist front under Communist leadership and a restriction of warfare in order to conserve the Communists' fighting potential and promote the creation of a broader base of popular support.[10] In response to this suggestion, the White Flag leadership in March 1950 established a Popular Democratic Front and a People's Liberation Army as an institutional framework for the unification of the leftist political and military organizations. Actually, however, these remained largely paper institutions, and it was not until the fall of 1952 that the White Flag, Red Flag, and PVO leaders, under the pressure of a series of military reverses, concluded a "tripartite alliance" realizing at least some of the goals of the 1949 Chinese Communist unification plan.[11]

Though the alliance instituted a more effective coordination of the strategy and operation of the leftist forces, it was too late to be of much avail. The initiative had long since passed to the government forces, which in 1951 scored a major victory in a drive west of Pyinmana, capturing the White Flag command headquarters. A few months later they attacked the first combined force of the "Liberation Army" near Mandalay and completely routed the ill-organized leftist units. The Communist guerrillas faded away into the villages, and by the end of 1951 the Communist and PVO leaders had shifted to a basic defensive strategy which thereafter remained unchanged.

The alliance entered into by the top leaders of the three groups also tended to intensify rather than assuage factional friction and discontent at the secondary level of leadership. Many White Flag district leaders were openly distressed by the alliance, feeling that the concessions made by Than Tun to bring it about were prejudicial to the BCP's position as the main Communist group. They were particularly distrustful of the doctrinaire radicalism of the Red Flag leader, Thakin Soe, whom they accused as a Trotskyite, and they resented the fact that Soe's plan of basic military organization and strategy had been accepted for the whole alliance. Many in fact considered the alliance a victory

[8] Regarding the earlier policy of the BCP toward the PVO, see "Why We are Fighting the PVO's," appendix to *Burma and the Insurrections*, Government Printing, Rangoon, 1949, pp. 46-47.

[9] In 1950 the PVO changed its name to the People's Comrade Party (PCP).

[10] Based on statements made to the author at Mandalay by Thiriya Than Maung, a former regional organizer of the BCP and presently editor of the Mandalay *Sun*.

[11] Discussion of the alliance may be found in *The Burman*, October 13, 1952, and *The Nation*, August 1, September 13, 16, 17, 24, 29, and October 10, 1952.

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for the Red Flag minority and feared that Soe's dominating personality might enable him eventually to capture complete control of the Communist movement.[12]

The sharply contrasting personality of Than Tun only heightened these fears. The White Flag leader commanded the loyalty of his subordinates not because of any fanatical dedication to communism, but because of his recognized abilities as an organizer, administrator, and leader capable of reconciling conflicting interests. But at the same time his pragmatic approach, in contrast to the dogmatic intransigence of Thakin Soe, made him more inclined to concession and compromise. A former BCP official and follower of Than Tun described the White Flag leader to this writer as—

. . . not dogmatic nor steadfast, but responsive to political winds. He is not an internationalist. He admitted as late as 1952 that he came to communism late (1943) because of his opportunism. He is not decisive like Thakin Soe, but is efficient in organizational matters. All of the thirty-five members in the Central Committee back him for this.[13]

Schism and Collapse

Developments at inter-group conferences between 1952 and 1954 steadily heightened the suspicions of dissidents in both the White Flag and PCP (formerly PVO) organizations that Thakin Soe had in fact displaced Than Tun as top strategist of the insurrection. Faced by the growing weakness of the Communist and PCP military forces, Than Tun was disposed toward acceptance of the government's offer of amnesty in return for cessation of the insurrection, and he entered into personal negotiations with the government to that end. The effort collapsed, however, because of Thakin Soe's insistence upon continuing the revolt in spite of serious military defeats.[14]

In 1954 the strains within the alliance reached a critical stage. Local units of the three groups began expending their energies in armed clashes against one another over such matters as the right to tax a certain village. District leaders became increasingly critical of the party chiefs, accusing them of unwillingness to listen to the views of subordinates at Central Committee meetings. Dissidents in the Red Flag group formed a splinter faction which later in the year reportedly attempted to assassinate Thakin Soe.[15] At a BCP Central Committee meeting in the spring, Than Tun himself was heavily criticized for organizing the party but not the masses, for failure to create a real popular front and "a true people's army," and for pursuing policies which alienated the villagers from the party.[16]

But underlying all these strains was the growing division within the leftist camp over the central issue of accepting the government's amnesty offer or continuing the insurrection. The evident determination of the top leaders to go on fighting in the face of a hopeless military situation—and also of rumored recommendations from the Cominform urging termination of the insurrection in conformity with the post-1950 general Communist line—gave rise to mounting disaffection in all three groups. At the same time, arbitrary acts of violence, seizures of property, and wanton executions of villagers by the armed cadres not only aroused the hostility of the population but caused revulsion and disillusionment among the local civil administrators, district leaders, and other subordinate functionaries of the insurgent parties.

As a result, all three insurgent groups in 1954 felt the impact of a swelling tide of defections by disillusioned party functionaries who chose surrender and government amnesty in preference to further participation in the revolt. (In June 1954, the Burmese government announced that total surrenders to date numbered 16,800.) Statements by several responsible military and civilian officials among those who subsequently surrendered revealed factional cleavages much more extensive than had hitherto been suspected. According to one of Than Tun's close subordinates, who gave himself up early in 1956, each of the original three insurgent parties had split into two, so that there were now six different factions.[17] Surrenders and arrests of Communist and PCP insurrectionists accelerated rapidly during 1957, and by the fall of 1958 only a few thousand were still underground. Than Tun and Thakin Soe, with small bands of followers, still remain in hiding in the countryside, unable to do much, yet declining the government's invitations to abandon armed struggle and "test their strength at the polls."

But in little more than two years after the Communists of Than Tun and Thakin Soe chose the path of

[12] Soe's scheme called for a unified command and formation of a combined striking force made up of 1,500 men from each party, which was to receive six months' political and military training. There were to be three subordinate commands, with the Red Flags responsible for the Delta zone, the White Flags for Central and Upper Burma, and the PCP for the western sector and the Arakan. *The Nation,* September 24, 1952; August 3, 1953.

[13] Statement to the author by Thiriya Than Maung.

[14] *The Nation,* June 16-19, 1954, reported criticisms of the leadership in both Communist groups.

[15] *Ibid.,* December 27, 1954.

[16] *Ibid.,* June 16-19, 1954.

[17] *Ibid.,* March 7, 1956.

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insurrection, groups subscribing to Communist-oriented policies and aims but renouncing violence reappeared on the political scene in Burma. In 1950, the Socialist group in Parliament split over the issue of Burma's policy toward the Korean war, producing a new alignment of "Red Socialists" who broke away to form the Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party (BWPP).

Communism Without Violence

Although relatively impotent in the Parliament at its inception, the BWPP soon attracted popular support in both urban and rural areas and developed the greatest electoral strength of any of the several pro-Communist or radical leftist parties which formed during the 1950's. The BWPP and the lesser radical parties joined forces in a coalition, the National United Front (NUF), which challenged the AFPFL in the 1956 parliamentary elections and captured over one-third of the popular vote.

Concurrently with the re-emergence of an overt pro-Communist Left, a number of student groups under the influence of the illegal Communist parties came into being. Ever since independence, Burmese student politics had been controlled by a Socialist-oriented faction, but in October 1953 an alliance of the pro-Communist groups won majority student support in a strike against the administration of the University of Rangoon and also established its influence in intermediate colleges and many high schools throughout the country. In 1954 the alliance was dissolved after a factional split along Red Flag, White Flag, and BWPP party lines,[18] but a new coalition of pro-Communist "sympathizers and neutrals"—the Rangoon University Students' United Front—competed in the University's student government elections and defeated the pro-AFPFL factions. In early 1955 the pro-Communist student associations around the country were brought together in a central All-Burma Federation of Student Unions, but there has since been a trend away from student political activity and toward the formation of student organizations not aligned with any national party.

Political developments during 1958 presented the Burmese radical Left with its greatest opportunity to gain control of the government since 1946, when Aung San and Than Tun had shared the leadership of the AFPFL. The split of the AFPFL into two factions in April of that year so weakened the position of the moderate Socialists in parliament that U Nu managed to retain the premiership only by obtaining the support of a majority of the NUF parliamentary representation. U Nu had promised new elections in November, but it seemed probable that, if they were held, the NUF coalition would be able to expand its vote gained in 1956 by capturing the votes of those dissatisfied with both AFPFL factions. Furthermore, nearly 40,000 Communist and PCP insurrectionists had been amnestied by that time, and it could be presumed that many, if not most, of them retained their radical-left sympathies and proclivity toward violence. U Nu strove to reconstruct his personal following in preparation for the elections but was advised by the army in September that it could not guarantee order if the polling took place. He then announced his decision to relinquish the premiership and to recommend the designation of Army Commander-in-Chief General Ne Win to serve as interim Premier until new elections could be held.

Ne Win's "caretaker government" was established at the parliamentary session in October with scant opposition from the moderates. On the other hand, the radical Socialist leaders, who had denounced the plan for an Army-controlled regime, were promptly silenced by confinement on an island "reserved for political and economic insurgents." Six weeks before the deferred elections finally took place in February 1960, the government released over 100 of these leaders to campaign in their constituencies. All of them were defeated, but—surprisingly—so were most of the candidates of the AFPFL faction which seemed to enjoy the support of the military. U Nu, on the strength of his powerful personality and rejuvenated political faction, swept into office with 55 percent of the vote, his supporters carrying three-fourths of the seats in parliament. With such a decisive parliamentary majority at his command, Premier U Nu has since been free of dependence upon the radicals of either Right or Left.

Why the Left Failed

Perhaps the most obvious reason for the failure of the Communist movement and of the entire radical Left in Burma has been the prevalence of a deeply-rooted factionalism which prevented the realization of organizational and elite unity. Not only has factionalism persistently characterized the Burmese radical-leftist movements and parties throughout the entire period from 1946 up to the present, but it has been a factionalism in depth, from the top level of leadership down to the village cadres and student political groups. Even when they were fighting as allies in the insurrection, the White and Red Flag Communists and the PCP could not overcome their differences—and developed new

[18] *Ibid.*, September 21-22, 1954.

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internal schisms of their own. Now that these underground factions have been augmented by the emergence of the BWPP and other legal parties of pro-Communist or radical Socialist orientation, it is fully apparent that the objective of a unified Communist movement in Burma still remains far from realization.

Sociological studies of the attitudes characteristic of Burmese political leaders and of the society in general provide clues to the causes of this intense factionalism.[19] Notably, these attitudes reveal a high degree of autonomy in individual action; disregard for a public ethic, as distinct from a family, village, or group ethic, especially on the part of those articulating local or associational interest; and skepticism regarding "the public welfare", coupled with excessive sensitivity to the "real private reason" behind a person's political stance. This suggests that the fragmentation characteristic of Burmese political life may spring from the fact that a political leader in Burma must constantly assert his individuality through ideas as well as action, or risk the loss of his following.

While it affords an interesting hypothesis, this psychological analysis fails to explain why factionalism was less damaging to the moderate Socialists than to the radical Left—or, for that matter, the extreme Right. On this point, two explanations may be offered. First, U Nu and the AFPFL, from the first days of independence, proclaimed as their own many of the Marxian principles which in other Asian states were espoused by the more radical Socialists and the Communists— *e.g.*, land nationalization and government ownership of industry. They also placed particular emphasis on economic welfare programs which, though often inefficiently managed, nevertheless appealed immensely to those concerned about modernization. In short, they annexed the basic economic principles and humanitarian ideals of Marxism, leaving the Communists with little more than their traditional methods of violence and rigid party discipline to differentiate them from the government party. Secondly, because of their emphasis on violence, the Communists tended to attract those who had grown up "with guns in their hands." Burma had experienced various forms of warfare since 1930, and there were many such men with little education or training, without hope of making a decent livelihood in the cities and without patience for the toil of the peasant. Many of them saw in the Communists' preachings of violent revolution a possible way of life. The Communist movement thus took on characteristics of opportunism and oppressiveness, while its progressive goals were actually more effectively promoted by the government.

But perhaps more than in factionalism, the fundamental reason for the failure of the radical Left lies simply in the fact that Burma is still too traditional to heed the siren call of rapid social and economic change. Modern nationalism, as noted earlier, did not appear in Burma until the 1930's, from two decades to a century later than in some other Asian countries. Today one still finds, in the villages and new suburbs, among the bureaucracy and even among intellectuals, a striking equanimity in the face of both Communist appeals and Western modernization goals. Buddhist traditions still dominate popular philosophical thought, and the secular institutions associated with this thought remain viable. The teachings of the Buddhist sects, familial ties, and the values of an agrarian culture all bolster the attitude that the Communists, like other proponents of Western ways, are but a passing wave.

The Future of the Left

Looking to the future, there can be little question that in Asian politics generally the next few decades will be on the side of those advocating great social change. It may be predicted also that those Asian countries which are most dissimilar to the West will probably experience the most profound social revolutions as the impact of modern communications and transportation technology creates sensitivity to a host of material wants. But these are judgments taking the long view, and at best they provide but a dim outline of Burma's political future. What can be said, then, of the factors likely to affect the fortunes of the radical Left in Burma in the years immediately ahead?

In analyzing the reasons why the Left failed to achieve its political ambitions in the past, we have explained, to some extent, why it is not likely to attain them for some years to come. For the basic factors that underlay that failure still remain operative today. On the one hand, the parties of the radical Left are too extreme to appeal to the practicing Buddhists—and better than four-fifths of the Burmese population are Buddhists. And on the other, they are too utopian to appeal to the Westernized Burmese, who see in AFPFL policy and the promises of Premier U Nu an adequate program for effecting essential social and economic change.

[19] Hazel Hitson, *Family and Paranoidal Personality* (Ph.D. thesis), Harvard University, 1959; Lucian Pye, *The Spirit of Burmese Politics* (monograph), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1959; Maung Maung Gyi, *The Social Background of the Burmese Political Leaders* (Ph.D. thesis), Yale University, 1958; and Lucian Hanks, *Psychiatry*, 1949, pp. 285-300.

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But these generalizations, too, fall short in not taking into account the dynamism that, in Burma as in other emergent countries, impels the frustrated who believe in progress toward a total commitment. They may be students of politics and economics, militant youth of the communal minorities, the poorly paid and socially sensitive civil servants, teachers, lawyers—in short, all those who aspire to greater opportunity, influence, or glory than they believe themselves and their countrymen likely to receive if conditions remain as they are. It is paradoxical that the social and economic development already achieved is likely to stimulate rather than moderate this dynamism. The ardor for still greater and faster improvements in social welfare increases as progress takes place. From among those who enter political life to secure these goals, a new leftist leadership will certainly emerge and may not suffer from the failings of factionalism and dissension exhibited by its predecessors.

There is now no leftist leader or organization in a position to challenge the government. Those men who are well known have disenchanted their followers by their past policies, while younger men with equal qualifications for leadership have no national organization to propagate their views. The financing of any party out of power is very difficult, for there are few wealthy men in Burma, and there is no evidence thus far of any substantial monetary aid to the Communist or Communist-inclined parties from Soviet bloc countries.

One can conclude that for at least half a decade there is small chance that the Left or the Communists will be able to gain control of the government, unless Than Tun or one of the prominent leftist leaders comes forth with a new program of mass appeal, or unless some new leader should profit from a change in Chinese or Soviet policy and secure adequate financial aid for a significant new propaganda effort. Both of these are slender possibilities. At the same time, the combination of genuine factional compromise, of occasionally vigorous project implementation, and of effective communication of welfare goals—qualities which were first demonstrated by the AFPFL and are also displayed, to a lesser degree, by the current administration of Premier U Nu—continues to be the basic strength of the moderate socialist position. Only failure to recognize these facts could compromise that position in the next few years.

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Cloak-and-Dagger Politics

The Conspirators,
by Geoffrey Bailey,
Harper, New York, 1960.

Reviewed by Richard Wraga

THE DESCRIPTION OF *The Conspirators* as "an extraordinary story of intrigue between Russia and Western Europe during the years before World War II" is appropriate in that the book discusses questions which, curiously enough, have so far received almost no public consideration. The work undertaken by Geoffrey Bailey thus explores virgin territory and, as such, deserves more than average attention.

The Conspirators is devoted to "provocation," a term used by secret services throughout the world to describe action aimed at provoking an enemy into activity desired by the manipulating authority. "Provocation" was used by the prerevolutionary Russian espionage and counter-espionage services, as may be judged from the Azev case.[1] a classic "provocation" affair. Following the October Revolution, "provocation" appeared on the Soviet scene in more varied and often spectacular forms, and it soon became a regular weapon in the arsenal of Communist police and espionage agents. Lenin's *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder* may, indeed, be regarded as an manual on "provocation" as well as a handbook on Communist strategy. An enthusiastic admirer of militarism, Lenin showed a distinct fondness for espionage, secret agents, and "provocation," and on one occasion, in 1920, he went as far as to express regret that Soviet espionage "unfortunately does not yet cover the USA."[2]

The Conspirators begins with an exploration of the "Trust" case which, beyond a doubt, can serve as a model of "provocation." The "Trust," a gigantic project directed against capitalist countries, was conceived by the Soviet secret service in the 1920's. The organization claimed to be anti-Soviet and attempted to unite all Russian right-wing anti-Communists, monarchists and conservatives, as well as former members of the Russian Army, in an effort to control and inspire their activity, which at the time presented a grave danger to the Soviet regime. The strategic objective of the "Trust" was to prevent a military intervention by the Allied Entente and to obtain a breathing spell to build up Soviet forces by supplying the Western powers with misleading information on developments in the USSR.

Mr. Bailey has concentrated on the mechanics and technique of "provocation" in his book and succeeds in turning some sections of it into a thriller. In doing so, however, he probably confuses many of his readers who at times may wonder why the Soviet secret service should have gone to so much trouble in playing their complicated game, and what the Soviets actually gained from it. The author concentrates most of his attention on the "Trust," but his comments are insufficient to answer the questions that he raises.

As far as the "Trust" itself is concerned, there is little doubt that the USSR profited from it immensely. For about seven years, active anti-Soviet forces were

[1] The Russian provocateur and terrorist Yevno Azev, born in 1869, began his career as an electrical engineering student. After graduation from the University of Karlsruhe, he returned to Russia and in 1899 entered the Social Revolutionary movement, of which he became an important leader and organizer two years later. In 1903 Azev emerged as head of the SR terrorist organization and as such was subsequently responsible for a number of political assassinations. Among his victims were the Russian Minister of Interior Plehve (1904) and the Archduke Sergei (1905). Azev's remarkable career came to a sudden end in 1908 when he was exposed by Vladimir Burtsev, the historian of the Russian revolutionary movement, as a Tsarist agent employed by the secret police since 1893. Thanks to his revolutionary fervor, he had had the full confidence of his party until the very end. He was tried *in absentia* and sentenced to death by the SR Central Committee in December 1908, but retribution never reached him. He reappeared in Berlin in 1910, and after two-and-a-half years of imprisonment by the German authorities during World War I, he died, free, in a Berlin hospital in April 1918.—*Ed.*

A native of Poland now residing in the United States, Mr. Wraga has written extensively on Soviet and Communist problems for European and American publications.

[2] *Sochineniia,* 4th ed., Vol. 31, p. 415.

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paralyzed by the Moscow authorities, the study of Soviet questions by Western services was disrupted, and important political circles and public opinion in Europe—and, indirectly, in the United States—were systematically misinformed about the USSR.

Through its links with the espionage and counter-espionage services of twelve Western countries, the "Trust" helped Moscow to spread the notion that the Bolsheviks were becoming increasingly nationalistic and that they had just about abandoned their plans for world revolution. It inspired views that Bolshevism was becoming democratic, and contributed to the popularization of Stalin's theory of "peaceful coexistence." At the same time, the "Trust" filled the secret files of European intelligence services, particularly in Poland, Finland, France, and Great Britain, with false reports and fabricated documents which distorted their estimates of Soviet economic and military potential.

BUT IN ORDER to give a clear picture of the scope and effect of Soviet "provocation" in general, one cannot limit oneself to descriptions of technique, nor can one pick at random one project, such as the "Trust"—an organization composed of a single group, the right-wing Russian émigrés. For at the time it operated, the "Trust" was not alone; there were other Soviet "provocation" projects of no lesser importance, each concentrating on a definite group (émigré Russian democrats and their leader Milyukov, émigré Socialists, and even Russian anarchists), using it to reach non-Russian circles in the West. While it was the task of the "Trust" to undermine the Entente, another organization, the *"Bratstvo Russkoi Pravdy"* (Brotherhood of Russian Truth), was aimed against Germany. Nor was only the Russian emigration singled out to act as a channel for "provocation." The Soviet authorities used other nationalities as well: the Georgians, for example, and the Ukrainians. These "provocation" projects worked along parallel lines, and Western intelligence services felt secure and happy when the information they received from one source was immediately corroborated by other sources, seemingly in no way connected with the first. Yet the connection was there, had they but known it. The information they obtained came from a single source—the USSR—and the purpose was the same in all cases: to promote Soviet goals.

None of this is shown in Mr. Bailey's book. The author, probably attracted by a cloak and dagger story, wrote the book without giving much thought to the real problem involved. What is more, he also occasionally confuses and links incidents of unconnected cases. An example is his treatment of the story of Boris Savinkov.

Savinkov was one of the most colorful individuals in the history of the Russian Revolution, an incarnation, almost, of some hero in Dostoievsky's *The Possessed*: a neurasthenic revolutionary; a terrorist, friend of Azev's, and at the same time a writer of talent; an idealist without principles and a libertine; a politician with ungovernable ambitions but totally unbalanced political convictions; a skillful actor who succeeded in charming Churchill, Masaryk, and Briand. After the victory of Bolshevism Savinkov found himself no better off than at the start. He became enmeshed in Soviet "provocation" and, in 1924, was lured into Soviet territory. There he was seized and soon afterwards "repented" before a Soviet court, his action compromising many Western politicians with whom he had been in contact and undermining seriously the anti-Soviet struggle. Savinkov's confession was intended, among other things, to convince the outside world of the hopelessness of any effort to dislodge the Bolshevik regime, which Savinkov himself then recognized as the "Russian people's rule." Even though the Soviet objective in this case differed from the aims of the "Trust," Mr. Bailey links the two affairs, disregarding the Soviet practice of distinctly separating operations of a similar character so as to keep their independent objectives in clear view.

Contrary to Mr. Bailey's assertions, the "liquidation" of Savinkov in 1924 did nothing to help the West in exposing the "Trust." Instead, due to the complex relations and conflicts of interest existing among the European secret services, the Savinkov case merely served to expand and increase the influence of the "Trust" as a Soviet tool of misinformation.

The decline of the "Trust" did not come until later. By 1926 the danger of further "imperialist intervention" against the USSR began to fade, and *pari passu* with this development the significance and usefulness of political émigrés from the USSR receded. Moscow then decided that the "Trust" had fulfilled its tasks and ordered it disbanded. Indeed, the organization was exposed by the Soviets themselves. In the following years a large number of similar organizations appeared on the European scene, but it was not until after World War II that Stalin reinstituted operations of the scope and scale of the "Trust." These still present a wide field for fruitful research.

THE CONSPIRATORS gives no overall picture of Soviet "provocation" in the 1930's. Of the numerous agencies which operated at the time, Mr. Bailey for

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some reason selected for discussion only the "Inner Line"—and then proceeded only to confuse already published material, most of which is of doubtful authenticity to boot. The "Inner line" belongs in fact to the many Soviet espionage and "provocation" projects which have remained unexposed to this day. After years of research, this writer agrees with B. I. Nicolaevsky—a leading expert on "provocation" and the author of a brilliant study of Azev[3]—that unlike the "Trust," the "Inner Line" was never abolished, but has undergone shifts and regroupings and continues to exist to this day.

It is known that with the aid of their "Inner Line" agents, Soviet intelligence took advantage in the 1930's of certain internal squabbles within Russian émigré circles and placed its own men in positions of leadership. As a result, throughout the whole decade, the "Inner Line" systematically misinformed the intelligence and counterintelligence services of several European countries and succeeded also in kidnaping two prominent Russian military émigrés: General P. A. Kutepov (1930) and General E. K. Miller (1937).

Mr. Bailey's presentation of the Tukhachevsky case, which he also curiously insists on linking with the "Trust," is equally unfortunate. He simply reverts in his book to the conspiratorial theories invented by the Soviets at the time of Tukhachevsky's trial and subsequently perpetuated in Europe and America by writers who were either unable or unwilling to subject the "affair" to a critical analysis. From a historian's point of view, needless to say, publications such as Litvinov's *Notes for a Diary* (cited by Bailey) and Budu Svanidze's *My Uncle Joe* (both the handiwork of the same writer), *Marshal M. V. Tukhachevsky* by Mrs. L. A. Nord, *The Far Eastern Plot* by A. Svetlanin, and other works produced in the West and exposed long ago as fabrications, are no more useful than the mendacious accusations of the Stalin era.

There is, to begin with, no longer any justification for treating the Tukhachevsky case as a "plot." The fact that the marshal, together with those whom Mr. Bailey cites as "Tukhachevsky's fellow conspirators," was fully rehabilitated after Stalin's death should alone have sufficed to dispose of the military "plot" theories once and for all. The liquidation, in 1937, of Tukhachevsky and a large majority of Soviet generals and other high officers was not the result of a conspiracy, a military opposition to Stalin, or even ideological differences (as was the case with Zinoviev and Bukharin). One cannot but agree in this instance with Boris Souvarine who, after an exhaustive study of the subject, concluded:

Properly speaking there never existed . . . any "Tukhachevsky affair", a term created irresponsibly in the West to personalize an episode which, in reality, is inseparable from the terrorist measures applied by Stalin to strengthen and reinforce his power. . . . Those executed were neither counterrevolutionaries, nor were they hostile to the regime, nor enemies of the people, nor even enemies of Stalin's party—just the contrary; and still less were they terrorists, spies or traitors.[4]

The explanation of Tukhachevsky's elimination, if indeed there is a rational explanation, is quite different. After 1934 Stalin began vacillating between two foreign policy courses: an alliance with the democracies against fascism, or a union with fascism against the democracies. It was upon his precise instructions that Tukhachevsky, personally and through representatives (Putna in London, Ventsov in Paris, and Semenov in Warsaw), began negotiations in 1936 with various European general staffs on the possibility of an anti-Hitler coalition. Signficantly, the Soviet generals, who had been trained during the years between 1924 and 1933 in German military schools, realized better than other party members the danger presented by Hitler's militarism. They thus naturally favored a change in orientation from opposition to "Versailles" to opposition to fascism.

By 1937, however, Stalin finally chose a pro-Hitler course, and the fate of Tukhachevsky and all the partisans of a democratic coalition was thus sealed. The logic of the proceedings that followed ran parallel to the "dialectical logic" used in all the Soviet purges from that of Trotsky to that of Molotov and Kaganovich.

MR. BAILEY INCLUDES in his book a bibliography which undoubtedly was intended to contribute to the scientific value of the work. However, the material cited has been assembled without order or system. While some works of doubtful worth have been included in the list, one of the most significant histories of the Russian emigration, perhaps the only serious study of its kind, has been omitted—Boris L. Dvinov's *Politics of the Russian Emigration* (The RAND Corporation, Washington, 1955). Nor does the list contain important contributions on the subject of "provocation" by B. I. Nicolaevsky, S. P. Melgunov, B. Souvarine, V. Levitsky, D. Filosofov, and P. Balakshin. There is no mention of Opperput's (Selaninov) memoirs, published in Berlin. The author also seems to have no

[3] Boris Nikolajewsky, *Aseff the Spy*, Doubleday, New York, 1934.

[4] *Le Contrat Social*, Vol. III, No. 4, pp. 201 and 203.

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knowledge of the "Old Bolshevik's Letter" by B. I. Nicolaevsky, which occasioned quite a stir when it was published in 1937 in the *Information Bulletin* of the Labor and Socialist International, and which is indispensable to anyone writing a history of Kirov's murder. Nor has Mr. Bailey apparently had occasion to study the "Open Letter to Stalin" by F. Raskolnikov, (*Sotsialisticheski vestnik,* October 19, 1939), a document of great importance for an accurate understanding of the "Inner Line."

Several Soviet contributions of importance have also been disregarded, and the author seems to have given little consideration to Russian émigré newspapers and periodicals, such as *Za Rodinu, Borba, Volia, Sovremennye zapiski, Russkiye zapiski, Narodnaia pravda,* and others. Many of these have carried articles pertinent to the problems treated in *The Conspirators.* English and French material has likewise been overlooked, not to mention Ukrainian, Polish, Czech, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav sources which often supply information published nowhere else.

In sum, the references consulted by the author are insufficient to form a solid basis for an investigation of a subject as complex as Soviet "provocation." Of course, no writer in the West can have access to the main source of information—the Soviet archives—and the files of many West European services are also closed to the research worker. On the other hand, many governmental and private archives are open to the public, and what is more, a number of active participants in the "Trust" and other Soviet "provocation" projects are still alive. It would appear therefore that immense possibilities are open to anyone wishing to study the subject introduced by Geoffrey Bailey. His book certainly does not close this area of study; it barely touches on the subject. If it whets the appetite of future researchers, it will have performed a useful function as a pioneering work.

The Communists and the Rise of the Nazis

Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung,
by Karl Dietrich Bracher,
Wolfgang Sauer and Gerhard Schulz.
Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln and Opladen, 1960.

Das Ende der Parteien, 1933,
edited by Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey.
Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf, 1960.

Reviewed by F. L. Carsten

WHILE THE BOLSHEVIK revolution and the consolidation of Bolshevik power have been studied in detail by many historians on both sides of the Atlantic, no comparable analysis of the Nazi revolution has been available hitherto. Instead, historians have concentrated on the person of Hitler, on the development of his ideas, or on the decline and disintegration of the republican order which enabled him to rise to power. Therefore, the publication of two bulky volumes on this subject, which to a large extent succeed in filling this gap, is a most welcome event. It is a sign of the magnitude of the enterprise that both books, which were published in Germany, are collective works: the one on the end of the political parties that of eight, and the volume on the seizure of power that of three historians.

Both books suffer from a certain amount of overlapping and repetition, and in neither case has there been an attempt to draw general conclusions from the mass of detail, or—what would have been even more interesting—to discuss the similarities and differences between the Nazi and Bolshevik revolutions. At one point Dr. Sauer says that "at first glance" the Bolshevik conception seems to be more differentiated and elastic than that of the Nazis, which was more primitive and brutal, and that the Nazis quite logically combined military with terroristic methods (pp. 686-7); however, if one thinks

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of the years of the civil war, this seems to apply equally to the Bolshevik dictatorship. Nor is it justified to say that the Nazis formed "an entirely new type of instruments of power" (p. 686): even the SS, with its concentration camps and separate armed forces, finds its prototype in the role and the enterprises of the OGPU under Stalin. There seems to be little doubt that both regimes studied each other's methods so as to "perfect" their own machinery.

Nevertheless, from a study of these two volumes certain important differences between the two systems emerge as far as the seizure of power is concerned. Hitler, even before 1933, systematically used political terror to intimidate his enemies and to create an atmosphere of permanent insecurity that would justify his demand for dictatorial powers. In Russia, this insecurity was created by the collapse of the old order—a collapse that stemmed from the continuation of the war and the revolution and was independent of any Bolshevik activity. There is no parallel in the Soviet Union to the brown terror of the SA, the importance of which is rightly stressed by Dr. Sauer; nor, in consequence, could there arise the kind of conflict that occurred in Germany between the army and the SA, and that ultimately led to "the night of the long knives" in June 1934—a crisis which might have wrecked the regime and which left lasting scars. The detailed analysis of this conflict is one of the most interesting parts of the book.

THERE ARE OTHER, more striking differences. The careful analysis of Professor Bracher and his collaborators makes it clear to what extent Hitler's seizure of power was facilitated by factors and developments in the history of the Weimar republic; Lenin, on the contrary, received no such aid (apart from the disintegration of the old order and the resulting anarchy). There were, first of all, the various authoritarian governments which had ruled Germany since 1930 and had dispensed with the constitution. In addition, the government formed on January 30, 1933, was a coalition government in which the Nazis held but a few posts. It thus appeared as merely another link in a chain of dictatorial governments, and hardly anyone realized that it was new in principle. Professor Bracher goes so far as to describe the seizure of power as "stealthy" *(schleichend)*: the state machine was taken over without any hitch or opposition; the new order was received with satisfaction, even welcomed, by the large majority of civil servants; it enjoyed the active support of influential bankers and industrialists, and the Nazis could therefore rely on innumerable experts whom they badly needed. On the morning of the famous Day of Potsdam (March 21, 1933) Hitler, decked out in white tie and tails, paid homage to the tradition of Frederick the Great (personified by Field Marshal von Hindenburg in full-dress uniform), thus stressing that there was no revolutionary break with the past. The Bolshevik leaders, on the other hand, in the immediate post-revolutionary period, went out of their way to emphasize their break with the past in every field—even where they later continued the traditional Russian policy. They had to rebuild almost from scratch, while the Nazis were able to use the existing—and solid—foundations.

This applies in particular to Hitler's relations with the German army. Only the Minister of Defence and (twelve months later) the chief of the army command were replaced by men considered to be more pliant and less critical of Nazism; apart from these two changes, the army not only accepted the new regime but supported it with enthusiasm, thus depriving the conservative opposition of badly needed support. The new Minister of Defence, General von Blomberg, declared in August 1933 that the army must now show everywhere that it "marches together with the national movement" *(mit der nationalen Bewegung mitgeht)*, thus using even the jargon of the *Bewegung*. On a different occasion, he asserted that the time to be non-political was past, and that there remained only one thing: "to serve the national movement with complete devotion" *(mit voller Hingabe zu dienen)*. Even the later leader of the military Fronde, General Ludwig Beck, celebrated the electoral victory of the Nazis in 1930 and welcomed their seizure of power in 1933. Without the tacit support of the generals, this could never have been accomplished so smoothly, nor could rearmament have been carried out so quickly and efficiently: from Potsdam the road led to Vienna, Prague, and Paris.

WHAT WAS THE part played in all these developments by the German Communist Party (KPD)? On this question, unfortunately, neither volume sheds any new light. Dr. Sauer maintains that "in general . . . [the KPD] succeeded in adapting its organization to underground work which it had prepared for years" (p. 909), while Professor Bracher comes nearer to the truth in saying that the party's "conspiratorial tactics were by no means suited to the new situation" (p. 193). Yet even this is, if anything, an understatement. Not only did the KPD continue to employ the same tactics it had employed without conspicuous success in the years before 1933, but it positively refused to go over to methods of underground work because it lived in

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the fond illusion that "the party cannot be outlawed" and that any preparation for underground activity would play into the hands of the party's enemies (an illusion shared by the leaders of the Social Democrats). When the Nazi terror finally forced the KPD to go underground, its methods were often so childish and ill-adapted to the new conditions that the rank-and-file members had to pay dearly for the stupidity at the top. This very stupidity, resulting as it did from the elimination or demotion of all its more independent leaders, prevented the party from offering any real resistance to the Nazis. Regrettably, this question is only touched upon by Professor Bracher, who thinks that any such resistance was perhaps made impossible by the brutal measures immediately taken by the new regime, or by the exigencies of Soviet foreign policy (p. 62). A more accurate explanation, however, is offered by Dr. Siegfried Bahne, author of the chapter on the German Communist Party in the second work under review. Dr. Bahne points out that the KPD leaders believed that there were only slight differences between the Hitler government and those preceding it—differences in "method", perhaps, but certainly not in principle. As the KPD had for years called the Social Democrats "Social Fascists" and had joined forces with the real Fascists to attack "the system", any distinction between the two had got blurred in the minds of the party members.

As late as April 1, 1933, a resolution of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (printed in full by Dr. Bahne) stated that the Communists had correctly called the Social Democrats "Social Fascists." The incredible assertion in the resolution that "the establishment of the open Fascist dictatorship . . . hastens the pace of Germany's development towards the proletarian revolution" clearly indicates yet another reason why the KPD did not resist the Nazis' seizure of power. In June 1934, the Central Committee of the KPD went so far as to speak of "a broad revolutionary wave" sweeping through Germany, of "the hatred against the Fascist tyrants increasing day after day"; it accords well with these illusions that the same declaration enjoined the German workers to demonstrate in the streets, to organize political mass strikes, to refuse the payment of all dues, taxes, interests and rents, and to chase the Fascist swindlers out of the villages! Equally illusory were the instructions issued to KPD members to build underground trade unions with a mass membership and to occupy posts in the German Labor Front so as to exercise influence upon this Nazi organization. But perhaps more damning than all this was the proud pronouncement of Fritz Heckert that "during the critical weeks no 'discussions' took place in the KPD": a party which had just suffered a signal defeat (but refused to acknowledge that this was the case) was praised for not indulging in "discussions"! One wonders what Lenin or Rosa Luxemburg would have said of this kind of Marxism.

If Dr. Bahne has little to add to the known facts about the KPD during the years 1930 to 1935, he has nevertheless done valuable service by rescuing from oblivion these and other official KPD documents, especially in view of the legends propounded on the other side of the Brandenburg Gate. What is even more important is the fact that a new generation of German historians is tackling the problems which must be tackled if the Germans are to come to grips with their own past.

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Meanwhile, back at the Plenum . . .

Troubles in Soviet Agriculture

By Arcadius Kahan

AGRICULTURE WAS THE main item taken up by the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in January of this year. But before discussing what the reports and Khrushchev's frequent interjections revealed about the state of Soviet agriculture, it might be well to note some of the political and organizational aspects of the gathering.

The plenum was clearly well-prepared: The reports and proposals of the top leadership were made known to the membership in advance. This "leak" of information about the leadership's plans is in itself an interesting development, suggesting that Khrushchev was trying to strengthen his own position *vis à vis* the Central Committee. And while the Premier's remarkable behavior led many commentators to speak of the plenum as a one-man show in the purely dramatic sense, it was also a show of strength in the political sense. On his home ground, Khrushchev had no need to remove his shoe and pound it on the table to put his points across. He achieved the same effects by constantly interrupting the speakers, putting them on the defensive, and meting out praise or blame. By these and other methods which many an actor might envy, he created a paternalistic image of the experienced, just, and honest champion of the underdog, prepared to demote incompetent or irresponsible bureaucrats and to replace them with able workers from the rank and file. Thus he suggested that it might be a good idea to send the Chairman of the State Planning Committee to work as a milkmaid in order to convince him of the need to provide milking machinery. In a similarly half-serious, half-jocular fashion he proposed nominating for the post of party secretary of the Kuban region a Ukranian farm woman who had been notably successful in growing corn; this, he suggested, would compel the Kubans to set a higher production target for next year.

Khrushchev obviously was trying to create the impression that the blame for any failures lay with the local leaders, who had misinterpreted or improperly executed the invariably correct policies charted by him. But it would be erroneous to consider the plenum simply as an intra-party show of strength on Khrushchev's part. The meeting took actual steps toward supporting Khrushchev's pet idea of strengthening the hinterland, steps which, it was hoped, would overcome the inertia of this weakest link in the Soviet economic-political chain.

WHY WAS KHRUSHCHEV so alarmed about the state of Soviet agriculture? To answer this question it is necessary first of all to note that the performance of Soviet agriculture was being viewed within the framework of the Seven-Year Plan. Under this plan the goal for increasing agricultural production was set at 70 percent above the level of 1958. The lion's share of the increase was to be achieved in the output of grain and livestock products, and therefore the slogan about "overtaking the United States in the production of milk and meat" expressed the central tendency of the projected development.

The goals of the plan were drawn up on the basis of an unusual bumper-crop of 1958, with the optimistic assumption of perfect weather conditions and a very high ratio of additional output to additional capital. The results of the first two years were quite disappointing: though 1959 agricultural output was officially reported as being at a par with 1958, this level of performance was chiefly attributable to some substantial carryover from

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the previous year, while the output in 1960 was on the whole below the level of 1958.[1]

Under the Soviet system it is not enough to find explanations for the failure to meet plan targets; one must also find scapegoats. This time the chief scapegoat was the former Minister of Agriculture Matskevich, who was absent from the plenum and could not defend himself (assuming, of course, that he would have been given an opportunity to do so *had* he been present). The main reasons for the poor performance, however, could easily be detected: adverse climatic conditions over substantial parts of Soviet territory, and the inability to increase the feed supply rapidly enough to meet the needs of an increasing livestock herd.[2] Contributory factors would include lack of mineral fertilizer to raise the level of yields, lack of shelter for livestock (for example, one half of state farm cattle in Latvia is still raised by peasant households), etc.

These explanatory factors have had a long history and should have been neither new nor unexpected to the Soviet planners. Nevertheless, the inability to raise agricultural output beyond the 1958 level—coinciding as it does with a steady rise of population, widely advertised promises to increase the standard of living, and mounting foreign commitments—has become a source of irritation for the Soviet leadership, and in particular for Khrushchev who has emphasized his personal concern with agriculture.

The experience of the last two years does not preclude a significant rise of agricultural output in the future, when climatic conditions may be more favorable and some of the present shortcomings may be removed. But for the moment, the Soviet policy-makers are paying for their insistence that achievements in agricultural production during a particularly good year represent permanently achieved levels of output from which the way can lead only upward. Having tried to convince themselves and the people that the unusually high 1956 or 1958 output levels were a result of "wise, farsighted policies of the party," they felt compelled in January of 1961 to divert the blame for failure in order to save face. Soviet agricultural output does indeed have a growth potential, but its rates are much smaller than those envisaged by the planners, who are reluctant to admit that this limited potential is largely attributable to continuing elements of backwardness.

One lesson learned by the planners and administrators, if the stock-taking at the plenum is to be taken seriously, is that Soviet agricultural production will rise only if the investments in this area are greatly expanded. Half-hearted palliatives will not do the trick; for example, soil-manure mixtures and peat, even when blessed by such an authority as Trofim Lysenko, are not infallible substitutes for mineral fertilizer. Also the distribution of available investment is not a simple matter. A distinction must be drawn between investments intended to decrease labor input per unit of output and investments directly aimed at increasing output. While the introduction of a potato-digger will certainly decrease the volume of labor necessary during the harvesting season, it is not a substitute for the use of insecticides or the development of disease-free strains of seeding material which can effectively raise the yield per unit of land.

AN INTERESTING PROBLEM for the planners is not only the distribution of investment as between, let us say, machinery and insecticides, but the quality and balance of the machinery supply itself. Soviet agriculture carries on the books an impressive volume of machinery. What is important for the production process, however, is the ability to use the machinery at the appropriate time for particular tasks required by the production process. Tractors are valuable, but only when the appropriate mounted machinery is available. The discussions during the plenum clearly revealed the inferior quality and poor utilization of many Soviet agricultural machines. It is apparently proving hard to revise the decades-old system by which the Soviet agricultural-machinery industry supplied the MTS with types and quality of machinery often unsuited for the particular soil or for the particular demands of various regions. Some machines performed only one type of field operation leaving the rest of the work to be performed by back-breaking manual labor. Nothing short of a thoroughgoing revamping of the system, which would allow the output and output-mix of agricultural machinery to be determined by the demand of the farms themselves, is likely to remedy the existing situation. This implies a reorganization and reorientation of the agricultural-machinery industry in the direction of producing a greater variety of complementary types of machinery and implements, possibly in smaller volumes for each type of machinery, so as to make possible a higher degree of specialization, suited to the needs of particular agricultural crops and local conditions. Until recently, the strength of the Soviet agricultural-machinery industry lay in its ability to adjust existing foreign models to conditions of mass production; now it is faced with the challenge of creating new models of original design and producing them at relatively low costs. In order to meet this challenge heavy investments of time and money will be required, and the degree to which these investments will facilitate achievement of established goals during the current plan-period is still questionable.

[1] Production figures for 1960 showed that grain, potatoes and sunflower seed were below the 1958 level, milk and meat were above 1958 but below 1959 levels, sugar-beet output was above the 1958 figure but its utilization for sugar was below that year's level, and wool was roughly at the 1959 level. In the case of vegetables, flax-fiber and eggs, no output figures were reported—an omission which, judging by past experience, indicates a low level of performance.

[2] During 1960 9.3 million sheep perished on collective and state farms in the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Georgia as a result of lack of feed and shelter.

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Apart from investment policies, one of the gravest problems of Soviet agriculture revealed at the plenum was the system of bureaucratic leadership in agriculture. Khrushchev ironically referred to the tendency for central agricultural institutions to cluster in Moscow in the vicinity of the Bolshoi Theater, and proposed to bring the institutions nearer to the farms. Actually the problem is not so much the location of farm bureaus but rather *where* and by *whom* vital decisions affecting the farms ought to be made. Should they be made by the farms themselves or handed down the line by bureaucrats of various degrees of authority? In its decree of March 1956 the Soviet government gave collective farms the right to decide on the selection of their own crops *within* the framework of the state's planned purchases of agricultural products in each particular region. This last clause implied that in practice heavy controls would have to be imposed upon the farms.

THE PLENUM raised the curtain on some interesting examples of bureaucratic controls. Thus the central authorities in the Ukraine, it was revealed, had repeatedly imposed a single date of corn-harvesting upon the whole republic. In Kazakhstan it was ordered that low grain be winnowed instead of straight combine-harvested. The cream of the jest was brought out in a dialogue between A. S. Chuslaev, the chairman of the Saratov district collective farm, and Nikita Khrushchev.

Khrushchev: **Did you figure it out by yourselves?**
Chuslaev: **By ourselves.**
Khrushchev: **Did someone from above exert pressure with respect to those figures?**
Chuslaev: **No, these are realistic figures.**[3]

This spontaneous dichotomy in the mind of the collective farm chairman between "pressure from above" and "realistic figures" is perhaps the most convincing proof that the degree of interference with the farms is still very large. Apparently even when the decision to interfere is made not in Moscow but in the republic, district or county, it may still be detrimental to local farm production, as well as to the economy as a whole.

Reading the speeches during this recent plenum, those who recall the discussion a few years ago about the so-called decentralization reform in the Soviet Union may be forgiven if they question whether any substantial decentralization was actually put into effect. The *leitmotif* in the speeches of the lower echelons, the collective farm chairmen and brigade leaders may be summarized as follows: "We (the farms) will provide you (the state) with all that you need in terms of reasonable demands, provided you make an effort to satisfy our production needs and let us conduct our affairs to the best of our ability, without constant interference on your part."

It is uncertain whether the degree of interference on the part of the bureaucratic apparatus is going to be relaxed in the future. The decision at the plenum to reorient the work of the Ministry of Agriculture toward less decision-making and more servicing of the collective farms through scientific instruction and agrotechnical information is not a sufficient proof that controls will be abandoned. The revival of the procurement agency and the strengthened roles of the Gosplan, Central Statistical Administration, and party apparatus (at the expense of the ministry) indicate no real lessening of controls.

Since the only reasonable solution of the problem—*i.e.*, freeing agriculture from bureaucratic controls—is apparently still anathema to the party leadership, alternative methods of stimulating output, in particular the idea of providing additional incentives to the individual peasant, inevitably came under examination at the plenum. Although this was not singled out as a specific topic, it loomed in the background of many speeches. Apparently, one of the factors which has discouraged greater production is a ceiling that was imposed on peasant income some time before the Seven-Year Plan went into effect. Speeches by lower echelon participants at the plenum stressed the need for differential remuneration of peasants on the basis of performance, while higher officials complained that even the existing tolerance of private household plots and livestock represented an unwise competition with the socialized sector.

Two developments in particular at the plenum indicated a trend antagonistic to incentives for individual peasants. One was the reported practice of decreasing the livestock herds in the private sector not only as a temporary means to fulfill government obligations in the socialized sector, but also as a matter of policy; the other was Khrushchev's approval of the practice of legislating locally the size of the private plot and the number of livestock in private hands. Thus the indications point to a cautious but systematic offensive against the private sector, carried on at a pace that the planners hope will not endanger the overall level of livestock output in the country. The plenum set the goals of 13,000,000 tons of meat and 50,000,000 tons of milk to be supplied to the state in the next few years—a considerable rise over the original Seven-Year Plan targets of 11,000,000 and 40,000,000 tons respectively. If these goals are to be taken seriously, we must expect a large-scale transfer of private livestock into the socialized sector.

The problem of socialized *versus* private agriculture came under consideration at the plenum in another aspect: how to correct the gaps in the supply of various commodities which are particularly demanded by consumers.

That there is still much room for private initiative can be inferred not only from Khrushchev's description of the "happy-looking" people who transport apples by air from the Ukraine to various corners of the Soviet Union, but also from a report from Kazakhstan published in December 1960. This report describes the activities of Soviet citizens who had been leasing irrigated land on collective farms to raise onions, using privately-hired labor. The

[3] *Pravda,* January 17, 1961.

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report (in *Kazakhstanskaia pravda* of Dec. 8, 1960) stated that there were some 880 such onion-raising entrepreneurs in the Alma-Ata district.

There is no doubt that as long as a sellers' market exists in the Soviet Union for various types of food products, the Soviet authorities will find many examples of the entrepreneurial spirit enabling people to operate ingeniously on the fringes of a centrally-planned economy.

To many readers of the plenum minutes, the most amusing topic may well have been statistics. The discussions on this matter may have proved disturbing to some staunch supporters of the Soviet regime abroad, but certainly not to Soviet citizens, who know and participate actively in the endeavor to "improve" Soviet statistics. Clearly, the problem of the "reliability" of statistical data is of vital concern in a planned economic system. Yet the fact is that unless the Soviet government devises some system of independent checks upon the reports of local authorities, neither the exact nor the approximate volume of output will be known to them—and, to paraphrase Krushchev's words uttered at the plenum, Soviet citizens will have to continue to bake pancakes out of statistics.

What *do* we know about the accuracy of Soviet agricultural output data? We know, for one thing, that the Soviet gross output figures of various commodities are very "gross"—*e.g.*, that the "barn yield" of grain and sunflower-seed output (data supposedly cleansed of Stalin-era exaggeration) is actually a measure of output from under the harvesting combine, containing excessive moisture, chaff and other impurities. We know, too, that the Soviet concept of "meat" is much broader than that which is used outside the Soviet orbit; it includes, apart from tallow and offal, a number of "byproducts" which are not included as meat anywhere else. Furthermore, we know that the gross output of milk is not a measure of its availability for human consumption, since a sizable part is fed to calves and piglets. Outside observers have suspected, and now have had their suspicions confirmed by the plenum, that a proportion of output was subject to double-counting—*i.e.*, that the estimated output by private households, when acquired by the collective farms, was reported again as collective output. One could add that in general the methods of estimating output have been very crude and probably have contained an upward bias. All this leads to the conclusion that while we do not know the exact volume of Soviet agricultural output, neither do the Soviet planners, caught willingly or unwillingly in the web of inaccurate data spun by their system.

THE PRACTICE of willful cheating with statistics as a means of preserving one's position in the political or economic hierarchy is an old feature of the Soviet system. It is important to determine at what levels and with what frequency this cheating takes place.

The various reports at the plenum concentrated their revelations chiefly upon the lowest level, citing cases where as a result of such "modified" reports, officials were rewarded with the titles of Heroes of Labor and were elected to the soviets of the republics. Such prestige in itself is no mean incentive, if the risk of padding reports can be kept within reasonable bounds and the rapid turnover of personnel can be a means of covering up and escaping responsibility. Much less, of course, was reported about distortions at the district level. The only cases cited involved corrupt practices in last year's record-

How To Resolve Differences

KHRUSHCHEV: When the number of cattle increases, the quantity of manure will increase; it is essential to organize its correct storing and use. . . . Two years are needed to build a mineral fertilizer factory. You will say that you will supply grain in two years, but what about dinner—will you serve it in three years? When it comes to eating, you want to do it today, but you will increase the output of grain only in two years time?
FLORENTIEV: I absolutely agree.
KHRUSHCHEV: Then there are no differences between us.

* * *

POLIANSKI: Obviously it will be necessary to plan anew, for the *oblasts* of the non-black-soil area, the sale of grain to the state, particularly of groats and leguminous crops. This will force their leaders to display greater energy and solicitude in increasing grain production and the output of other agricultural produce.
KHRUSHCHEV: This is all correct, except for the word "obviously"; it is imperative to set up a plan for the crops in these *oblasts*.
POLIANSKI: Correct, Nikita Sergeievich.
KHRUSHCHEV: Then there are no differences between us.

* * *

KUNAEV: Comrades! Special attention should be given to the proposal to organize the use of irrigated lands, and in this connection to expand sowings of rice.
KHRUSHCHEV: Not at the expense of reducing sowings of cotton. In a word, irrigated lands on which cotton can be grown should not be planted to rice.
KUNAEV: This will not happen, Nikita Sergeievich.
KHRUSHCHEV: I am telling you so you will remember.
KUNAEV: I understand. (Stir in the hall.)

—Pravda, Jan. 12 and 17, 1961.

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breaking and much-honored Riazan district and this year's rival for such laurels, the Tian-Shan district in Kirgizia.[4]

There is a feature of Soviet statistics which deals not with past output but with goals of future output and deliveries. At the plenum a part of the story was unfolded, showing that in order to meet delivery requirements for artificially high goals, some farms had delivered high-quality seed and had diminished the basic herd; the result was later planting with low-quality seeding material and the retardation of the growth of livestock. But admitting the existence of such practices does not mean their automatic elimination, since their occurrence is a function of the dichotomy that exists between the long-run plans and the short-run performance criteria of success. Until the chief planners settle for more realistic goals, such damaging practices are bound to persist, and Khrushchev's pressure during the plenum for high, hardly attainable goals for Soviet agriculture does not provide much hope for a change.

WHILE SOME OF KHRUSHCHEV'S specific proposals are—to say the least—questionable, there is little doubt that his statement regarding the government's intention to increase the level of consumption has met with a favorable response from the hard-pressed citizens of the USSR. Whether Khrushchev's promise was aimed at enlisting support for his future plans or merely recognized a consistent demand of public opinion is basically immaterial; the fact remains that the state and party have once more committed themselves to the goal of higher consumption, declaring that now, in contrast with the past, the means for achieving it exist.

Among the decisions of the plenum the most important are: the commitment to increase the volume of investment in the manufacturing of mineral fertilizer and agricultural machinery; the creation of an institution to perform the role of a middleman between farms and to direct the supply of machinery and equipment according to the needs of individual farms. With respect to long-range plans for increasing agricultural production, the emphasis upon maximization of output is still the dominant note. There is also a certain similarity between the goals toward which Soviet agriculture is to strive in the future and a measure which was hailed in 1948 as the "Stalin plan for the transformation of nature." At the root of both ambitious sets of goals lies the general notion of making Soviet agricultural output independent of weather hazards. Stalin saw the solution in the planting of shelter-belts, which would collect moisture in the dry areas; Khrushchev sees his solution in a broad program of irrigation. The first panacea ended in a complete failure and huge capital resources and labor effort went down the drain. The second looks more promising in terms of lasting physical effectiveness, although its economic justification remains to be tested.

Leaping forward to 1965, will the Seven-Year Plan in agriculture be achieved? If the recent plenum is at all meaningful, it can only convince objective observers that the goals will not be met. For one thing, there is the perennial penchant for *administrative* rather than economic palliatives. Furthermore, the upward movement of Soviet agricultural output is negatively correlated with high goals, fantastic slogans and "statistics." Real improvement will depend upon sound agricultural practices and economically rational decisions. There are no substitutes.

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[4] The following exchange on this subject took place between Khrushchev and Razzakov, the delegate from Kirgizia:

Razzakov: However, in the training and education of leading cadres we still suffer from serious shortcomings and mistakes. This is borne out by cases of inflated figures and faking, often concocted by executives [*kolkhoz* chairmen and party functionaries] themselves.

Khrushchev: Out of the party with them! These people are not Communists, they are hangers-on. They should be thrown out of the party and be brought to trial.

Razzakov: Right!

Khrushchev: And they should be punished, regardless of who they are. If we don't restore order, the plans will be statistically fulfilled, but products there won't be enough of. As is known, you cannot make pancakes out of statistics.

Razzakov: Some of our leaders assume high obligations, but instead of concentrating their efforts on fulfilling them, they embark upon the wrong—and fundamentally criminal—path of purchasing the missing products from the population and state trade establishments. In his theses, Comrade Khrushchev subjected the CC of the Kirgiz Communist Party to a severe yet fully justified criticism for these mistakes. And indeed, the former secretary of the Tian-Shan *obkom* [district committee], Isaev, committed a crime by compelling the managers of *raions* to buy butter at the state stores and deliver it as part of the fulfillment of milk procurements.

Razzakov went on to relate the punishment meted out to Isaev, but under sharp questioning by Khrushchev he admitted that this was done only "after the letter" (presumably from the CPSU CC), and that Isaev had at first been "punished" by being named Internal Affairs Minister. After some stinging remarks by Khrushchev, and the inevitable "animation and laughter in the hall," Razzakov said: "Therein lay our serious mistake. We appointed him Minister of Internal Affairs." (*Pravada*, January 14, 1961)

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"Frying Snowballs" in the Soviet Press

"We have declared and will declare again . . . that the peaceful coexistence of ideas is as non-sensical as fried snowballs."—Georgi Zhukov, Chairman of the Soviet Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations, at a conference sponsored by the Great Britain-USSR Association in Steyning, England, February 24, 1961.

Reply to the *New Times*

WE, TOO, LIKE PROGRESS and betterment in this magazine—self-improvement especially—and so it was with some satisfaction that we read the latest Moscow appraisal of our efforts. "[*Problems of Communism*]," wrote Comrade P. Mstislavsky in the December 1960 issue of the official *New Times*, "tries to garble the facts in so subtle a way as to make the distortion unnoticeable and, hence, more valuable as a propaganda technique." We seem to have come a long way since 1957, when *Pravda* succinctly labeled our scholarly contributors as "gangsters of the pen, paid informers, and renegades," and we sincerely hope that, having been implicitly readmitted by our Soviet critics to the ranks of civilized humanity, we may now perhaps look forward to a time when degrading abuse and vilification will give way to an exchange of views enlightened by reason.

In the meantime, we wish we could return Mr. Mstislavsky's compliment in full. He had set out to comment on our symposium "Toward a 'Communist Welfare State'?" (*Problems of Communism*, Nos. 1 and 3, 1960), but in a quixotic attempt to have his cake and eat it too, he found it necessary to resort to distortions that are not only unsubtle, but also readily noticeable. Admittedly, Mr. Mstislavsky faced a difficult task, for some of the conclusions in the symposium he liked—some, indeed, he liked too much—but others not at all. From the point of view of the "world's most progressive philosophy," some adjustments were clearly necessary, and how he went about it we shall presently see.

When Comrade Mstislavsky likes what he reads, he says so. Thus, in his article, he quoted our authors approvingly and quite extensively whenever they reported that Soviet living standards and social welfare services had improved during recent years. Only one difficulty arose in this instance: How could Comrade Mstislavsky—used as he was to the peculiar rules of Communist "freedom" of the press—explain to his readers that a "bourgeois" journal, and one published by the United States Government to boot, objectively reports improvements in the material conditions of the Soviet population? Mr. Mstislavsky's answer was ingenious: ". . . since the magazine is sent to a restricted list of subscribers, and since its articles cannot be republished in North America, the contributors were given a good deal of leeway." Unfortunately for his case, none of this is true. The circulation of *Problems of Communism* is not restricted; anyone in any country of the world can subscribe, and we should indeed be glad to arrange for a personal subscription for Comrade Mstislavsky. We can in fact divulge a secret in this connection: there are in the United States several thousand subscribers to the magazine; it is available in every major public and university library and is used as instruction material in the universities.

Mstislavsky is equally wrong in saying that our articles cannot be republished in North America. On the inside page of our front cover it is clearly stated for anyone who can read that "*reprinted* materials [used very rarely in any case] have been copyright cleared and, unless specific restrictions are noted, may be republished in all countries except the United States and Canada." The obvious aim of the last stipulation is to protect the copyrights of American publishers who generally permit reprints in other countries, but who justly require control over republication rights in the domestic market—a condition Mr. Mstislavsky would understand if the Soviet Union observed copyright conventions. (Besides, reader

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of the English-language press that he is, he could have noticed our articles reproduced in part or in full in numerous well-known American publications.)

As to the "leeway" we have allegedly given the contributors, we can only say that our writers are free scholars and journalists and free men who need not and would not consent to censorship or corruption. And when, as Mr. Mstislavsky reports, they "discard the old notions about poverty and forced labor in the Soviet Union," it is because most of the huge forced labor camps in the Soviet North and Far East *have* been disbanded since Stalin's death and because poverty *has* been alleviated—not because they were told or "allowed" to do so.

ONE MIGHT THINK that Mr. Mstislavsky would have been pleased to find in our symposium material he could quote, and that, in return, he would do his readers the favor of reporting and even criticizing the conclusions in an objective manner. Instead he resorted again to transparent distortion and fabrication. Few of the contributing authors escaped this treatment.

Most of the participants in our symposium, and Mr. Solomon Schwartz in particular, addressed themselves in one fashion or another to the question of what had brought about the recent improvements in public welfare in the Soviet Union. Mr. Schwartz's answer was as follows:

The USSR has become a modern industrial state, but the great majority of its working population lived until recently, and to a lesser degree continues to live today, under conditions characteristic of economically backward countries. **It is this simple yet fundamental fact—perhaps *the greatest internal contradiction of Soviet life*—which in the past few years has, with "irresistible force," influenced the entire course of development in the USSR. (Italics in original.)**

For "a modern industrial state," Mr. Schwartz continued —and Mr. Mstislavsky quoted him correctly here—"can function properly only if it possesses a working class that enjoys a relatively high standard of living, tolerable working conditions, and access to educational opportunities."

But with this Comrade Mstislavsky was not content and proceeded to interpret Mr. Schwartz's statement as "confirmation that socialism, far from depressing living standards, makes for their steady rise . . . it is here that we have the fundamental difference between the capitalist and the socialist systems . . . Industrial expansion under capitalism does not of itself lead to a higher standard of living." Yet, as any reader should be able to discern, not only did Mr. Schwartz speak of "a modern industrial state—not "a socialist state"—but he also made it perfectly clear in the subsequent discussion that *even the Soviet leadership* had to bow to the economic imperatives of industrialization and relieve the majority of Soviet workers from the extreme material and disciplinary strains to which they had been submitted during the 1930's and the wartime and immediate postwar periods.

From here to outright fabrication it was only a short step, and Mstislavsky took it without hesitation. In a desperate effort to prove that the Communist Party is more solicitous of the workers' welfare than the workers' own organizations ever could be, he triumphantly announced in his next paragraph that "Mr. Schwartz is compelled to admit 'that the initiative in these [social and cultural] reforms comes from the Communist Party.' " The readers of the *New Times* ought to know that they have been made victims of a hoax. Mr. Schwartz was not "compelled to admit" anything, particularly since Mr. Mstislavsky's "quote" represents an incomplete rendition of Mr. Schwartz's sentence, which did not refer to any broad "social and cultural" reforms, but to a revision of the trade unions' role. Here is what Mr. Schwartz *did* say:

To be sure, the Communist leadership would not think of permitting the unions to reassume their traditional functions. What it has done is to turn them into organs of social welfare, and to let them participate to some extent in the administration of plants as a kind of counterbalance to the danger of bureaucratization. *It is worth noting that the initiative in these reforms came from the Communist Party, that the role of trade-union leadership has been merely that of an obedient agent and executor of the party's orders, and that the trade union masses have yet to be drawn into these practices.* **(Emphasis added.)**

SO MUCH FOR the treatment of Mr. Schwartz. Turning to the question of the responsiveness of the Soviet system of economic planning to consumer preferences, Mr. Mstislavsky referred to Mr. Peter Wiles, who, so we are told, "rejects the viewpoint, expressed by other contributors, that satisfaction of consumer demand is inconsistent with 'certain features of the Soviet economy . . .' " It seems almost cruel to quote what Mr. Wiles really said—and at the very beginning of his article:

I agree that "certain features of the Soviet economy are inconsistent with the proper satisfaction of consumer demand"—in one sense, indeed, so radically inconsistent that to achieve such satisfaction would require a fundamental change.

Mr. Wiles then discussed the incompatibility, at the present stage of development, between central physical planning on the one hand, and consumers' sovereignty and rational allocation of scarce resources on the other. A few paragraphs later, he continued:

But there is another sense in which the "proper satisfaction of consumer demand" is inconsistent with "certain features of the Soviet economy." This is the Soviet obsession with investment, and with a more rapid growth for heavy industry. Maximum consumer satisfaction at any moment of time would require a relaxation here also.

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Only at this point did Mr. Wiles insert the qualification that if *future* consumer satisfaction is considered, and *if* Soviet consumption continues to grow at anything like its present rate, then this policy may not be, in any permanent sense, a defect of the Soviet system.

Mr. Richard Lowenthal suffered an even stranger fate at Mr. Mstislavsky's agile hand: almost in one breath he was called upon to bear witness and accused of falsification—and by quotation out of context in both instances. In concurrence with Mr. Schwartz's view, Mr. Lowenthal stated at the outset that "the transformation of living and working conditions in post-Stalin Russia . . . amounts to a somewhat belated adjustment by the USSR to the stage of 'industrial maturity' it has already reached." He then addressed himself to the question of how seriously the Soviet leadership is committed to the pursuit of high consumption standards in the USSR. From this section of the article Mr. Mstislavsky extrapolated the following part of Mr. Lowenthal's sentence: "The Soviet rulers are genuinely interested in increasing mass consumption, and there is little question . . . that they should be able to do so." Let us see what Mr. Lowenthal wrote:

No doubt *the Soviet rulers are genuinely interested in increasing mass consumption, and there is little question that* within the limits set by higher priority objectives [investment in heavy industry, armaments and development aid], and given normal circumstances, *they should be able to do so.* But the idea that because of their propagandist promises they are "committed" to a consumption race with the United States, whatever its effect on other objectives . . . , overlooks the fact that the Soviet system has neither the political mechanism of democratic pressures [including the role played by independent trade unions and political labor groups], nor the economic mechanism of partial dependence on demand, which would give such promises the weight of a "commitment" in democratic capitalist conditions. . . . It may be confidently asserted that as long as the [Soviet] totalitarian power structure and its ideological dynamics last, the share of individual consumption in the national product will continue to be far below that in the capitalist democracies—just as it is now, after all the recent improvements. (Emphasis added.)

The quote speaks for itself, and the violence done to Mr. Lowenthal's meaning is plain. Yet Mr. Mstislavsky was not done with him yet. Having fraudulently exploited him as a friendly witness, he decided, curiously, to impugn Mr. Lowenthal's credibility by accusing him of conclusions he never made. Wrote Mr. Mstislavsky:

Even more artificial and absurd is the attempt to regard prosperity and the building of communism as mutually opposed. Mr. Lowenthal does that in his article by falsely claiming that "in official ideology, the 'building of communism' is not defined as a direct achievement of material abundance."

A bizarre exercise in logic, this! The second sentence is of course in no way proof of the first. What is more, Mr. Mstislavsky was again careless in quoting, for he omitted the stress Mr. Lowenthal had put on the word "direct" in the original version. This is what Mr. Lowenthal had to say:

Among the goals pursued by the ruling party of the Soviet Union, the people's welfare and consumption standards do indeed have a place, but a subordinate place. In the official ideology, "the building of communism" is not defined as a *direct* achievement of material abundance; before this can be attained, further changes have to be carried out in the structure of society—above all, in assimilating the living and working conditions of collective farmers to those of wage-laborers on state farms.

Mr. Mstislavsky is tilting against windmills, and his purpose escapes us. Mr. Lowenthal never said—anywhere in his article—that communism and material prosperity are mutually opposed. Nor did he imply it in any manner. Nor did he distort Marx's dictum that under communism (no one has ever given the slightest indication when this utopian condition would arrive) there would be an abundance of material and cultural values; in fact he himself stated in an earlier passage that the "Communist ideology also proclaims that abundant satisfaction of all wants is the ultimate purpose of the economic system." Between an "ultimate purpose," an ideal goal, and the *process* of achieving it there is a world of difference, which Mr. Mstislavsky seems unable to grasp. Indeed, so important is this difference between means and ends, that our clear recognition of it is what in the final analysis divides us from Mr. Mstislavsky and his mentors.

ONE COULD GO ON with the painful task of exposing the profusion of distortion and mendacity in Mr. Mstislavsky's article. But one important point remains to be made. In the introductory part of his piece, Mr. Mstislavsky quoted—with great selectivity, as is his habit—from our editorial note introducing the symposium. Moreover, we are said to have believed that our contributors "would arrive at an objective scientific interpretation' of the irrefutable facts about the rising living standards in the USSR that would suit Western propaganda needs." We said nothing of the sort, of course, nor did we have any such intention. The scholars who contributed to our symposium reported the truth as they saw it; they all agreed that the material welfare of the Soviet people has improved in the past few years.

However, we also asked a question which Mr. Mstislavsky failed to report—namely, whether the recent increased attention in the USSR to consumer satisfaction implies an eventual transformation of the Soviet political system and progress toward political freedom. Most of the contributors answered in the negative, while others hesitated to venture an opinion or expressed cautious optimism. But there was general agreement that the political and economic nature of the Soviet system has denied Soviet

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citizens the full benefits of the economy's productive potential.

We fully agree with Bertrand de Jouvenel: It would be monstrous not to feel pleased about the material betterment in the lives of the Russian people. What we regret, and what we criticize, is, in Mr. Alec Nove's words, "the lack of political and economic responsibility to the ordinary citizen, which still remains [in the Soviet system] . . ., the fact that the top leadership in the USSR is to a great extent free from any organized pressure from below, and that it has been able to neglect with impunity the urgent needs of the people. . . ." We are not engaged in a debate of the relative merits of "capitalism" and "socialism," as Mr. Mstislavsky and Mr. Khrushchev would have it. We are opposed to totalitarianism, and that includes the Soviet variety which Moscow insists on calling "socialism." As Asoka Mehta, the Indian Socialist, put it, "there is an allegiance to freedom as well as to development"—and it is equally alive in Asia and America, in Africa and in Europe, and, to be sure, among the Soviet people as well. Communism is not the "world's most progressive philosophy"—Mr. Mstislavsky and the *New Times* notwithstanding—because it denies the former and, in the long run, hinders the latter.

C.F.

Reply to Three Soviet Economists

The Soviet journal Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia *(World Economy and International Relations—published by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) printed in its April 1960 issue an article by V. Kollontai, G. Mirski and L. Stepanov, entitled "False Prophets and Real Life." The piece was written in reaction to two papers—one by Professor Alex Inkeles of Harvard University, and the other by Mr. Oleg Hoeffding of The RAND Corporation—that appeared under the joint title "The Soviet Union: Model for Asia" in the November-December 1959 issue of* Problems of Communism. *Professor Inkeles had examined the Soviet system "in terms of actual development and social reality" (rather than in terms of the officially propagated image), and attempted to answer the question whether it had any applicability to the problems faced by the newly emancipated countries of Asia. Mr. Hoeffding examined the Soviet economic system and experience within the same context. Messrs. Kollontai, Mirski and Stepanov in turn accused Professor Inkeles and Mr. Hoeffding of seeing "as their main task the discrediting of the idea of industrialization" and of general opposition to social progress. Messrs. Inkeles and Hoeffding answer these and other charges below.*—Ed.

WE SHOULD BE GRATIFIED by the signs that our Soviet colleagues are giving more attention in their journals to the intensive analysis of Soviet society carried on by non-Communist scholars. One may detect a more serious tone in these comments, which suggests we have come closer to the possibility of balanced intellectual debate. The more recent contributions also seem less vituperative than those we encountered previously, despite occasional lapses into the old-style name-calling. Unfortunately, progress has not yet reached such a point that Soviet critics will describe their opponent's position without distorting it in the extreme and in the process slandering the author. At least I am forced to this conclusion by the article "False Prophets and Real Life," in which Kollontai, Mirski, and Stepanov completely misrepresent the position I took in my article on the Soviet social system as a model for Asia.

My critics state that I reject, indeed demean and defame, the very "idea of industrialization" as appropriate for the underdeveloped countries of Asia. They hint that I am against social change. Indeed, they insinuate that I favor the preservation of the caste system in India merely because it is a traditional and religiously sanctioned social form. Anyone who reads what the article actually says will easily recognize that this is ridiculous. Far from glossing over the facts, the opening paragraphs of my article described the pervasive illiteracy, the low standard of living, the ineffective technology found in so many Asian countries. Far from opposing change, I declared that "where such conditions prevail, the impossibility of continuing to tolerate them leads more compellingly than anything to acceptance, in principle, of a massive program of change." Finally, I made it plain that the idea of change is everywhere linked to that of industrialization.

The only issue then is what shall be the form in which this program of change is cast? In reviewing Soviet experience, I developed at some length the reasons for my position that the Soviet approach to this problem had led to totalitarianism. The roots of Soviet totalitarianism are of course numerous, but in my article I emphasized that the commitment to extremely rapid industrialization, at a forced pace and without popular consensus, contributed substantially to its development. This totalitarianism, and

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the popular resistance which it in turn generated, was an important factor in the high cost of lives, in physical resources and natural wealth, and in social and cultural heritages, which the Soviet people paid for its industrialization.

The obvious question is not whether to industrialize, but how? The move toward industrialization seems to be inevitable, even where it is far from being economically strategic. The important questions, therefore, are those which deal with the speed of industrialization, the political auspices under which it will be conducted, and the social forms it will generate. My belief is that industrialization resting on popular consensus and carried out within the framework of the democratic process is infinitely preferable. My argument is that where industrialization is carried out at a forced pace and without popular consent to the goals set, the means chosen, and the price paid, totalitarianism is the probable, perhaps the inevitable, outcome. This basic argument is alluded to, but it is not discussed by my Soviet critics. The reason, I believe, is that it is too difficult for them to deal with this topic in an article meant to be read by a Soviet audience which has learned the connection between forced industrialization and totalitarianism not from "false prophets" but from "real life."

Alex Inkeles

THE THREE SOVIET AUTHORS who have combined to answer my article have produced, on the whole, a fairly representative sample of what in Moscow passes for scholarly polemics. If anything, by Soviet standards, it is a reasoned and restrained rejoinder. Epithets are used sparingly, and mildly. I am accused of nothing worse than "inhuman cynicism" and "playing with marked cards." Some of my major points are, in effect, conceded after the obligatory qualifications have been made, and sometimes as if I had not made them myself.

At the same time, following the familiar pattern of Soviet controversy, my critics are careful to conceal from their readers the real point and purpose of my article, and to avoid summarizing my argument in its entirety. This enables them to condemn my views on things which my article did not even touch upon, or to impute to me views which I neither hold nor express in my essay:

1). They say that "the term 'state planning' adorns only the title of the essay . . . while the problems of planning and its importance for economic development are not considered in the text at all." In my introduction, I made it plain that I regard *Soviet-type* planning as an inseparable ingredient of the totalitarian system of government and social control in the USSR. My article was addressed principally to the question of the relevance of Soviet developmental experience to those Asian countries which refuse to accept the totalitarian solution. Thus, I was not concerned either with the efficacy of Soviet-type planning, or with that of non-totalitarian approaches to planning which, needless to say, exist. My critics, with commendable understatement, admit that "social transformations of the class society do not proceed painlessly or without struggle." I would not deny that massacring landlords, liquidating *kulaks*, expropriating shopkeepers, suppressing labor unions, reneging on foreign debt, etc., all have their implications for economic development but, to repeat, my essay was not concerned with them.

2). My critics charge that "my main task is to discredit the idea of industrialization." My article, I think, speaks for itself on this absurd assertion.

3). They claim that I "do not spare words in advertising the Western economic system, the Western way of life, and Western 'democracy'." I searched my essay in vain for a single word along these lines. I dearly wish that either Western or Soviet experience in economic development had cut-and-dried solutions to offer on the tough problems faced by Asia and other underdeveloped countries. My critics do a good bit of "advertising." My function was to analyze, not advertise.

To deal briefly with other points made by the Moscow trio:

Predictably, my suggestion that the dismal record of Soviet agriculture contains little that deserves emulation in Asia has drawn heavy fire from them. Given the facts, they cannot but lack ammunition to make this barrage effective, and have to substitute smoke shells for more telling projectiles. Thus, to establish the "indisputable superiority" of collective farming, they note that gross output of agriculture, between 1934-38 and 1955-57, increased by 23 percent in the "Far East" and by 57 percent in the "Near East," but by "more than 65 percent" in the USSR. A finding that the Soviet increase was not much more than that of a region as notably afflicted by economic stagnation as the Near East would hardly provide irrefutable proof of "superiority." However, the proof turns out to be even weaker: reference to the Soviet index of gross agricultural output, in the source cited by my critics (*Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1958 g.*, p. 350), shows that this index increased, from the 1934-1938 *average* to the 1955-1957 *average* (and this kind of comparison is clearly implied by my critics' text) not by "more than 65 percent," but by 58 percent, or about as much as they attribute to the "Near East." I don't know what is faulty here: their arithmetic, or their deck of cards?

My reviewers also deny my far from original statements that Soviet policy had "neglected agriculture." They conveniently ignore my qualification that since 1953 Soviet policy had given more attention to agriculture, with noticeable effect on output. This I wrote in mid-1959. Now, in early 1961, I am inclined to add that the Soviet agricultural system seems to be doing poorly even in the absence of neglect: *vide* Khrushchev's severe criticisms of 1960 performance at the recent Central Committee meeting, his remedial and punitive measures, and also his

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remarkable appeal to rid the management of Soviet collective farming of "drunkards, idlers, and frauds."

Another recent development also provides an ironical commentary on my critics' contention that adoption of the "Soviet model" would rid free Asia of its dependence on food imports, which I had noted, with concern, in my article: the USSR and China have embarked on large-scale food imports from the free world (see, for example, *Christian Science Monitor,* Boston, February 13, 1961).

It would be ungracious of me not to concede at least one point to my critics. I had pointed out that Soviet industrialization had proceeded from a more advanced base, inherited from capitalist Russia, than most Asian countries commanded at the start of their planned industrialization. I illustrated this with figures tending to show that per capita industrial output in pre-Soviet Russia was higher than India's in 1956. My critics take exception to this comparison:

In the next few years, India will treble its iron and steel production. In Indonesia, Burma, and other countries, output of power, metals, cement, etc., is increasing rapidly. . . . In the not distant future, Asian countries will achieve per capita output levels comparable to those of pre-revolutionary Russia.

This, of course, is entirely true. What gratifies me particularly is my critics' acknowledgment that non-Communist Asian countries *can* expand industrial output so rapidly, without the benefit of Soviet-style totalitarianism.

Oleg Hoeffding

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to send communications dealing with matters discussed in *Problems of Communism.* Comments should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism,* U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington 25, D.C.

COMMUNISM IN CUBA

TO THE EDITORS: I wish to comment on the long and hostile review of my book, *Red Star Over Cuba,* in your January-February 1961 issue. The review is loaded with such characterizations as "exaggerated allegations . . . emotion-packed interpretation . . . (obsession) with the conspiratorial side of communism . . . ," etc., etc. In the same issue, you publish three articles on communism in Latin America, all of which suggest that the only way to combat communism is to support socialist movements. Am I to infer that one has to advocate socialism to get favorable treatment in a USIA periodical?

1). Your reviewer thinks I should not regard the Castro revolution as a conspiracy. Conspiracy means a "combination of persons for an evil purpose" and it is therefore the web of much of contemporary history. The Bolshevik revolution was a conspiracy, as was the Nazi consolidation of power in 1933-34. Those who refuse to analyze the mechanics of conspiratorial movements cannot be experts on communism.

2). Your reviewer says that I charge Fidel Castro with two student murders on "hearsay evidence." The evidence in question is sworn testimony by Rafael Diaz Balart, Castro's former brother-in-law, to the effect that Castro asked Diaz to help him commit a murder and later told Diaz that he had done the job. This is not hearsay (as anyone familiar with the rules of evidence should know), but an admission against interest which is admissible in any criminal trial.

3). The reviewer, George Sherman, says that I admit "that Batista himself usurped power twice—once in 1940 and again in 1952. . . ." Mr. Sherman should not use me as a cloak for his own ignorance or inexactitude. I made no such statement for the obvious reason that Batista was elected freely in 1940. The verb "admit" is singularly objectionable for it contains the innuendo that I am an apologist for Batista. The falsity of that implication will be plain to anyone who takes the trouble to read my book.

4). Mr. Sherman is apparently the sort of expert on communism who does not know what "sleeper cells . . . cut-outs . . . and mail drops" are and, therefore, suggests I should incorporate a glossary. If we issue a popular, abridged edition for readers uninformed about the problems of communism, I shall bear this suggestion in mind.

5). Mr. Sherman observes that I criticize the State Department for having rejected Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith's advice on Cuba and infers that I am "quick to see virtue in . . . tyrannical dictatorship." This comment implies that Ambassador Smith supported the Batista

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dictatorship, a false charge that was assiduously spread at the time by a clique of pro-Castro propagandists in the US press and elsewhere. The facts are that Smith advocated the replacement of Batista by a democratically elected Cuban President and that he personally favored Dr. Carlos Marquez Sterling, candidate of the Orthodox Party and chief author of the progressive Cuban 1940 Constitution, for that office. This is clearly stated both in Ambassador Smith's sworn testimony and in my book. Mr. Sherman attempts to falsify the evidence by innuendo and to smear both Ambassador Smith and me in the process.

6). Your reviewer states that "more often than not" my references are to "suspect" sources such as the Cuban police file on Fidel Castro. This statement is false, as anyone capable of counting with his fingers can find out for himself. The sources on the Bogota uprising are primarily three books by prominent Colombian officials and writers. The primary source on the Soviet apparatuses is a series of articles by the pro-socialist Pedro V. Domingo in the Chilean quarterly, *Estudios sobre el Comunismo.*

7). It is true that I have used some source material which originated in non-democratic governments. Is there a new rule of scholarship that the authenticity of a document is positively correlated with the degree of democracy prevailing in its country of origin?

8). My book is attacked in your pages as faulty in scholarship, despite the fact that the march of events has substantiated almost everything that it asserts. If a writer analyzes a Communist dictatorship, he must rely on evidence and documentation which is less than perfect. Certain archives are closed. Documents may be forged. Known enemies of communism cannot go to Cuba without risking their lives. Above all, the writer must protect the identity of eyewitnesses lest their families in Cuba suffer reprisals.

May I remind you that the initial reports on the extermination of European Jewry were not well documented and that there were "liberals" who dismissed the first eyewitness reports on Stalin's prison camps as "hearsay" concocted by reactionaries. Personally, I have no desire to follow the example of Hegel's owl of Minerva and analyze tyrannies only after they have been destroyed, for in so doing I should contribute to a condition in which they will destroy us rather than the converse.

NATHANIEL WEYL
Washington, D. C.

MR. SHERMAN REPLIES: Mr. Weyl persists in identifying revolution and conspiracy (item 1 above). Analyzing conspiracy does not explain the causes of revolution—either in Cuba today or in Russia 40-odd years ago. My criticism of Mr. Weyl's book remains precisely that its absorption with conspiracy—to the extent that conspiracy is an element in any revolutionary upheaval—takes us no way towards understanding the profound social and economic forces upon which the Castro regime bases its power. Furthermore, Mr. Weyl's defense of his scholarship removes none of my doubts about his attempted analysis. Rafael Diaz Balart's sworn testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee about student murders (item 2 above) is a case in point. *Red Star over Cuba* reproduces part of that testimony and paraphrases other parts (pp. 62-63). On p. 63, Mr. Weyl writes: "Diaz Balart proceeded to explain (to the Committee) that he was not in Havana at the time of the murder of Manolo Castro and therefore was not speaking from his personal knowledge." Manolo Castro was one of the students in whose murder Mr. Weyl is implicating Fidel Castro. About the other murder, Mr. Weyl quotes verbatim from the testimony on the same page: " 'Q: Do you have any personal knowledge respecting the killing of Caral? A: (Balart) No, through my brothers, and through the other friend—I was not in Havana.' "

If we stop quibbling over legal terms—"hearsay evidence" or "admission against interest"—and go to the heart of the matter, I cannot see how this is admissible evidence against Fidel Castro—whether he is guilty or not.

I apologize for my inaccuracy about *when* Batista usurped power. It was in 1934 and 1952, not 1940 and 1952. But Batista did usurp power *twice.* Mr. Weyl does not deny that. Nor does he dispute any of the specific examples I cited to show his ambivalence toward the Batista regime.

I do not apologize, however, for my criticism of Mr. Weyl's repeated use of esoteric and undefined terms of conspiracy (item 4). If he meant the book to be a handbook for a limited audience of "experts on communism" (his term), then he and his publishers should not use a blurb saying the book reads "like a detective story". If, on the other hand, Mr. Weyl expected his book to be taken seriously by a wider, moderately informed reading public, he should have remembered that most readers lack his specialized knowledge of the intricacies of Communist conspiracy.

Mr. Weyl is too quick to draw unwarranted implications from my review to support his own jaundiced views of Ambassador E. T. Smith's critics (item 5). First of all, he quotes a bare fragment of my passage which distorts its meaning. I did not imply that Ambassador Smith supported the Batista dictatorship. The most I implied was that the ambassador used poor judgment in dealing with that dictatorship. I took Mr. Weyl to task for failing to show the same tolerance and understanding toward Ambassador Smith's critics as he shows toward Mr. Smith. After all, General Batista—and not these critics—finally sabotaged Ambassador Smith's whole Cuban policy when he (Batista) broke his "promise" to the ambassador to hold free elections in 1958. Less biased observers than Mr. Weyl could blame Mr. Smith for even believing the dictator would honor those pledges.

As for Mr. Weyl's sources (item 6), suffice it to note that he has not refuted any of the cases I cited, where

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he makes tendentious statements without documenting them. Furthermore, the suspect sources he does use are woven intricately into the fabric of the book. Without these crucial threads, Mr. Weyl's pattern of conspiracy falls apart.

Take Dr. Castro's link with the Bogota assassination and riots in 1948. The "sensational" report of anonymous "Colombian Dectective #6", published later in a Caracas newspaper, enters Mr. Weyl's narrative on p. 10. From there to p. 13, he quotes the report exclusively (and supplies italics for emphasis) to show that Castro distributed propaganda "Communist in style" in Bogota just before the April events; that he knew the assassinated Colombian leader but denied it to the police; and that Castro's Cuban accomplice had a prior meeting with the assassin. Then on p. 33, the report of Detective #6 shows that Mr. Castro and friend arrived at their hotel four days after the riots, well-armed and "with a good haul of loot," and that detectives found papers identifying the two Cubans as "first-grade agents of the Third Front of the USSR in South America".

This evidence typifies the kind which appears at key points throughout the book. Now, the report above may well be accurate and Mr. Castro's complicity real; I am not arguing that. I do say, however, that the case Mr. Weyl presents on such flimsy and circumstantial evidence is unconvincing—to this reader at least.

My review applied no general rule that the "degree of democracy" in a country determines authenticity of a document (item 7). I referred specifically to secret Batista police reports (unpublished) and *Carib*—mouthpiece of the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. Given the nature of both regimes plus their special hatred of the Castro movement, I do think it justifiable to view their uncorroborated official or semi-official documents with healthy skepticism. Mr. Weyl does not.

Finally, Mr. Weyl's letter nicely sets out my own reasons for skepticism toward his type of analysis of Communist dictatorships (item 8). He pleads less than perfect evidence and documentation—*e.g.,* that "certain archives are closed," that "documents can be forged." Precisely. These are handicaps which dictate caution, reasonableness, and humility about establishing the truth, not the type of sweeping indictment on shaky evidence he presents.

It is spurious for Mr. Weyl to claim the "march of events" as an ally for his scholarship. For many of the people he so bitterly attacks—people who are also "enemies of communism" (perhaps less well-known than himself) but who have "risked their lives" in on-the-spot investigations in Cuba—reach entirely different conclusions about just what that "march of events" has been.

FROM THE EDITORS: In his letter Mr. Weyl inquires—presumably *not* rhetorically—whether he is "to infer that one has to advocate socialism to get favorable treatment in a USIA periodical." We wish to assure him that there is no basis for such an inference.

SOVIET GOALS—REALITY OR FICTION?

TO THE EDITORS: Professor Tucker's review of my book, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (November-December 1960), left your readers, I fear, with a number of misapprehensions. Perhaps a somewhat hasty reading caused Professor Tucker to assert: "All that has been said directly and explicitly by Soviet spokesmen about the shape of the projected Communist world order might easily be covered in a few pages, and the main substance of it has been summarized in the foregoing paragraph." The foregoing paragraph in his review dealt with the question of the Communist plan for a world federal political structure superimposed on a nonfederal, strictly centralized ruling world Communist Party. If this was really the sum of direct Soviet statements about their projected world order, then the book would undoubtedly have been a waste of time.

In addition to discussing the Soviet concept of a world political structure, however, I dealt directly and explicitly with other major aspects of their envisioned world order by citing explicit Soviet views concerning their projected fusion of nations, and the shape of their future world culture and world language, as well as of their future global stateless society. All of these discussions were, of course, interwoven with the evolution of theory and institutions that have developed in the Soviet Union for the very simple reason that the Soviet Union is the repeatedly self-proclaimed and self-avowed prototype of a world state. Professor Tucker might also have indicated that I dealt at length with a number of closely related themes such as Soviet manipulation of the concept of national sovereignty and Soviet views toward other and rival supranational projects, all of which etch more indelibly their own grand design.

Professor Tucker then proceeds to relate that I did discuss the "present-day Soviet concept of the shape of the ultimate world Communist society." But he seems mystified because in this chapter, in which I discussed other questions than Russian nationalism, I drew heavily upon the non-Russian nationalist ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Bukharin, while earlier I had considered the impact of Russian nationalism that pointed to a Russified image of a Soviet world state. This difficulty is of Professor Tucker's making, however, for Khrushchev's present-day concept of the future is precisely an amalgam of the views expounded in Chapters III and IV on Russian nationalism and in Chapter XIII on the "world state of no state." While he complains that I have presented a "simplistic" treatment of my subject, I have tried to depict the complex realities of it, and have therefore rejected the simplistic, either-or interpretation that he seems to demand.

I am also obliged to point out a clear misstatement of my views. Professor Tucker asserts that even though "Moscow no longer rules the smaller bloc states as if they were mere *oblasti,* as in *Stalin's* time," I allegedly object today to the term "satellites" since it implies "too

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much independence" for these states. The passage in question begins by considering the status of the "people's democracies" in *Stalin's* time, when, as Professor Tucker puts it, they were ruled from Moscow "as if they were mere *oblasti.*" I had hoped this was clear by citing almost immediately after this passage Gomulka's "description of how the *Stalinist* chain of command operated in the people's democracies." In the pages that followed I paid considerable attention to the post-Stalinist changes in "Eastern Europe," including the "many roads" doctrine.

It is true that I still consider these people's democracies as future Union Republics of an expanded USSR, although I indicated that the expedient moment for this transformation may lie at some rather distant time in the future. At this point Professor Tucker and I seem to be in basic disagreement. He points to the concept of socialist international law arising among Communist states. I could, of course, point to the complicated system of treaty relations and international legal procedures employed by the supposedly independent Soviet Republics prior to the formation of the USSR in 1923. It all depends upon one's historical perspective and the amount of weight assigned to the long-range ideological beliefs that have not been shed by the Soviet regime. Professor Tucker acknowledges that I have cited "a series of Soviet pronouncements over the years in which fidelity to this goal [of a world state] has been reaffirmed," but he holds that this is simply an ideological statement that one must not take very seriously as an operational objective of Soviet foreign policy.

The precise role of ideology is always a subject of sharp debate. My own views have been stated for me, better than I have put them myself, by the perceptive reviewer (Mr. Tang Tsou) in the December 1960 issue of the *American Political Science Review.* There he states that there are several approaches to defining the role of ideology and national interest in determining the nature of Soviet foreign policy. One explanation "ascribes to ideology the relatively minor role of a system of categories and assumptions for the ordering of experience, which may retard or speed up but cannot prevent the adoption of policies dictated by national interest. The second approach is to stress the continued force of the ultimate Marxist-Leninist goals and assumptions as operational concepts. Departures from ideology are then explained as tactical adjustments to the nation-state system which the Communist leaders seek to sweep aside at the opportune moment. Some of these tactical adjustments may harden into permanent modifications of the ideology but they do not affect the long-term goals and basic assumptions. The second view has been shown by the developments in the cold war to have greater predictive value and has prevailed. It has now been applied by Mr. Goodman to examine the Communist goal of establishing a world state."

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MR. TUCKER REPLIES: To call attention to the paucity of Soviet material on the specifics of the "grand design" is hardly to imply that a book on the subject need be a waste of time, though perhaps it could be both adequate and fairly short.

I did not apply the word "simplistic" to the study as a whole but specifically to its treatment of Soviet foreign policy as a changeless quest for a world state. Nor did I assert, as Professor Goodman now suggests, that Soviet ideological statements must not or need not be taken very seriously. The issue had to do with the kind of evidence needed in order to establish what is an operative goal of policy. The point I made was that we cannot infer simply from Soviet pronouncements about the goal of a world state that this is *in fact* the operative goal of their behavior. In any given instance or at any given time ideological statements may serve various purposes other than mirroring actual policy, as Professor Goodman himself, by the way, implies when he refers (p. 176) to "deceptive postwar statements" on the possibility of peaceful coexistence.

My "clear misstatement" consisted in imputing to him the view that even now the term "satellite" does not accurately describe the East European states because it implies too much independence. This was based in part upon the following paragraph. which starts a new section of the book on page 338:

Meanwhile, in fact if not in name, the European satellites are being prepared for their transformation into Union Republics of the Soviet Union. Rudzinski quite properly objects to the term "satellite" as implying too much independence, "*i.e.*, small states influenced in their foreign policy by a great power." These nations could more accurately be likened to protectorates or to puppet states, such as Japan created in Manchukuo in 1932, since Moscow seeks total control over their domestic life as well as their foreign relations.

If this, as the author now asserts, was not meant to refer to the contemporary situation but only to the situation "in *Stalin's* time," why the use of the present tense?

THE RIGHT TO CRITICIZE

TO THE EDITORS: It is unfortunate that questions of interpreting communism should provoke such bitter controversy among American Sovietologists as that occasioned by Alfred Meyer's review of *Protracted Conflict* by Robert Strausz-Hupé and his collaborators (*Problems of Communism,* July-August 1960, and subsequent correspondence). Far more serious, however, than what I regard as the sensationalist over-simplifications of the Strausz-Hupé book or Mr. Meyer's somewhat overdrawn reaction to it, is the suggestion by Mr. Strausz-Hupé's sympathizers that any book which warns us loudly enough about the Communist menace must be regarded as sacrosanct and

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that *Problems of Communism* should keep its pages clear of any objection to the official line.

The matter is not helped by the fact that *Protracted Conflict* is an emotional and misleading book, which imperatively demands criticism as the critic frankly sees it. Strausz-Hupé *et al.* reflect the tendency of some Americans to think of the Soviet Union merely as an aggressive force to be met with force. The authors interpret the whole Communist movement in this light, while they are weak in defining ultimate Communist aims and motives. They convey a fantastic image of Communist omniscience, skill, success, and single-mindedness. They hint at radical solutions masked in obscurity—including the elimination of the democratic process in foreign-policy making, and even preventive war—this while citing democracy, morality, freedom, Western civilization, as the reasons why we should win. To win we would sacrifice all the things worth fighting for and make struggle for victory an end in itself—which is just the mentality that Strausz-Hupé and his colleagues attribute to the Communists. There are, of course, passages in the book that are not as extreme as the general impression which the whole creates, and it is relieving to note that Mr. Strausz-Hupé in his reply to Mr. Meyer falls back on these points to make his stand more reasonable.

I am not impressed by the argument that Mr. Meyer is wrong and ought to be silenced because he is out of step with the numerous public officials and reviewers who have praised *Protracted Conflict*. Such apparent unanimity over such a debatable book creates all the more need for a bold minority opinion to get some discussion going. . . .

As a contributor to *Problems of Communism* I am glad to know that its editors have refrained from any attempt to control the opinions expressed in their journal. On the basis of its fine history I feel confident that *Problems of Communism* will never subject the scholars who contribute to its pages to any such restrictions as those under which our counterparts on, say, *Novoe vremia* or the Moscow *International Affairs*, must suffer.

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I varnish reality—
I emend verses.
To reread them is astonishing:
They are compliant and tranquil,
And not only obedient
To all the laws of the land—
I meet my norm!
They correspond to the plan!

To get them into print
Through a back door
I have been commissioned
To begin
to hunt
down truth.
But for a direct road
To lead them to the ruble
I break their hands.
I hack off their legs.
I betray them utterly,
I varnish and I lie.

THE above excerpt is taken from one of a series of remarkable poems written by an anonymous Russian poet and secretly circulated throughout the USSR. Several of these poems will appear in the next issue of this journal, along with a commentary discussing the entire problem of "underground literature" in the Soviet Union. Other articles in this issue will deal with recent Soviet literary works, the conflict between "liberal" and "conservative" authors, and current attitudes of Soviet youth.

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